Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-104
Wednesday
29 May 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-104 *29 May 1996*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

ALBANIA

Albania: Berisha Assures Voters, Denounces Socialist Withdrawal *[ATA]* 1
Albania: Ministry 'Clarifies' Enforcement of Law on Meetings *[ATA]* 2
Albania: Police Prevent 'Illegal' Rally by Opposition *[Tirana Radio]* 2
Albania: PS Candidates Win in 5 Constituencies So Far *[Tirana Radio]* 3
Albania: Socialists at Shkoder Polls Remain, Sign Ballots *[ATA]* 3
Albania: Socialists Urge 'Peaceful Resistance' to 'Dictatorship' *[ZERI I POPULLIT 29 May]* 3
Albania: OSCE Says Elections Marred by 'Irregularities' *[AFP]* 5
Albania: Press Analyzes Possible Composition of Parliament *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 28 May]* 5
Albania: 6 Parties Refuse To Recognize Election Results *[ATA]* 6
Albania: Cabinet Creates Council for Labor, Social Problems *[ATA]* 6

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Editor on IMF Terms, Changes in BSP *[DUMA 29 May]* 7
Bulgaria: Doctor Offers To Testify in The Hague for Serbs *[TANJUG]* 8
Bulgaria: Closure of Defense Industry Plants Opposed *[DUMA 27 May]* 8

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Slovenia's Kucan Meets Havel, Praises Relations *[LIDOVE NOVINY 224 May]* 10
Czech Republic: Klaus Views Relations With Germany *[Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 27 May]* 10

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Government Approves Economic Accord With Cuba *[Bratislava Radio]* 12
Slovakia: Minister Addresses Meeting of Defense Officials *[OBRANA 25 May]* 12
Slovakia: 'Full Text' of Lexa Report on SIS *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 23 May]* 12
Slovakia: International Press Institute Protests Lexa Speech *[SME 25 May]* 20
Slovakia: Journalists Protest 'Intimidation' by SIS *[SME 27 May]* 20

HUNGARY

Hungary: Opposition Demands Defense Minister's Dismissal *[Budapest Radio]* 21
Hungary: Horn Supports Defense Minister in MiG Dispute *[Budapest Radio]* 21
Hungary: Survey Gauges Support for EU Membership *[HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 25 May]* 21
Hungary: Foreign Debt Decreases, Domestic Debt Increases *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 28 May]* 23
Hungary: 'Scandal' of Surveillance of Minorities Examined *[TANJUG]* 24
Hungary: Army Plans To Rent Firing Ranges to Foreign Troops *[HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 25 May]* 24

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Commentary Views International 'Anti-Karadzic Campaign' *[GLAS SRPSKI 25-26 May]* 26
B-H: ONASA: Only by Force Can IFOR Remove Karadzic *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 25 May]* 26
B-H: Serb Official: Karadzic Agreement Relatively Satisfying *[AFP]* 27
B-H: NATO's Solana Denies Agreement on Karadzic's Future *[AFP]* 27
B-H: Sources Say Karadzic Possibly Facing 'Physical Liquidation' *[DELO 27 May]* 28

B-H: Daily Urges Arrest of Karadzic, Mladic *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 24 May]* 28
B-H: Bildt on Karadzic's 'Provocative' Attempts To Retain Power *[AFP]* 29
B-H: Serbs in Australia Support Karadzic, Mladic *[SRNA]* 29
B-H: Plavsic Comments on 21 May Meeting With Milosevic *[GLAS SRPSKI 24 May]* 29
B-H: Serb Commentary Criticizes Milosevic's 'Fickleness' *[GLAS SRPSKI 25-26 May]* 30
B-H: Commentary Protests Accusations of Serb 'Isolationism' *[Pale TV]* 31
B-H: Pale TV Criticizes Hague Tribunal, Cites Late Serb General *[Pale TV]* 32
B-H: Muratovic: War Criminals' Removal Electoral Precondition *[BH PRESS]* 33
B-H: SDA Endorses Muslim Participation in Mostar Elections *[BH PRESS]* 33
B-H: Kljuc Commission Objects to OSCE Election Rules *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
B-H: Poll Shows Majority Believe IFOR Can Arrest Karadzic *[DNEVNI AVAZ 24 May]* 34
B-H: Stolac Bosniaks Say IFOR, UNHCR 'Too Incompetent' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
B-H: IFOR Tactical Command Moves to Prijedor *[TANJUG]* 35
B-H: Muratovic Addresses Bosnian Assembly on Dayton Agreement *[BH PRESS]* 35
B-H: Herzeg-Bosnia Government Reorganized Into 6 Ministries *[Zagreb Radio]* 36
B-H: Government To Resettle Bosniaks in Serb Houses *[AFP]* 36
B-H: Muslim Refugees Prevented From Visiting Homes in Stolac *[AFP]* 37
B-H: Soljic Writes Army HVO Generals on Fojnica Arrests *[BH PRESS]* 37
B-H: Air Force Commander Describes Peacetime Objectives *[Tuzla Radio]* 37

CROATIA

Croatia: Tudjman Delivers Speech at Presidential Council *[Zagreb Radio]* 39
Croatia: Tudjman Says Armed Forces Need To Resist Pressures *[Zagreb Radio]* 39
Croatia: Tudjman Addresses Troops on Armed Forces Day *[Zagreb Radio]* 40
Croatia: Human Rights Group Calls Serbs' Situation 'Alarming' *[AFP]* 40
Croatia: Beli Manastir Assembly Rejects Chairman's Resignation *[Beli Manastir Radio]* 41
Croatia: HDZ To Sue Weekly for Libel *[Zagreb Radio]* 42

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: Butrus-Ghali Views Petition for Early Elections *[MIC]* 43
FYROM: Rehn Advises Albanians To Study in Tirana *[MIC]* 43
FYROM: Skopje Refuses To Join Meeting in Sofia *[MIC]* 43
FYROM: Gligorov May Meet Greek President in Jun *[MIC]* 43
FYROM: Trends Toward Radicalization Among Albanians *[VECER 25-26 May]* 44
FYROM: Party Identities, Orientations Analyzed *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 28 May]* 45
FYROM: Socialist Party Elects Ljubisav Ivanov as Head *[MIC]* 47
FYROM: Socialist Party Chairman Criticizes Government *[TANJUG]* 48

POLAND

Poland: Paper Reveals Vatican Confidential Letters *[NIE 23 May]* 49
Poland: Reaction to NIE Publication of Vatican Letters *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 23 May]* 52
Poland: Church Official on Concordat, Constitution *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 24 May]* 52
Poland: Weekly Views Polish Church Moves To Reform *[WPROST 19 May]* 54
Poland: Coalition Leaders Deny Split *[Warsaw TV]* 56
Poland: Politicians View Early Parliamentary Elections *[TRYBUNA 28 May]* 57

ROMANIA

Romania: PRM's Tudor Launches 'Most Venomous' Attack on Iliescu *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 22 May]* 59
Romania: Iliescu Declares PRM's Tudor 'Nonexistent' *[JURNALUL NATIONAL 24 May]* 60
Romania: PD's Roman Stresses Need To Join NATO *[AZI 16 May]* 60

Romania: Roman Urges Mures Inhabitants To Vote Wisely *[AZI 27 May]* 62
Romania: PDSR President Favors Ties to PUNR After Split *[JURNALUL NATIONAL 25 May]* 62
Romania: Daily Warns of Moldovan Secret Service Disinformation *[ROMANIA LIBERA 23 May]* .. 64

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: Watts 'Concurs With' Slovene Stance on SFRY Division *[Ljubljana Radio]* 66
Slovenia: EU Associate Membership Feared To Become Casualty *[Ljubljana Radio]* 66
Slovenia: Privatization To Be Finished by End of Year *[DNEVNIK 15 May]* 66
Slovenia: Law on Audit Agency Declared Constitutional *[DELO 18 May]* 67

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Belgrade Does Not Want IMF Membership Interrupted *[TANJUG]* 69
FRY: FRY, Russian Deputies Urge Aid for Bosnia *[TANJUG]* 69
FRY: 'Anonymous' Terrorism in Kosovo Reported *[SRPSKA REC 6 May]* 69
FRY: Serbian Extremists Implicated in Kosovo Events *[SRPSKA REC 6 May]* 72

Serbia

Serbia: Karadzic 'Not Seen' at Meeting With Milosevic *[AFP]* 73
Serbia: Interest Asserted in All Forms of Economic Cooperation *[TANJUG]* 74

Montenegro

Montenegro: Yugoslav Left Party Holds First News Conference *[TANJUG]* 74

Albania: Berisha Assures Voters, Denounces Socialist Withdrawal

AU2805195096 Tirana ATA in English 2139 GMT 27 May 96

[Report by A. Sakja, F. Vladi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 27 (ATA)—President of the Republic Sali Berisha and Chairman of the Democratic Party [PD] of Albania Tritan Shehu held a news conference on Monday [27 May] midday at the Palace of Congresses about the development of elections in Albania.

"I would like to greet the Albanian electors for the historic verdict of May 26th. I express my conviction that with this verdict they separated the history, voted for their future, for Albania to have its place in the West," said Berisha before local and foreign reporters, the observers who attended the elections and the diplomatic corps.

Berisha expressed gratitude for all those who voted for the Democratic Party's alternative and assured them that the PD will use their trust to fulfill their goals, ideals and aspirations for which they gave their votes.

Berisha also expressed respect for all those who voted for the alternative of the opposition.

"I would like to guarantee these electors that their votes will be fully and wholly respected. They will have their own seats in the Albanian Parliament, despite the absurd decision of that political group, which, after the people's verdict, decided to pull out of the Albanian political scene.

"I would like to give my word to all those who voted against the PD that we will try to reconsider from another dimension and read clearly their vote against us. With the Sunday's [26 May] vote, all won, except a group of Marxists, who deserve the complete failure," said Berisha.

Berisha said that May 26th was a great festivity for all Albanians, and, also for all foreign observers who consider the Marxist ideology a doctrine of totalitarianism.

"I would ask those who may favour their Marxism not to consider their Marxism equal to the Albanian one because they completely differ from each other. Maybe, Marxism for them is a theory of libraries, an academic theory. For the Albanians it is the doctrine of great misfortunes in their history, the doctrine of severe oppression, of extreme poverty, of the deepest isolation," Berisha said.

He stressed that Albanians voted on Sunday for the PD because they paid homage to the attained freedoms, the freedoms they enjoyed during the last four years.

"Never before in the national history have we, the Albanians enjoyed a greater solidarity than during the last four years from Europe, the United States and other friendly countries," Berisha said.

He stressed that when it is about the "Marshal" plan, Eastern countries often complain why this plan was not undertaken for them as well.

"I would like to say that Albania has had a 'Marshal' plan. This is how I consider the extraordinary assistance from Europe, the U.S. and other friendly countries for Albania over the last four years," said President Berisha.

He stressed that on Sunday Albanians did not vote only for what they have realised over the last four years but, above all, they voted for what they will realise in the next four years.

"Our programme was simple, we declared its essence in 1993: Albania—example of fast development. When we declared this as an objective, the skeptics laughed. But, for three years in succession, Albania has had the highest economic growth in Eastern Europe. Its guarantee is the anchor of salvation for Albanians, is a compensation for the lost 50 years time," Berisha said.

Referring to the PD victory, Berisha said that the PD motto in this campaign was: to win every vote and in every constituency.

"We went from one village to the other, from one city to the other, stopped on our way and met people on buses, on streets and everywhere. We could not enter their homes but tried to enter their hearts.

"On the other side, we have prepared the best electoral programme and have presented the best candidates in the Albanian history," said Berisha.

Berisha said in the meantime that the red front, "in its utmost craziness," replaced reformers with Enverists, first class intellectuals with political gangsters, and introduced to the Albanian electorate the candidates of the Albanian Party of Labour of 1991.

Berisha thanked the Italian president, the NATO general secretary, the chairman of the Austrian People's Party, for their visit to Albania, in support of the PD and its policy. He also expressed gratitude for the great friends of Albanians and their democracy, President Jacques Chirac, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, President Klestil, and many others who brought their representatives here in support of the PD alternative in these elections.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Albania: PS Candidates Win in 5 Constituencies So Far

AU2805192696 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1730 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Central Election Commission [KQZ] just issued a press communique for domestic and foreign correspondents who are observing the elections on the latest results received from the constituencies that have handed their voting records to the KQZ. KQZ Secretary Kreshnik Spahiu told Radio Tirana:

[Spahiu] So far, there has been an increase in the voting records coming from constituencies to the KQZ. At this moment, we have at hand the voting records from 78 constituencies. Apart from the constituencies in which Democratic Party [PD] candidates have won, Socialist Party [PS] candidates have won in five constituencies, specifically in Constituency 91 in Corovode, Constituency 102 in Tepelene, Constituency 72 in Librazhd, Constituency 88 in Berat, and Constituency 70 in Gramsh. A candidate for the Human Rights Union has won in Constituency 114 in Sarande.

Also, 10 constituencies—specifically Constituency 99 in Pogradec, Constituency 108 in Vlore, Constituency 67 and 68 in Elbasan, Constituency 111 and 112 in Gjirokaster, Constituency 110 in Permet, Constituency 71 in Librazhd, Constituency 97 in Korce, and Constituency 20 in Mirdite—will have further balloting. According to the law, the second round of elections will be held in these constituencies on 2 June 1996.

The KQZ members are examining and discussing the regularity and exactness of the election results in four other constituencies. The KQZ is continuing its work.

Albania: Socialists at Shkoder Polls Remain, Sign Ballots

AU2805151396 Tirana ATA in English 1037 GMT 28 May 96

[Report by M. Malja]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Shkoder, May 28 (ATA)—At the time when voting on May 25 was going on normally and without problems in the district of Shkoder and when the election commissions in the eight constituencies there had not any complain by commission members of Socialist Party [PS] and other opposition parties, quite of a sudden, by an order from high instances, representatives of these parties pulled out of elections. But not all of the PS members in the polling stations left. Hence, seven process-verbaux have been signed by election commissions members of PS and other opposition parties in the 9th constituency, while in the 3d, 4th, 5th and 6th constituencies these representatives have signed respectively 10, 9, 10 and 11 election process-verbaux.

While leaving, many commission members by opposition parties in the polling stations, highlighted the normal process of elections.

Albania: Socialists Urge 'Peaceful Resistance' to 'Dictatorship'

AU2905102996 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 29 May 96 p 2

["Statement" issued by the Socialist Party in Tirana on 28 May: "No to the Dictatorship! We Will Win. Long Live Genuine Democracy!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At about 1200 [1000 GMT] today, 28 May 1996, representatives of the entire opposition went to Skenderbeg Square to peacefully demonstrate in a democratic fashion, but Berisha's state police, the National Intelligence Service [ShIK], and gangs of hooligans and vandals enacted a preplanned scenario of unprecedented violence.

Police units with shields, rubber truncheons, and other instruments assaulted the representatives of the opposition, beating them bestially and striking some of them with such force that their lives were in danger.

The savage violence did not spare the best-known opposition figures and parliamentary candidates of the entire opposition, but was aimed on purpose against them.

We are telling the entire public at home and abroad that those struck and beaten included Servet Pellumbi, who has serious injuries to his head and body, Namik Dokle, Arta Dade, Ndre Legisi, Ermelinda Meksi, Pandeli Majko, Halil Lalaj, Mojkom Zeqo, Agim Fagu, Musa Ulqini, Enver Ruci, Alfred Paloka, and Bardhyl Agasi. Arben Imami, Prec Zogaj, Neritan Ceka, Gramoz Pashko, Blendi Gonxhja, Ridvan Peshkepia, Skender Gjinushi, Paskal Milo, Gaqo Apostoli, Shahin Kadare, and a number of candidates for deputy in the 26 May elections were savagely beaten up.

Citizens, members and supporters of the opposition, especially women, young people, and the elderly were beaten, covered with blood, and detained at Tirana police stations.

In this abnormal situation, the police encircled and besieged the Socialist Party [PS] building with police and ShIK personnel, while the powerful joint demonstration of the opposition continued on the premises of the PS headquarters and at key points on the city streets. All this repression took place in the presence of foreign

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

journalists, some of whom did not escape the beatings and physical violence.

The PS Presidium calls on its electorate and the entire people throughout Albania to reflect on what has happened, to continue peaceful resistance and democratic protest and not to recognize the elections of 26 May, which Berisha's regime and leadership turned into a farce and a rape of democracy in Albania.

The PS Presidium appeals for genuine democracy against Berisha's neodictatorship, which threatens an appalling disaster for the future of the nation and for basic human rights and freedoms. Any regime built on stolen votes and police violence is illegitimate. The Albanian people will never allow themselves to be plunged into dictatorship and chaos. Direct responsibility for this situation falls on Berisha and on those who have encouraged him in this antidemocratic and illegal scenario. Responsibility falls on all those sections of the state, the police, and the ShIK who, in contravention of the law, have been serving Berisha's illegal scenario of usurping power.

The opposition's decision not to recognize the validity of the electoral farce shows that it was the forces of the opposition who calmly and with democratic insight avoided the confrontation planned by Berisha that would have led the country into total instability. In front of the Albanian people and the entire world, the opposition calls for peace, stability, and understanding in the country.

Meanwhile, Berisha's regime, in its total insanity and sensing that it is increasingly isolated from the people and has lost their support, has turned down a blind alley and has absolutely no future.

Now, at the end of the 20th century, it is utterly clear that dictatorships have no future.

The PS and other opposition parties that have opposed Berisha's putsch are trying to find a political solution that will be as democratic as possible, so that the people's disillusionment in Berisha's regime, which shamelessly stole the people's votes, will not be turned into total disillusionment in democracy.

The PS urgently demands the annulment of the electoral farce and the holding of new and genuinely free and democratic elections under the supervision of the Council of Europe and the United States. This is the sole democratic and legitimate way in which the political parties can mediate between the people and the state in order to achieve democracy in the teeth of dictatorship. This is the essence of the basic message of the PS and the opposition, "Together with us for genuine democracy."

We appeal to the honest electorate of the Democratic Party, the police, and the ShIK, and all honest citizens everywhere in Albania to raise their voices and not allow their Albanian brothers of the opposition to shed their blood, to dissociate themselves urgently from violence and from Berisha's dictatorship, and to show civil courage, honesty, and historical responsibility in order not to allow members of the opposition and other citizens of Albania to be struck at the blind whim of Berisha's untrammelled personal power.

We appeal to the institutions of Europe, the world, and the United States to assess with the utmost seriousness the critical situation that is arising and is destabilizing not only Albania but possibly the region.

Berisha is not bringing stability. On the contrary, as a result of his political bravado and his personal dictatorial power and that of his clan, he is risking the stability of the whole of Albania and the region.

Democracy in Albania will never be defeated, because the Albanian people will never be defeated.

Berisha's dictatorship will not live long.

Albanian people!

The question is not just one of a political struggle between the opposition and Berisha but of the life of each citizen in genuine democracy. This is an essential issue that genuinely transcends the parties.

It is a question of the future of the nation and the triumph of its aspirations for freedom, genuine democracy, progress, and dignity.

No to dictatorship! We will win. Long live genuine democracy!

We demand:

1) The annulment of the violated elections, and free elections.

2) The resignation of the prime minister, the public order minister, and the deputy minister, who himself directed operations and struck at opposition deputies and leaders.

3) The resignation of the director of Radio-Television which broadcast disinformation about today's events.

4) The immediate lift of the siege of the PS building and an end to the pursuit and persecution of opposition members and supporters. All those detained by the police must be released.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Albania: OSCE Says Elections Marred by 'Irregularities'

AU2905102196 Paris AFP in English 1003 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, May 29 (AFP)—The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] on Wednesday [29 May] said that weekend elections in Albania were marred by widespread irregularities that included altering voter registers and fixing the number of votes.

"During the counting process observers noted several instances where the voter register was altered to bring it in line with the number of votes cast," the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights said here in a statement.

"In some polling stations the number of ballots cast exceeded the number of signatures on the voter register," it added. "Also, there were widespread reports of the alteration of ballots to make them invalid."

The OSCE had sent 23 teams of observers to Albania to observe the Sunday vote along with other international and domestic observers who have also declared that the elections were fraudulent.

President Sali Berisha's ruling Democratic Party has claimed an overwhelming victory in the poll over the opposition Socialist Party which pulled out from the vote along with five other parties hours before the polls closed Sunday.

Albania: Press Analyzes Possible Composition of Parliament

AU2805135096

[FBIS Report] Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian on 28 May carries on page four three 300-word unattributed reports under the general headline, "Only 25 Members of the Opposition in Parliament?"

The first report states: "Only 25 members of the opposition in the parliament? Preliminary results provide this picture of the Albanian political arena, which will apparently be overwhelmingly dominated by the blue of the Democrats. Reports from the Democratic [PD] stated yesterday that 101 candidates have won their mandates. On the basis of reports and calculations from the PD claiming a victory of more than 60 percent, 15 more Democrats from the proportional lists will take their seats in parliament.

"Although with only a slightly higher percentage than in the 22 March [1992] elections, the Democrats will have a significantly higher representation in the parliament as a result of the Electoral Law. A balance more in favor of first-past-the-post candidates as opposed to proportional representation gives an advantage to the party winning seats rather than gaining a percentage of votes nationwide. The size of the percentage does not have a great influence on the number of deputies entering the parliament.

"While the PD candidates are now more or less known, a question mark still hangs over those of the opposition. Their decision to withdraw has been accompanied by total indifference to the election results. They say that even after the official conclusions to be given by the Central Electoral Commission, nobody will appear to take up the few seats remaining in the parliament."

The second report, under the headline, "No Legal Provision for a Boycott," states: "The Albanian Electoral Law cannot comment on the situation created by the withdrawal of all the candidates proposed by the opposition parties that have not recognized the election results. It has only provided for one similar circumstance. Article 18 of the law states that if a candidate is withdrawn by the party that has proposed him, withdraws his candidacy, or dies after having been registered by the constituency electoral commission, the relevant party may propose another candidate if such a thing occurs no later than seven days before election day. If a candidate withdraws during the seven days before the election, the party may put forward a candidate from the proportional lists in his place. No legal solution can be provided for the situation created after the total withdrawal of the candidates of a number of opposition parties that do not recognize the election results. The law does not provide for developments of this kind."

The third report, under the headline "Which Names Will Be on the Proportional Lists?," states:

"The names of the candidates for deputy who will enter parliament on the basis of the proportional lists remain unknown. If everything is easier for the first-past-the-post candidates, in that the candidate obtaining more than 50 percent of the valid votes in the first round wins, the problem of the proportional lists is more complicated. The Albanian Electoral Law lays down that 25 additional mandates will be distributed among the electoral participants that gained more than 4 percent of the votes in the first round. This is if the party has entered the campaign on its own. If an election front has been formed by two parties, the level of the threshold rises to eight percent, and so on.

"The ballot paper offered the Albanians a double form of vote, for an individual and for a party. The law lays down that in order to win a parliamentary seat the total number of votes cast for the parties must be calculated. The parties will receive the number of seats resulting

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

from its percentage of this total divided by 25. However, all the parties that have announced that they will not recognize the election results stated last night that they will not even agree to accept the seats due to them from the proportional lists."

Albania: 6 Parties Refuse To Recognize Election Results

AU2805155996 Tirana ATA in English 0846 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 28 (ATA)—Six Albanian parties: Socialist Party, Democratic Alliance, National Unity, Agrarian Party, Human Right Union Party, and Social Democratic Party, in a report signed by them for Albanian TV, declare they do not recognise the results of May 26 elections.

We will not take part in the parliament and demand that elections be repeated under close observation of the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the U.S., the report of the six political parties says.

Albania: Cabinet Creates Council for Labor, Social Problems

AU2805121596 Tirana ATA in English 0901 GMT 28 May 96

[Report by M. Noti]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, 28 May (ATA)—The Albanian Council of Ministers in its recent meeting approved the project for the creation of the National Council of Labor and Social Problems. Perceived as an organ that will institutionalise the relations between three social partners: the state, the employers and employees for the first time in Albania, the creation of this committee has to do with the treatment of problems of policies and legislation in the field of labor and employment, of professional training, of salaries, of insurances, and social protection.

Through this committee, the possibility of a dialogue between the government, employers and employees will be possible, realizing a social market economy.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Bulgaria: Editor on IMF Terms, Changes in BSP

AU2905112496 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 29 May 96 p 7

[Article by DUMA chief editor Stefan Prodev: "Money and Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are living under a dictate. Things are dictated from afar, namely, from the headquarters of the World Bank and the IMF. Those headquarters will help one, but only if one succumbs to their pressure. We will give you a handful of dollars, they say, but only if you comply completely with our economic will. However, their economic will is squeezing us and turning us into an obedient animal. The prime minister rejected the allegation that "pressure was applied," but Anne McGuirk did not stand on ceremony. She departed only after we had assured her that we would carry out her instructions. Those instructions resemble the servitude of prisoners. Unlike the blonde lady, Zhan Videnov tries to choose his words very carefully, which is understandable. Bulgaria urgently needs financial aid and he must find it, regardless of the cost, and even if the cost involves social suffering. What has been missed over the years must be made up for, regardless of our present possibilities. The gentlemen from the IMF are not very interested how this happens and what the sacrifices will be. They do not have hearts, only computers. Thus we were confronted with pressure from an international machine that has turned a huge part of the world into its hostage. Now it is our turn to bend our head and enter the lion's den. Sentiments are pointless in this case. We must either obey, or we will perish. There is no alternative. Therefore, no one should think that he is smarter than the IMF's money. They are aliens, ready to do us a favor today in order to use us tomorrow. This is their philosophy.

Unlike the prime minister, I am not a politician but a journalist, and therefore I can speak openly. The game the international financial institutions are playing with Bulgaria is not only economic but also political. Their loans pursue specific social goals. One of them is to press the government of the Democratic Left to the wall and compromise its social program. The great election successes of the leftist forces must be erased through insurmountable economic pressure. What the internal opposition could not do will be done from outside in a simple and clean manner. Let the Bulgarian people understand that the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is powerless to lead him out of the crisis, unless it succumbs to the foreign interest. This party must not harbor the illusion that it is all-powerful and can implement some of its social intentions without the consent of the West. In this context, the loans we receive from the IMF and the World Bank conceal specific political implications. They want to break our national desire to succeed and bring us to our knees. This has already happened in many places, so why not Bulgaria? In this area international capital uses all possible means. From specific amounts of money to specific suggestions. Most of all, they use the mistakes of our own government, something that provides them with easy and ready-made solutions. Had Mrs. McGuirk not found our society in its current grave situation she would have negotiated with the leftist ministers in a way that was more dignified for Bulgaria. Alas! She found us amidst chaos, and this allowed her to dictate harsh conditions.

The letter the government sent to the IMF headquarters does not promise anything good for Bulgaria. It is full of commitments, for which our people will pay dearly. No doubt, there was no other possibility. Let us not be naive. Those commitments will allow the opposition to become active. Now, on the eve of the presidential elections, it will turn them into a political weapon. Despite the polite phrase that "the reforms are of crucial importance," neither the IMF nor anyone else in the West will really try to defend the policy of the leftist government. On the contrary, with their tacit agreement our political opponents will frantically attack the BSP and the government. They will use their own failures in the last four or five years against us. This is logical because there are no ethics in politics. Those who are guilty will transfer their guilt to us. The first strikes are already evident. The prices terror, the speculation with the bread and fuel, the raging crime, the increased taxes, the banking shock, and the compromised budget, let alone the crazy dollar, are stealing our society's faith and breeding panic. The government is hanging by a thread. This is undoubtedly welcomed by all those who want to turn the Democratic Left's mistakes and omissions into hard cash and thus profit. Now is the time to strike the Democratic Left below the belt and make demands of the government, especially if one notes that the IMF's conditions aggravate our grave situation even further and indeed encourage the opposition to attack. The social commitment that we could not fulfill because of objective reasons will now bite back. It is no accident that the antisocialist forces are speculating most of all with those commitments.

The Socialists and their supporters are facing a decisive test. In the streets, they are again facing hostile glances and insults. Those who were defeated in two election campaigns are beginning to stir. The oppressive conditions imposed by Mrs. McGuirk and her friends inspire them with hope. Those conditions imply that the socialist government should not expect help from anywhere.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Somewhere in the West, the government has been condemned. However, this would not be the most terrible thing if here, in Bulgaria, we were to adopt rapid and radical measures against the maladies that are torturing us. It is high time for the BSP and the government to wake up and overcome the impotence that has engulfed them. The Socialists must act. Let the blue [Union of Democratic Forces] street say whatever it wants to say. The important thing is what our answer must be. This answer must be more than categorical. If necessary, a new social policy must be proposed, new political faces, new government solutions, and above all—a new awareness of the social commitment. All that is rotten in the party and government must be eradicated. Corruption, power ambitions, and profiteering have no place in the leftist ranks. This was said a long time ago but evidently no one was listening. The compromise with evil is impossible any longer. This is our only alternative. If we do not act, we will find ourselves naked among wolves. The people must see that they are always on our minds and we are ready for every sacrifice.

Difficult days and months lie ahead. No one will help us unless we help ourselves. Our will to govern must be combined with political and social prudence. Otherwise we will perish. Let us begin a great and sincere dialogue with society. We Socialists are the last to keep something secret from society. Let us point out those who are responsible for society's suffering—both our culprits and the others. Let us beg the people for forgiveness and trust. If we do this sincerely and directly, we will feel better and our people will feel better, because the dollar injections we will receive from the IMF are not the real salvation. They will only postpone our financial drama, but will hardly feed the people. The people will struggle themselves for their well-being. This is where we must help them. Perhaps this sounds like a populist call, but is a sincere one. Money is also politics, but politics is not only money.

Bulgaria: Doctor Offers To Testify in The Hague for Serbs

LD2805165096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1608 GMT 28 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bileca, May 28 (TANJUG)—Mikhail Nikolov, a Bulgarian doctor who treated Serb fighters during the Bosnia war as a volunteer, has sent a letter to the International War Crimes tribunal in The Hague offering to personally testify in favour of the Serb people and refute the charges against them.

'I have followed all the activities of The Hague tribunal, which is increasingly turning into a farce, and it is clear that you have serious orders and intents to, for the first time in world history, put on the dock an entire nation,' Dr. Nikolov said in the letter to prosecutor Richard Goldstone.

'I have saved hundreds of Serb lives in the recent war. In the logic of the Hague tribunal, I have saved criminals and vandals and therefore I deserve to be punished. I am at your disposal and I want to refute your absurd charges,' Dr. Nikolov said.

Bulgaria: Closure of Defense Industry Plants Opposed

AU2805133696 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 27 May 96 p 7

[Commentary by Vasil Popov: "What Do You Know About Military Music?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "What do you know about military music?" This is something we say to people who try to make a decision outside their sphere of competence. It is a saying in the category of "let it be," and "apres moi le deluge." Such catchphrases served as the basis of the practical methodology for eliminating the Bulgarian defense industry at the very beginning of the changes. Only the sheer obstinacy of several branch leaders and thousands of workers saved the branch during the period of the blue [Union of Democratic Forces] political-trade union haymaking.

Now a similar danger has emerged because of the one-sided approach in determining the plants that will be terminated. The list, published one week ago, includes enterprises of the military-industrial complex that are included on the list only because of their financial situation.

One of them has unique technologies and know-how related to the production of thermal heads of self-guiding missiles. Not a single Bulgarian neighbor has a similar enterprise. We are among the 5 percent of world states that possesses such an enterprise. Has anyone stopped the production of military aircraft fighters or missiles for shooting them down? Cutting unique production lines and selling them piece by piece will bring no profit and will set us back 30 years. Everyone can guess who will celebrate if this happens, people in arms manufacturing say bitterly.

The group of military enterprise included in the list of plants that are to be closed, are not only mutually linked, but they also supply raw materials and assembly parts for many other enterprises. Closing them down will cause the collapse of a large group of producers of arms and ammunition both for the Bulgarian Army and for export. The basic cause of the problem—the credits for

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

further constructing the mobilization capacities of the country, which the state refused to assume despite the decision on this matter parliament adopted three years ago.

Naturally, the problem involves our national security and this does not allow a public debate of all the details. However, it can be pointed out that after the envisaged elimination the army will remain without artillery shells, aircraft bombs, mincs, antitank and antiaircraft missiles, firearms ammunition, and antiaircraft artillery systems. Everything which until now we produced ourselves, successfully sold abroad, and could sell again in the future, must now be imported, including even bullets for hunting rifles.

One notes that among the enterprises listed as redundant, there are some that were completed only on the eve of the crisis. Enterprises that were just completed, with a modern technological line conceived for decades ahead, are threatened with closure, and their lines are supposed to be scrapped. True, their production does not fit NATO's caliber and standards. However, with the money that will be obtained from closing those enterprises down, we cannot rearm our army, and cannot even purchase the catalogues and brochures of similar enterprises in the West. Indeed, we are light years away from being able to purchase weapons in the West, despite the fact that some politicians are dreaming of this.

The only Bulgarian enterprise that produces special piercing instruments for the military industry, appears also to be redundant. This means—in simple terms—that we will have no instruments to produce the barrels of our guns and automatic submachine guns. Naturally, such instruments cannot be used for making holes in the wall. Smart states conserve such lines when the specific goods they produce are not sought in the markets at the moment. They keep them ready for reactivating both for the needs of their own defense, and for the case of renewed demand. Indeed, it is another matter whether demand has really decreased, or this is rather a suggestion on the part of those who want to push us aside from the markets.

On top of everything else, no one has canceled the commitment of those enterprises to satisfy specific mobilization needs. Someone again is making a hasty and unconsidered move. We are closing down our only source before we have made it clear how and from where we will satisfy the specific needs of national security and defense.

Those engaged in the arms-producing branch are proposing a competent solution, based on a differentiated approach toward those enterprises. Some must be healed, others conserved, preserving the minimum personnel needed to reactivate them if it becomes necessary. They remind us that the mechanical attitude toward closing down military enterprises will cause a chain reaction that will engulf the entire military-industrial complex.

Actually, is there a military-industrial complex in Bulgaria that has all the necessary characteristics and indices, and indeed, what do you know about military music.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Czech Republic: Slovenia's Kucan Meets Havel, Praises Relations

AU2805140596 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 24 May 96 p 3

[Article by Petr Smejkal "Ljubljana and Prague Have the Same Objectives"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovenia and the Czech Republic have identical interests with regard to incorporation into West European structures. This statement was made by Slovene President Milan Kucan, who commenced his first official state visit to the Czech Republic in Prague yesterday.

"We are not competing in terms of speed, and we welcome the incorporation of individual states," said Kucan following his meeting with his Czech counterpart, Vaclav Havel. "Slovenia has its own specific problems, however, and we are glad that the Czech Republic supports us," emphasized the Slovene guest.

Kucan described as the most major Slovene problems, first and foremost, the "Balkans syndrome"—the proximity of Bosnia and the fact that Slovenia borders on countries where there were, just recently, armed clashes—and the difficulties associated with the transition to a market economy. According to Kucan, the Czech Republic has helped the Slovene economy by assisting Ljubljana in its entry into the Central European Free Trade Associaation (CEFTA). Since that time, the mutual exchange of goods has been increasing rapidly. Last year alone, Czech exports amounted to $247 million, which is an increase of 39 percent compared with 1994. On the other hand, its imports amounted to $132 million, an increase of 59 percent. "The Slovenes do not have as long and as good relations with the other Slavic nations as with the Czechs," emphasized Milan Kucan.

As far as peace in nearby Bosnia is concerned, Kucan told LIDOVE NOVINY that the IFOR [Implementation Force] international forces will probably not leave Bosnia following the expiration of their mandate. The Dayton peace accords merely represent a suspension of the war. But, at the same time, Dayton is an important step toward peace.

In reply to a question from LIDOVE NOVINY, Kucan said that Slovene-Croatian relations represent another set of Slovenia's problems with regard to neighboring countries. These are chiefly property-related legal problems arising from the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. The course of the border on the Adriatic Sea or the issue of the Krsko nuclear power plant, whose construction was financed by Ljubljana and Zagreb, have still not been resolved.

In connection with Slovenia's endeavors to join the European Union, which, so far, have been blocked by Rome and its property-related legal claims against Ljubljana, Kucan expressed hope in the new Italian Government. According to him, it is possible to envisage that the government of Prime Minister Prodi will be more flexible. It has seemed recently that Rome is going to try to normalize relations and will no longer prevent the signing of an association agreement with the EU.

Czech Republic: Klaus Views Relations With Germany

AU2805162596 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 27 May 96 pp 144-147

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Renate Hanusova in Prague; date not given: "Charity Is Burying Morals"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Hanusova] Mr. Prime Minister, almost everywhere in Europe there is a nostalgic return to the past. Former communists are having a field day, but not in the Czech Republic. Everything suggests that you, a Conservative, will win reelection after six years in power. What is the reason for this?

[Klaus] The Czech Republic occupies a special place among the other postcommunist countries for several reasons. Democracy is deeply rooted here. Our economic reforms are proceeding faster than elsewhere, and the transformation of society here is generally more efficient and frictionless.

[Hanusova] You mean the Czechs are governed better?

[Klaus] That is something that you from abroad must judge for yourselves. But after the success of our Velvet Revolution, we immediately developed clear visions of the future. First, we wanted to set up democratic institutions such as parties, and a legal system that works. Second, we wanted a firm market economy, without any of the socialist "third way" that has had such a tragic effect on our history. To implement these objectives, we have struggled to gain the population's support. I am in a chronic election struggle, always "on the road," as the poet Jack Kerouac puts it. [passage omitted]

[Hanusova] The German Greens and the Social Democratic Party of Germany are more interested in reconciliation between Prague and Bonn than your conservative friends in the government are. Do you not yearn for a new government in Bonn?

[Klaus] No. I do not want make any electoral suggestions to the Germans nor do I want them to make any socialist experiments.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Hanusova] But does there not seem to be a problem between you and Helmut Kohl? You were in Bonn in January, and he did not even receive you.

[Klaus] I do not think we have a mutual problem. Generally, German-Czech relations are very good. But I realize that as long as we have not adopted a common declaration about the past, Herr Kohl has difficulty in coming to Prague. I believe this could have been resolved two years ago. But it has not happened to this very day.

[Hanusova] Are the Sudeten Germans the only obstacle to this declaration?

[Klaus] For sensible people who do not wish to fight old battles, all of this is not so important. People understand that it is not so important, only a few politicians refuse to do so. We want to look to the future. We do not know what we can agree upon with people who live only in the past. [passage omitted]

[Hanusova] Thank you for the interview, Mr. Prime Minister.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovakia: Government Approves Economic Accord With Cuba

LD2805163096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The 72d meeting of the Slovak Government opened today with a parliamentary proposal on the development of airports. Oto Goerner reports:

[Goerner] [Passage omitted] The cabinet agreed with the proposed agreement between the Slovak and Cuban Governments on support and mutual protection of investments. This agreement should create favorable conditions for the development of mutual economic cooperation based on higher forms of business activities. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Minister Addresses Meeting of Defense Officials

AU2805142296 Bratislava OBRANA in Slovak 25 May 96 No 21, p 1

[Report by "m": "Engineer Jan Sitek, Slovak Defense Minister: The Overall Security Situation in Europe Is Not Satisfactory and Will Not Be for a Long Time To Come"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A joint meeting of leading officials from the Defense Ministry and General Staff of the Slovak Army took place precisely in the middle of May. The objective of the meeting, which became part of the preparation by the top officials, was to acquaint them with military-political aspects in the development of international relations and cooperation in Europe, and explain the problems connected with the control system for the defense of the state.

Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek spoke at the introduction to the meeting and said, among other things: "The over three years of bilaterally beneficial cooperation between NATO and the Army of the Slovak Republic have facilitated the building of solid foundations for our common future. The following facts testify to this: We believe in the same values and accept responsibility for their defense; we are taking essential steps to achieve interoperability; we are studying the system of work of the Alliance: we are learning the methods they apply for democratic control of the army by society; and we respect the necessary correspondence of principles in building armed forces and their general supply. We particularly emphasize utilization of the possibilities offered by our participation in the Partnership for Peace plan."

In another part of his address the defense minister dealt with the issues connected with the necessity of ensuring the defense readiness of the Slovak Republic. He emphasized: "The overall security situation in Europe is not satisfactory and will not be for a long time to come, and so far there is not an effective Europe-wide security system, enshrined in international law, that is capable of providing each European state with sufficient and dependable guarantees for its security." [passage omitted]

Slovakia: 'Full Text' of Lexa Report on SIS

AU2405125896 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 23 May 96 pp 8-9

["Full text" of "Report on Work of the Slovak Information Service (SIS)," delivered by SIS Director Ivan Lexa at the 15th Session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on 22 May 1996: "President M. Kovac Was Convicted of Misusing the Secret Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the plenary session yesterday of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], Ivan Lexa, director of the Slovak Information Service [SIS], delivered a report on how the SIS fulfills its tasks. Because of the significance of the content of this report in the context of the activities of a part of the Slovak opposition, we carry the full text of the report:

Respecting your decision on the public discussion of the report on how the SIS fulfills its tasks, I was forced to change its content and some passages last week, in comparison with the document that I personally delivered on the floor of the NRSR OKO [Special Supervisory Body for the activities of the SIS] and the written text of which I passed onto its chairman.

As director of the Slovak Information Service, I am bound by law to keep silent about facts subject to state or official secret acts. Therefore, you will certainly understand my duty to observe the law, and the necessity arising from it to adjust the report for this unique and nonstandard form of presentation, of a report on the work of the secret service.

The SIS, as a Slovak state body, fulfills tasks to the extent defined in Law 46/1996 of the Code on the SIS as rendered in NRSR Law 72/1995 of the Code. It obtains, collects, and analyzes information on activities threatening the constitutional system, territorial integrity, sovereignty, or security of the Slovak Republic, on activities of foreign intelligence services, organized crime, terrorism, facts jeopardizing or damaging the economic interests of the Slovak Republic, and intelligence on threat or leaks of data subject to the state secrecy act. The Service obtains, collects, and analyzes information on activities abroad aimed against the constitutional system and security of the Slovak Republic. In addition to

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

this, the SIS fulfills tasks assigned to it by the State Defense Council, and other tasks arising from international agreements and treaties, by which the Slovak Republic is bound.

The work of the service cannot be assessed without regard to the social and political development, particularly after 1989. Like the Slovak Republic, it was established in January 1993, and its work has been marked by all the phenomena that accompanied the building of an institutional basis of the new state.

Experience and tradition were lacking, as was a long-developed personnel basis, materiel and technical equipment, and legislation. Many citizens were linking the secret service with the infamous bodies of the former regime, and especially the opposition has never ceased to reinforce these sentiments—No other institution has ever been subject to such public scrutiny and pressure by the media.

Those behind the attempts at scandalizing the SIS are not only the authors of the disinformation planned by a part of the opposition, the Christian Democratic Movement and the Slovak president in particular, who follow their own goals, but also the people who are inconvenienced by the existence of means to detect and document their dirty practices. That is one reason why they fear the truth.

Foreign Contacts Beyond Any Control

At the time of the common state of the Czechs and the Slovaks, special services were the domain of the federal monopoly. The powers of decision were there, the materiel and technical basis was there, the intelligence banks were there, the selection, preparation, and deployment of personnel were made there, and the special corps were formed there. Only weak regional subsidiaries operated on the territory of the Slovak Republic, and even that was rare.

Just a few dozen FIS [Federal Security and Information Service] agents were operating in Slovakia at the end of 1992—without the necessary intelligence experience but, as a rule, with a negative stand regarding the establishment of a sovereign Slovak state, which was reflected in their work against the national and democratic forces in the Slovak Republic.

Thus, objective difficulties accompanied the foundation of the SIS, which were caused, above all, by the absence of tradition, and a dearth of experience. Nevertheless, if I were to assess the unsatisfactory state of the service when I took over, I would not qualify it as the primary concern.

The previous work of the SIS frequently was not in accordance with the law. As an example of all these infractions, I will give the well-known, and at the time never checked into, foreign contacts of the former head of the intelligence, his publishing activities still after joining the SIS, and the contacts with a part of the political team, whereby he bypassed even the then director. It has never been clear whether the foreign intelligence he controlled obtained information for Slovak state bodies, or vice versa distributed internal state information abroad!

As is well known, the activity of the former SIS management, subservient to the Slovak president, culminated in illegal intelligence work against a parliamentary political entity, which is testified to by the renowned report by the NRSR OKO of May 1995, on the basis of which, esteemed ladies and gentlemen, Michal Kovac lost all credibility as president!

Secret Information Leak

The internal definition of service standards was in very bad shape in April 1995. Very often, police regulations—not very suitable for the specific needs of the service—were used, with some modifications. The first director, his closest associates, and practically the entire team of officials were originally either members of the police corps, or of investigation or other units of the Interior Ministry. The dominance of their police training, particularly by the men conducting intelligence work, and the shortage of agents qualified for the intelligence-gathering mission, together with the aforementioned circumstances, contributed to the apparent inability of the SIS to fulfill the tasks assigned to it by law.

Such important areas as the subversion of the constitutional foundation of the state, political and religious extremism, and the consequential sphere of economic interests remained completely without coverage.

There was a complete absence of systematic personnel work, with young, promising, and linguistically skilled people, who were successful in their civilian profession, had passed the demanding admission procedures, and completed the specialized form of expert training. The short-term training courses were conducted by foreign intelligence services, which again carries with it some definitely negative aspects.

The planned strength of the individual units of the service was achieved by an uneven hiring of people with varied professional quality—the support units staffing was excellent but the intelligence unit staffing was catastrophic. The unit specializing in foreign intelligence was only staffed by one-tenth of the men required, and

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

they were mostly people conducting the administrative, technical, economic, or support activities. The state of the protection of the service against information leaks was dismal. The people who were in charge then, and who were responsible for it, are still benefiting from it today. Numerous former agents have been instigated to violate their vow of silence. Some exploited the benevolence of the prosecution bodies, and caused a leak of top secret data, whereby they confirmed their lack of professionalism, and the justice of their dismissal.

Until the middle of 1995 there were actually no people who would act in a legal and completely documented form to benefit the SIS. Police methods, completely unsuited for intelligence work, were mechanically applied. The creation and use of information-technical resources had not even started, and the application of information-operational resources was at a bare minimum. The organizational system did not even plan staffing for some important activities assumed by law.

Financial means were used irresponsibly, inefficiently, contrary to the needs of building up the service. The absence of modern technical resources in the execution of the intelligence work contrasted with the lavish furnishing of the administrative rooms and facilities.

The distribution of the information and archival banks left by the federal intelligence services was criminally neglected. Numerous information and archival banks have not been sorted and distributed.

The situation was similar in the distribution of materiel and hardware. We received mostly incomplete, obsolete, and often useless hardware that fulfilled its role only in the accounting books.

Neither a complex automated information system, nor a classified communications system were built.

An efficient internal control at the level of service director and its units was absent. Inspections were conducted sporadically, random inspections were an absolutely unknown phenomenon, and there were no adequate disciplinary punishments adopted to amend the determined shortcomings and violation of the valid standards. Moreover, there was no correlation with the system of remuneration. Even if there were agreements with state bodies, they were of only symbolic value, cooperation assumed by law had been permanently only assumed.

The Situation After April 1995

The situation fundamentally changed after April 1995. A radical overhaul of the internal regulations controlling the operation of the service and the process of obtaining, collecting, and analyzing information began in the second half of 1995. Measures and original solutions were adopted to maintain the secrecy of the operation. We have been developing this process since then. The internal control activity has improved significantly, and is currently conducted on several levels. The results of these controls are the basis for implementing personnel, disciplinary, and organizational measures.

The system of education and training of the men, whose intelligence and other preparation we conduct ourselves, has been reassessed in the second half of 1995.

Following a series of successful talks with the central bodies of state administration, the agreements on cooperation assumed by law were signed or, as the case may be, amended, e.g., with the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family, the Ministry of Transport, Post, and Telecommunications, with the military intelligence units, and other institutions.

As SIS director, I have been fulfilling my obligations with respect to the NRSR OKO. I have attended all the sessions of the supervisory body to which I was invited, and I have submitted all the documents as requested. I last attended a meeting of the NRSR OKO in February 1996. At that session, I submitted a report on the fulfillment of tasks and the activities of the SIS. The NRSR OKO chairman receive one copy of the amended report in April 1996 and he also received other documents that NRSR OKO requested from me in accordance with law.

We have been tenaciously developing and using cooperation with intelligence services of other states. We orient ourselves toward the EU and CEFTA member states but we have replaced tourism at the state's expense as practiced by the former management by careful preparation of talks, precise formulation, and satisfaction of specific requirements.

We maintain work contacts with services of 23 states. Since April 1995, 12 working meetings at the level of service directors have taken place, three of them in Bratislava. The results of the talks are reflected particularly in a more intensive exchange of information, and we also have joint project in the works with some partner services. This cooperation includes the struggle against organized crime, international terrorism, proliferation and trade in narcotics, and money laundering.

One of the reasons for inadequate work of the service was the low standard of its intelligence work planning. The tasks defined in Law 46/1993 on the SIS are described in more detail in the Strategic Orientation of the service approved by the State Defense Council. The

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

intelligence priorities contained in the Strategic Orientation are further detailed in the individual departments of the service, which conduct intelligence work that must be preceded by a detailed analysis of these priorities. While approximately one-third of all intelligence priorities was processed only analytically in April of 1995, as early as at the end of the year, we were obtaining information to all intelligence priorities. The information output of the service for the circle of recipients defined in law has significantly increased, and that both in quantity and quality. The quantity of output more than doubled last year in comparison with the preceding period, and continues to grow.

In the process of fulfilling tasks connected with the protection of the constitutional system, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the state, the SIS obtains, collects, and analyzes data on phenomena potentially threatening democracy and the execution of state administration or, as the case may be, phenomena capable of destabilizing society or causing political and social crises. The most precarious circumstance of the situation in Slovakia is, in our opinion, the fast radicalization of political life, which is accompanied by disinformation campaigns, evoking insecurity in the citizens, and shattering their confidence in state power, its institutions, and even in the state per se. The process of fabrication and dissemination of disinformation addressed to foreign receivers goes then hand in hand with this unfortunate and terrifying radicalization, which keeps coming back like a contagious echo metamorphosed to an authentic, full-value, infallible, and objective view of foreign media, political, or economic circles.

The SIS, in accordance with its legal obligations, evaluates these facts, and determines which interest groups are in the background.

We obtain, collect, and analyze also data on politically motivated violence—be it against state representatives and constitutional officials, or other public personalities.

We register and process signals of corruption in state administration and abuse of power by constitutional officials.

Moreover, we monitor expressions of extremism connected with advocacy of territorial autonomy, nationalist and chauvinist manifestations of intolerance, racial supremacy, and religious fanaticism.

Activities of Foreign Intelligence Services

Regarding the external security of the Slovak Republic, our intelligence covers all the decisive parts of the world, which could affect the security of the republic. The region of the Balkans, geographically very close, is of particular interest. The relative calming down in this part of Europe will apparently favorably reflect also on us. From the security point of view, the solution to the Balkan crisis means not only the elimination of the refugee problem but also of the danger of the spread of Islamic extremism from Bosnia. The problem of export of crime from the states of the former Yugoslavia continues. It is to be expected that poverty in the war-devastated states, the great quantity of arms among people, and the conceivable banditry of discharged soldiers will still boost the problem.

Islamic and Arab extremism does not have a sufficient basis in Slovakia, and therefore does not yet represent a real danger. Nevertheless, it cannot be completely disregarded.

Regarding the increase in crime and the influx of foreign guest workers to Slovakia, which was to follow the termination of the visa obligation for the citizens of the Russian Federation, the pessimistic predictions have not come true.

The development in Slovakia is much more affected by various supranational and international institutions, foundations, foreign interest groups, and lobbies. The SIS monitors their activities, and assesses the objectives with which they seek in this country. In the process, we register also activities that do not correspond to the interests of the Slovak Republic: for example the exploitation of participants in expert undertakings for the purpose of information, selection of information suppliers, utilization of foreign sojourns of Slovak experts for the purpose of obtaining detailed information on the situation in the sector in which they work, etc.

The SIS pays attention to threats to the security of the state and international security through illegal proliferation of dual-use material. It obtains information on the purchase of equipment, parts, and chemicals, which could be used in the production of arms of mass destruction. The smuggling of radioactive material from Russia and Ukraine represent a particular danger. The topicality of this problem is testified to by several instances of interception both at the border and inland. We cooperate in this struggle against proliferation with foreign intelligence services.

Our geographical situation explains the increased and, it seems, somewhat nervous interest on the part of other states, and therefore also of their intelligence services. They threaten our republic by penetrating its political, economic, and security structures. The speculation on, revelation of, and thwarting of their activities comprise the task of both domestic and foreign intelligence of the SIS. We have information that they operate in Slovakia, we monitor their activities, but it is difficult to prove it because international communication is

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

basically barrier-free, and the modernization of methods of intelligence is fantastically fast. One must add to this the willingness on the part of some representatives of political, social, economic, scientific, and technical sectors to supply representatives of foreign entities with even confidential information concerning the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic.

A prominent place in the broad spectrum of interests of the present intelligence services is reserved, next to the political—especially, the so-called associative [ingerencna]—espionage, for the economic espionage, the target of which is the arms industry and the research basis of the Slovak Republic. We have also encountered instances of various representatives of foreign firms visiting our enterprises and offering cooperation, while the results are much less interesting for them than the technology, conversion or development plans, plans for obtaining foreign markets, etc.

Organized crime and terrorism are increasingly beginning to influence also the security of the population of Slovakia and its economic relations. As this is a worldwide phenomenon, it must not be underestimated. Terrorist attacks, whose original mission was to fulfill predominantly political aims, can in the future be motivated by the far more dangerous religious fundamentalism or ethnic hatred.

Organized crime groups very quickly realized the opportunities that the newly arisen situation offered them. The opening of borders facilitated their movement and the legislation, unprepared for the new conditions, guaranteed them the unusual indulgence of state bodies in the face of their unlawful activities.

The disproportionate financial gains stemming mostly from trade in drugs, stolen cars, or from organized prostitution allowed the criminal organizations to improve their structure and methods of management and contributed to a high degree of professionalism among their members. At the moment, several internationally active organized crime groups are operating in Slovakia and are directly threatening the economy, the state's foreign policy, and the security of the population. These groups come mainly from Russia, Ukraine, Chechnya, Italy, the former Yugoslavia, Albania, and China. They trade in arms and drugs, are engaged in illegal border crossings, organized prostitution, and, naturally, in laundering their unlawful profits.

The SIS is gathering information about the illegal activities of these groups and giving it to bodies responsible for criminal proceedings. To recall some cases, in the successful solution of which we played a crucial part, I can mention the thwarting of the planned escape of a prominent Calabrian mafioso, Branco D., while he was awaiting trial in the Palace of Justice, or the arrest of a number of people smugglers and persons taken across the Slovak border illegally from other states.

As for terrorism and activities preparing the ground for politically motivated violence, one cannot talk about developed forms in Slovakia yet. But in the past two years there have been cases in which certain features were reminiscent of terrorism. I am thinking, for example, of explosions in cars as an accompanying phenomenon of the power struggle in the underworld.

So far, we have not noted on the territory of Slovakia any direct international terrorist attack. For the time being, we are not a targeted country in this sphere, which does not mean, however, that we cannot become one.

The SIS is also continuously collecting information on facts that could jeopardize or damage the internal economic interests of the Republic. In this context we are focusing on the acquisition of findings about the dirty activities of the managers of some financial firms trying, through private companies, in which, in some cases, close relatives of the managers are either partners or executives, to siphon off from state enterprises parts of their financial resources and property.

A chapter of special significance is the export and import of conventional arms and weaponry that are subject to the licensing commission's supervision. In this area the SIS centers on possible fraudulent operations with end user certificates and on forgeries of customs declarations.

In the sphere of protecting state secrets, the SIS concentrates on the acquisition of findings about the possible threat to the execution of state power and to the lives of citizens of the state, as well as about negative influences on its external and internal security and economy, that could be caused by leaks of information about serious facts constituting a subject of state secret.

Purposeful Discreditation of the Slovak Republic

Allow me to inform you also about some further facts that directly or indirectly influence the state, building, and activity of the SIS. The political radicalization of society, which is connected with the activity of the president of the Slovak Republic, came to a head after the NRSR expressed no confidence in his performance in this post, based on a report by NRSR OKO, in which Slovak President Michal Kovac was found guilty of having misused the secret service in the previous period [prior to Lexa's appointment as SIS director]. Similarly, in September 1995, the Government of the Slovak

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Republic called on Michal Kovac to step down from his post. All these acts reflected a realistic assessment of Michal Kovac's performance in the presidential post, starting with March 1994, when the president significantly contributed to the fall of the legitimate government, which brought about domestic political instability and early elections in the Slovak Republic.

Michal Kovac's confrontational steps against other constitutional bodies of the Slovak Republic found their reflection in an unprecedented polarization of society and its political and social awareness. Together with the militant part of the opposition and some mass media, he has been trying, since April 1995 [when Lexa was appointed SIS director], to carry this militancy and confrontation into society also by means of the self-serving discreditation and defamation of the secret service and its representatives. The situation has gone so far that the president of the Slovak Republic himself, systematically, and without any grounds or evidence, is accusing and criminalizing the SIS as a state body, doing so even abroad. His completely unfounded and unjustified attacks call in question the constitutional foundations of our state. Acting to the detriment of our society and Slovakia's good name, Michal Kovac does not hesitate to misuse the SIS's name when trying to deal not only with his problems as statesmen, but also with his personal and family problems.

In September 1995, for example, he asked me for the first time in writing, as laid down by law, to provide specific information. In accordance with the law, I met his request and provided him with some information. He also asked me, in written form, for "information that could lead to discrediting constitutional officials." In other words, he asked me for compromising materials about you, esteemed members of parliament. I refused to meet his request and in my written reply I drew his attention to the immoral nature of his request. Some members of the NRSR OKO, too, were able to convince themselves of this fact directly in the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic.

On 9 October 1995, he told a foreign news agency, unsupported by any proof, that, I quote, "in the background of the alleged kidnapping of his son is SIS chief Ivan Lexa." On 15 November, again for a foreign news agency, he said, I quote, "he has no doubt about the participation by the SIS in the alleged abduction of his son." The insinuations reached their pinnacle in his statements of 15 February 1996, at a news conference in Bratislava, and, a few days later, in Vienna, in which he directly accused the SIS director and the SIS of having committed a criminal act. In these cases he also misused the immunity with which he is provided by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. He clearly demonstrated that, in the interest of solving his family's problems, he is capable of violating in an unprecedented manner the principles of a democratic and law-governed state, of which he is the supreme representative. In a law-governed state, the presumption of innocence applies and, when it applies to his son, it also applies to any other citizen. The results of the investigation of the alleged or, if you wish, faked kidnapping of his son have been published in the mass media. In the conclusion of his resolution the investigator writes that, I quote, "the Police Corps investigator is unable to objectively decide at present whether the criminal act of abduction abroad had really been committed or whether the kidnapping had been simulated." Countless facts are cited in the resolution. There are also other facts that are known to the public and that do not feature in this resolution—for example, the president's dubious visits to states involved in the case of his son, the withholding of documentation imported from Austria on 1 September 1995, and the failure to make available written materials for fingerprinting and criminal expert analysis, in defiance of calls by criminal prosecution bodies to do so. What is unimaginable in a democratic society is his meetings with the investigators of a case in which he was personally involved as the father of Engineer Michal Kovac Jr., his public promises of presidential amnesty to everyone who owns up to the alleged kidnapping, or his absolutely nonstandard pardon for Oskar F. [former SIS agent who confessed to have participated in the kidnapping].

In this case he demonstrated that, when his family is at issue, he is capable of forgetting the Slovak Republic, its interests, its citizens, and the presidential oath taken under the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. His appearance before the Austrian court, too, was instructive in many respects. This court ruled, predominantly on the basis of the depositions of three persons—Oskar F., who was unexpectedly brought in, Engineer Michal K. Jr., and his father, the president of the Slovak Republic—the way it did: Not to extradite Engineer Michal K. Jr. to the FRG, whose authorities had issued a valid warrant for him on suspicion of serious fraud. Michal Kovac Sr. misused his social status also at the public hearing of the Austrian court, which did not decide on whether Engineer Michal K. Jr. had or had not been abducted. I respect the decision of the Austrian court, just as I respect the resolution of the Slovak criminal prosecution bodies. I am convinced, and a great deal of circumstantial evidence supports this, that the case of Engineer Michal Kovac Jr.'s detention was just a cloak designed to conceal the Technopol case. As long as the opposition keeps attacking and criminalizing the SIS and the government—without proof, but all the more militantly—so long it is possible to keep silent about the fraud against Technopol, which is exactly what is hap-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

pening. Last week Slovak Television broadcast a documentary, whose contents were extremely interesting. The documentary points to the serious suspicion that the investigation of the Technopol case, in which, by all appearances, the son of the president of the republic plays an important role, was being thwarted. Had he not been involved in this case, the German authorities would not have issued an international warrant for him and his companions and Slovak investigating bodies would not have brought charges against them. I am not authorized to comment on this case, you can form your own opinion about it. For political reasons, the president's actions receive active support from some militant political circles and the media. Deputy Ladislav Pittner is at the head of the so-called citizens' independent investigative commission. Igor Cibula, a former high-ranking SIS functionary, is, according to his own words, an active member of this commission. How absolutely ludicrous it is to call this group of people a citizens' independent investigative commission is demonstrated by the list of some of its most active members. These include, for example, Jan Langos, chairman of the Democratic Party and former federal minister of interior; Vladimir Palko, member of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Presidium and former FIS deputy director; Juraj Kohutiar, KDH staff employee and former high-ranking FIS representative in Slovakia; and the journalist Peter Toth, son of the KDH chairman's secretary, who ran unsuccessfully on the KDH ticket for the NRSR. General Pittner is being actively assisted, furthermore, by Jozef K., former chief of the Slovak part of the FIS; Jaroslav S., former investigator who plays a controversial role in the case of Michal Kovac Jr.'s alleged kidnapping and who, at a time when he was in active police service, appeared at the news conference of an opposition political entity; Jozef S., former high-ranking functionary with the Regional Office of Investigations of the Bratislava Police Corps; Frantisek Z., former director of the Office for the Protection of Constitutional Officials; Imrich A., former high-ranking Police Corps functionary; journalists Milan Z., Ivan S., Lubomir L., and Karol W., responsible for the publication of negative articles about Slovak state bodies abroad; General Vladimir Mitro, my predecessor; and by others. Some discharged SIS members, such as Engineer Jan M., Martin O., Ondrej S., and others, are working for the commission as well.

Endeavor To Bring About a Change in the Domestic Political Situation

I am saying with all due seriousness that this is not an independent group of citizens but an organized group of former StB [Communist-era secret service], FIS, SIS, and Police Corps members and some militant, previously pro-federation, journalists, under the supervision of the KDH apparatus and leading representatives. This group even uses the methods and techniques of intelligence work that, under the law, can only be used by state agencies assigned to do this. Their attempts have been registered to illegally build networks of agents within state administration bodies. Just for illustration: Ask Mr. Igor Cibula about the firm NEW TREND or the slogan "Dominik." The aim of this illegal intelligence structure is to bring about a change in the domestic political situation in Slovakia. I do not intend to comment at any length on the wretched pamphlet that the commission has twice submitted to the public. Just one little thing. Regarding the passage in which Mr. Pittner claims that, on 31 August 1995 [the day of Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping], I was supposedly sitting in a helicopter without identification markings hovering above certain parts of Bratislava, with a transmitter in my hand, I can only recommend to the general a change in therapy: He should abandon the treatment for flat feet and have his mental functions attended to. Through several persons, this organized group is also linked with the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic. It is this group that is keeping the Oskar F.'s location a secret. A mutually interconnected network of information media, particularly Radio Free Europe, Radio Twist, the daily SME (the co-owner of the last two is the entrepreneur Jozef M., who also employs some former members of security bodies), and TV Nova (the company's co-owner is former profederation politician Fedor G., whose extended arm in Slovakia is the journalist Eugen K.) is trying to organize an antigovernment campaign, to criminalize state bodies and the government of the Slovak Republic, and to spread anti-Slovak sentiments abroad. Aside from the aforementioned journalists, this group also has its feelers in the daily PRACA—Ivan C., also known for his attempt to establish a rival news agency—and in the daily NARODNA OBRODA—through Jan F., who is Igor C.'s partner in several limited liability companies. Most recently, these people created noise by producing and distributing an inauthentic recording of an alleged conversation between the Slovak minister of interior and the SIS director. Its expert analysis points to the suspicion that a criminal act was committed. Incidentally, they are supposedly producing more of this. General Ladislav Pittner, former minister of the interior, declared in this context that he did not consider the encroachment upon human rights and freedoms and unlawful and anticonstitutional conduct to be relevant. If a former minister of interior and leader of a militant political opposition wing dares make such a claim, I cannot imagine what he would be capable of if he came to power. So far, we only have circumstantial evidence, no proofs, about these persons' links with foreign intelligence centers. I also consider remarkable the public

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

bragging by MP's Ladislav Pittner and Miklos Duray of contacts with the intelligence services of foreign states. In countries with an established democracy, such cooperation would mean their immediate resignation from the posts of constitutional officials and political death.

The attempts at self-serving discreditation of the SIS in the case of the sale of the triptych "Adoration of the Magi" are embarrassing. After all, it was not the SIS that tried, surreptitiously, secretly, covertly, and without any contract, to sell for hard currency and to take out of the country historic treasures of immeasurable value. Likewise, it was not the SIS that had forgeries of the original made. As a citizen of the Slovak Republic, I am glad that this precious piece of art and cultural heritage remained in Slovakia.

It is regrettable that the president of the Slovak Republic and the aforementioned persons are capable of misusing even a tragic accident and a family's mourning for political ends and that even some church representatives, such as Pavol Flajsik or Jan Krstitel Balazs, are becoming involved in some of these activities. This is a long way from Christianity, ethics, and the teachings of Jesus.

We avail ourselves of findings that the aforementioned organized group of former members of security forces and politicians is preparing against the SIS another provocation, as a result of which the leaders of the Catholic Church ought to turn against the SIS and the state bodies of the Slovak Republic. The basis of this provocation is to be the allegation, or fabricated evidence, that the SIS or other state bodies are working illegally against the Catholic clergy.

I remember the top secret order issued by FIS Director Stefan Bacinsky three weeks before the parliamentary elections of 1992, which decided on the establishment of the Slovak Republic. The preamble of this order reads that it must be realistically assumed that separatist, undemocratic, and nationalist forces will be victorious in Slovakia. Today, these dyed-in-the-wool federalists are again organizing the disintegration of the constitutional system of our young Slovak Republic.

Democratic Press Does Not Make Accusations Without Proof

In this social climate, and with the aforementioned factors at work, the developing SIS manages to orient itself and to erect a dam against these eroding elements. The journalistic community's standard of culture, and its militancy, exceed all foreign analogies, all cases of problems encountered by the intelligence services in surrounding states. In the years 1995-96 we registered in practically each of these countries the publication of suspicions regarding the activity of secret services. Let us recall the alleged bugging of the Spanish king, accusations leveled against the BIS [Security Information Service] in the Czech Republic that it was monitoring the activity of political parties or the leaked [BIS] secret report, the Olexy case in Poland, the suspicion that the English [as published] service was involved in taking pictures of a member of the Royal family, the alleged bugging of Japanese businessmen by the American CIA, problems concerning the alleged involvement of members of the German service in smuggling radioactive materials, or the currently debated affair of the Hungarian intelligence service, which has been accused of shadowing minorities.

The democratic press in all these countries does not raise any accusations without proofs, is not trying to break up or criminalize these agencies, but only faithfully describes verified factographic data. I recommend to our press representatives to pay heed to this. Misusing the indulgence of criminal prosecution bodies and without any proofs and facts, some militant journalists are publishing whatever comes first into their hate-filled heads. The nature of work and the level of secrecy of the activity of persons and of other facts related to the work of every secret service in the world establish conditions for their vulnerability to the media. I do not know of any director of an intelligence service who would engage in polemics with the mass media, who would refute each claim or statement made by representatives of the press. This simply is not possible if he wants to act professionally. However, I do not know of any state that would tolerate such a degree of militancy among a part of the journalistic community, including, for instance, the publication of the names of the intelligence service's members or technical devices, or the publication of lies about it, as is the case in our country.

Since 1989 there has not been a single case of criminal punishment of a nonprofessional former member of the intelligence service or a journalist who consciously and demonstrably published facts constituting the subject of a state and official secret, or who published expressed lies. On the one hand, we can boast about this before the democratic world but, on the other, such indulgence is damaging to the interests of the Slovak Republic.

I have familiarized you with the state of the SIS and the tasks it is fulfilling. I have not dodged even the unpleasant, though transitory, problems that it is running up against. I am convinced that this state agency is, and will remain, a guarantee and protector of the state interests of the Slovak Republic and its citizens. In conclusion, allow me to publicly convey thanks to, and express recognition for, all SIS members, who are carrying out difficult and demanding work for the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

benefit of the interests of the state security of the Slovak Republic and its citizens, often at the expense of their families, health, and lives.

Slovakia: International Press Institute Protests Lexa Speech

AU2805161696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 25 May 96 p 7

[CTK report: "International Press Institute in Vienna Protests Against Ivan Lexa's Speech"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna—In a letter addressed to Prime Minister Meciar yesterday, the Vienna-based International Press Institute (IPI) expressed concern over attacks on the media contained in the recent speech by Ivan Lexa, chief of the intelligence service, to parliament. In particular, the IPI drew attention to Lexa's statement that some Slovak information media are helping the so-called independent commission investigating the kidnapping of the president's son, Michal Kovac, to "create an anti-Slovak atmosphere." The commission is headed by Christian Democratic leader Ladislav Pittner. In this context Lexa expressly named Radio Free Europe, the independent daily SME, the private station Radio Twist, and Czech television station NOVA. In its letter the IPI resolutely protests against Lexa's threats that "journalists publishing state secrets or spreading lies cannot reckon with leniency." The IPI, which, according to its own data, represents the media of 85 countries, works toward the freedom and safety of journalists and the possibility to spread ideas freely.

Slovakia: Journalists Protest 'Intimidation' by SIS

AU2805161396 Bratislava SME in Slovak 27 May 96 p 2

[Report by "r": "Commission of Slovak Syndicate of Journalists Concerned About Lexa's Accusations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Syndicate of Journalists (SSN) Commission for the Protection of Journalists' Rights dismissed as completely unfounded and untrue the words of Slovak Information Service [SIS] Director Ivan Lexa in the Report on the SIS Activity, in which he accused some media and specific journalists of criminalizing state bodies and the government and of spreading lies abroad. "The Commission regards the fact that these accusations were raised by the secret service director as intimidation. It also considers intimidating Ivan Lexa's statements about the alleged abuse by journalists of the indulgence of criminal prosecution bodies, which presage possible future prosecution of journalists by these bodies," reads a statement signed by J. Baranek, chairman of the Commission. In case of necessity, the Commission is determined to make use of the assistance of international journalists' organizations and of organizations for the protection of human rights.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Hungary: Opposition Demands Defense Minister's Dismissal

LD2805114696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0700 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The debate continues in parliament on the participation of Hungarian fighter aircraft in foreign military exercise without permission. Andras Kerekes reports from parliament:

[Kerekes] Despite Prime Minister Gyula Horn's explanation, the opposition still insists on the dismissal of Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti because he is politically responsible for what happened; he was either negligent in his duty as a minister or he intentionally covered up the violation of the Constitution. The opposition still blames the minister for trying to cover up everything when the news broke about the events.

Gyorgy Keleti wants to wait for the Constitution to be interpreted in this case, because at the moment it is unclear whether parliament's special permission is needed even for soldiers to go abroad on language courses or religious pilgrimages. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Horn Supports Defense Minister in MiG Dispute

LD2805142396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In a preagenda contribution this morning, Prime Minister Gyula Horn briefed parliament about the unauthorized participation of MiG-29's in a military exercise in Poland. The Defense Ministry's main division command for aviation and air defense and a deputy state secretary were negligent for failing to check whether constitutional conditions had been met for the aircraft's participation in a foreign exercise. What is more, they did not inform the minister or the state secretaries about the issue. He did not mention any names.

Gyula Horn again expressed support for his defense minister. He said he agreed that an inquiry should be carried out by the Defense Committee, also with regard to the fact that there had been three similar incidents during the term of the previous government. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Survey Gauges Support for EU Membership

AU2805153796 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 25 May 96 pp 62-63

[Report by Endre Hann: Survey on the Membership—EU-phoria]

[FBIS Translated Text] The vast majority of the Hungarian population supports the country's membership in the EU—this is the most important result of the survey recently carried out among 1,200 people by the Median Public Opinion and Market Research Institute, commissioned by HETI VILAGGAZDASAG. If a referendum was held in the near future on this issue, it would probably be successful and would decide in favor of membership with a large majority. One of the reasons for the broad support might be the fact that people are not aware of the probable disadvantages of membership.

The public is very interested in the thought of joining the EU, 69 percent of the questioned people claim that they have at least thought about this issue. The vast majority would support the entry; if we express the answers on a scale of 100 with 0 meaning complete rejection by all replies and 100 meaning complete acceptance by all replies, we get an average score of 71. The break-line of the rejection of support does not coincide with any kind of party political division: Only the Independent Smallholders Party's [FKGP] supporters oppose Hungary's possible EU membership in a greater than average proportion, but the supporters are in the majority even among them.

Sociological differences appear to be more significant in forming opinions on membership. Analysis of the replies shows that the EU's attraction is lower among people with a low level of schooling, older people, and those living in the provinces. In spite of these differences, the "European thought" has a majority in all social groups. Presumably the supposition that our possible membership will have more advantages than disadvantages lies in the background of the broad support.

The research was extended to certain concrete problems relating to EU membership, problems in which politicians and the public are interested. Obviously, at the moment, these issues are still more theoretical for the majority of Hungarian citizens, and they are only linked with the generally attractive notion of Europe in the minds of a few people. In spite of this, the proportion of uncertain answers was only a few percent; judging from the proportion of the "I do not know" answers, the possibility of terminating the forint seemed to have astonished people most, but even in this issue—which probably is emotionally charged for many—those who were willing to accept it were in the majority.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Only those expected consequences of EU membership were met with broad antagonistic feeling which relate to the "foreigners'" rights—namely to take up employment and freely buy property. Regarding the latter, potential voters of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] have bigger reservations than supporters of the other parties. At the same time, it is noteworthy with how much general positive expectation people look toward the possible effects of the EU-dictated competition and the strict West European food standards: The "average" person probably only associates the positive consequences, mainly a better quality of goods, with the Western challenge and does not tend to think about the more controversial effects.

It is hardly surprising that, out of the EU membership's expected consequences, the clearly advantageous ones create a positive reaction with the majority of people. Opinions on the possibility of foreign purchase of property and land somewhat stands out of line: Mainly due to their own financial limits, many people see this "freedom" with expressed antagonism, or at least with indifference.

In accordance with the generally positive expectations to do with the country's EU membership, more than half of the questioned people claim that they would definitely participate in a referendum on this issue (this is 4 percent more than the proportion calculated also at the end of April by Median on the intention to vote at parliamentary elections "next Sunday"). Although it is not planned to hold this kind of referendum in the near future, should there be one, according to the indications, a sweeping majority would support membership.

Would you support Hungary's EU membership in the near future?

	Percent
Would thoroughly support it	38
Would support rather than oppose it	32
Would oppose rather than support it	12
Would completely oppose it	4
Do not know	14

Support for EU Membership in Various Social Groups (on a scale of 100)

Schooling		Place of Residence		Age		Party Preference	
Fewer than eight classes	64	Village	69	Over 60	68	FKGP	65
Eight classes	70	Town in province	71	50-59	69	MSZP	73
Middle school	76	Budapest	76	40-49	73	Alliance of Free Democrats	73
University	76			30-39	71		
				18-29	76	Civic Opposition	78

[Passage omitted]

If a referendum were soon to be held on EU membership, would you attend and how would you vote?

	Percent
Would definitely attend	55
Would definitely not attend	10
Uncertain	35
Would vote yes	85
Would vote no	10
Do not know	5

What would Hungary's EU membership involve?

	Percent
Only advantages	11
More advantages than disadvantages	37
Advantages and disadvantages would balance	25
More disadvantages than advantages	12
Only disadvantages	3
Does not know	12

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Hungary: Foreign Debt Decreases, Domestic Debt Increases

AU2905113096 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 28 May 96 p 11

[Report by "E.J.": "Foreign Debt Has Decreased, Domestic Debt Has Increased"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the first quarter the net foreign debt of the government and the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] decreased by $400 million, but the budget's gross "domestic" debts increased by 126 million forints. While repayments were being made abroad, even advanced repayments, domestic burdens of the past in the form of devaluation losses, debts taken over from the social insurance, and consolidation bonds have been accumulating.

The payment for the yen-bonds (40 billion yen, which is some $380 million) issued last year was received in January, the MNB's flash report says. However, in February some of an ECU260 million [European currency units] ($320 million) loan taken up in 1991 from the EU was repaid, and in the first two months, more than $200 million of advance payments were also made. This is the main reason that, according to latest information, the MNB's foreign currency reserves decreased from $12 billion at the end of 1995 to $10.8 billion by the end of March. The other consequence is that the foreign debts themselves decreased much more than the balance of the debts and demands: At the end of the quarter, the MNB and the government owed a gross $21.5 billion abroad, which means that its gross debt decreased by $1.7 billion compared to the end of last year; its net debt amounted to $10.1 billion at the end of the quarter, which is a $0.4 billion decrease. According the MNB's calculations, $0.3 billion of the latter can be attributed to cross rate changes (and the strengthening of the dollar), therefore, the actual reduction of debt amounts to some $100 million.

In the meantime, commercial banks and enterprises somewhat increased their foreign indebtedness; they owed their partners some $4.9 billion at the end of March. The nearly $0.9 billion of proprietary loans is added to this; the increase is $140-150 million compared to the end of 1995. This way, the proportion of the state sector in the country's indebtedness continued to decrease; its share of the net debts was 69 percent in December and 67 percent in March.

This means that, although gradually, the state is withdrawing from the foreign debt; the situation of the "domestic" debts which continued to grow in the first quarter is different. (Domestic is in quotes because a large section of the state debt—nearly two-thirds of it at the end of 1995—is owed to the central bank.) The central budget's total gross debt was 4.735 trillion forints at the end of 1995 and 4.861 trillion forints (74 percent of the expected GDP) at the end of March, within this, the interest-bearing "domestic" debt increased from 2.392 trillion to 2.571 trillion forints, and the budget paid 145 billion forints of interest on this.

The deficit-financing debt increased by 57 billion forints in the first three months (49 billion of this in the form of treasury bills), and the "other" interest-bearing debts increased by 153 billion. Within the latter, the biggest item is the conversion of the non-interest-bearing debt—resulting from devaluation—to bonds [kotvenyesites] to the value of 101 billion on 28 February (which was recently followed by another 315 billion). Mezobank, which took in Agrobank, was fitted out with 9 billion [forints] of bonds marked 2016/B, and the budget incurred another 16.5 billion debt through taking over the 1993 debts of social insurance. The assumption of the social insurance debt does not mean an increase of the gross debt, it only means that the debt which was previously financed by treasury bills has now been moved across to the "other" column.

Although the non-interest-bearing debt is constantly growing because of the devaluations, an amount has now been removed from it partly through the conversion to bonds and partly by the fact that, from the privatization incomes, the budget "repaid" 169 billion of the "zero-rated" debts. This way, this debt which has no expiration has in the end been somewhat reduced (from the 2.023 trillion at the end of 1995 to 1.97 trillion in three months). The changes in the "zero-rated" debt provide the main answer to why the "domestic" burdens are growing while the state's foreign burdens are decreasing. Some of the foreign debt—the devaluation losses—appear as "domestic"; to this extent, the budget passes on its foreign burdens to the MNB. And the moment this debt is converted to bonds, the burden is laid on the taxpayers' shoulders. Now the choice is whether to roll these burdens on with foreign or with domestic loans.

In the first quarter, the current account deficit was $226 million, which is a serious improvement compared to the $1.42 billion in the first quarter of 1995. However, as NAPI GAZDASAG has also pointed out, foreign trade cannot take the credit for this because the turnover deficit amounted to $821 million in the first three months this year which is actually worse than the $805 million in the first three months of 1995. Working capital inflow amounted to $451 million in the first quarter so it only partly covered the current account deficit.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The more favorable foreign balance can mainly be attributed to the fact that tourism closed the first quarter with a $118 million surplus as opposed to the $157 million tourism deficit a year earlier. On the other hand, $445 million went out of the country in the form of interest and capital income this year, $100 million less than in the first quarter of 1995. Unreciprocated transfers resulted in a surplus inflow of $256 million, as opposed to the $123 million in the first quarter of 1995.

Hungary: 'Scandal' of Surveillance of Minorities Examined

LD2905111896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1041 GMT 29 May 96

[By Srdjan Basic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, May 29 (TANJUG)—The discovery that Serb, Croat and German minorities in Hungary's Baranya County had been under police surveillance for over three years is assuming proportions of a national scandal.

Hungarian press recently reported that the Hungarian security service has been making reports from meetings of local organisations of Baranya Serbs, Croats, Germans and even Romanies since the summer of 1992.

Minister without Portfolio in charge of National Security Isztvan Nikolicz tried to diminish the importance of the scandal during a recent meeting with leaders of the minority organisations and reporters, but some questions remained unanswered.

The head of the Croat selfrule in Baranya County Ivica Djurok said the aim of the surveillance was to discover if minorities in Hungary were intending to form an autonomy, while the leader of the Germans Lerinc Kerner said it was shameful that something like that was being done to loyal citizens of the country half a century after the forcible deportation of Germans from Hungary.

Nikolicz tried to explain that the surveillance was prompted by the war in Hungary's immediate neighbourhood and added the gathered information did not even have to fall under the confidential category.

This explanation was accepted by the parliamentary committee for national security headed by Imre Konja, the man who was interior minister in the previous government (when the surveillance started).

This substantiates belief in the complicity of those formerly and presently responsible for the surveillance, who at the same time insist that Hungary's policy towards its minorities should serve as an example to others and especially to neighbouring countries.

The head of the German territorial selfrule said he could understand the authorities' concern that the conflict in its neigbourhood between Serbs and Croats could spill over to the north but did not understand what Germans had to do with this.

State Secretary for Minority Issues Caba Tabaidi admitted the case had damaged relations between the government and minorities and the authorities announced they would see if similar 'preventive protection' was applied in other parts of Hungary.

Hungary: Army Plans To Rent Firing Ranges to Foreign Troops

AU2905095496 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 25 May 96 pp 99-100

[Correspondent's report: "Military Firing Range Deal—Area Chaos"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Everything seems to be for sale in the Hungarian Army nowadays: They are now trying to market unused firing ranges and to rent out existing firing ranges to foreign armies. In principle, all this requires parliamentary authorization, but, as a recent case shows, Defense Ministry officials tend to treat the constitutional stipulations with considerable largess.

"A painful and severe violation of the Constitution," Jeno Poda, parliamentary deputy of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and member of the Parliament's Defense Committee, said regarding the fact that, last week, the Defense Committee accepted the Defense Ministry's proposals on this year's plan on Hungarian Army units training abroad and the Committee submitted the plan to parliament in the form of a draft resolution. As the justification of the proposal shows, all this took place in accordance with the stipulations of the Constitution; namely, that "the deployment of Hungarian Armed Forces outside Hungary and the deployment of foreign troops on Hungary's territory require the preliminary agreement of the Hungarian Parliament." It is another matter that the Defense Committee's draft resolution is slightly late: Eight MiG-29's and their personnel, as well as a 50-man air defense missile unit left for a firing exercise in Poland before the aforementioned draft resolution even made it to parliament.

This hasty decision in violation of the Constitution—a decision allegedly made by current Chief of Staff Sandor Nemeth, who is due to retire in a few weeks—is all the more painful because there has been an increase in the number of international troop movements affecting Hungary in one way or another in recent years. For example, an air defense missile exercise already took place in Poland in 1995, and Hungarian troops

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

participated in military exercises twice in Romania and once in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Italy. At the same time, this is a two-way movement: British troops held military exercises in the area of Hodmezovasarhely in 1994, and Romanian troops exercised in Taborfalva and at the central firing range between Varpolata and Hajmasker in 1995, and of course the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops held firing exercises at Pecsvarad, Taborfalva, and Ujdorogd. According to the plans, there will be a lot of movement in 1996: Romanian engineering units, Polish armored troops, and Austrian and Swedish air force units will come to Hungary and, in exchange, Hungarian troops will exercise in Austria, Poland, France, and Germany.

Such international military contacts are justified by both military diplomacy reasons and financial considerations. Accepting "guest troops" seems to be a rather good deal: According to information originating from the Defense Ministry, the upcoming one-week live-firing exercise in Poland will cost more than $1 million. The possibility of such deals stirs the imagination of the Defense Ministry leaders: It was announced two weeks ago that, in exchange for financial contributions, the Slovene Army and the British Army would gladly carry out shooting exercises in Hungary. "Slovenia does not have a firing range, and Great Britain would like to exercise its troops on militarily unknown areas," Defense Ministry Spokesman Lajos Erdelyi told us and added that, according to the budget law, the Defense Ministry must produce a private income of some 10 billion forints.

According to experts, the big money lies in the air force and missile-launching deals. However, most military shooting ranges in Hungary are only suitable for firing exercises with light weapons like machine guns and small rocket launchers. Heavy weapons like artillery and tanks can only be hosted by the 40-50 kilometer central firing range between Hajmasker and Varpolata and the training ground lying in the area of Taborfalva and Tatarszentgyorgy.

Regarding renting out firing ranges, the intention to do so is clear, but the necessary legal regulations are covered by deep fog. It is true, however, that Defense Ministry officials and members of the Parliament's Defense Committee started negotiations two weeks ago on working out the rules governing the aforementioned transactions. "It is our basic principle that Hungarian laws and regulations prevail in the use of Hungarian firing ranges by foreigners, and the foreign troops can only make use of these ranges as much as the Hungarian Army," Lajos Erdelyi told us. He added that the request of the U.S. IFOR troops to hold a 20-day live-ammunition firing exercise, a longer exercise period than that of Hungarian troops, was rejected on this basis. According to Lajos Erdelyi, in addition to making a so-called honest profit, the rules should require the "guest troops" to finance the renewal of certain buildings, the elimination of environmental damages caused by them, and also to compensate the communities in question for the noise pollution inherent in the movement of troops and firing with live ammunition. "In my opinion, this law should guarantee that 25 percent of the income originating from renting out should go to the local government bodies," Lajos Poda thinks.

The possible renting of firing ranges already raises a series of legal questions, like the extent of rental fees that would enable the Defense Ministry to make a profit and would not scare the clients away. Ways must also be found to transport foreign troops to the given firing ranges (the movement of troops on public roads represents an increased danger of accidents, as shown by the movement of IFOR troops). [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Commentary Views International 'Anti-Karadzic Campaign'

AU2805185596 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 25-26 May 96 p 1

[Commentary by Kolja Besarovic: "The Pressure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not a single day passes without an orchestrated message, always the same, from some of the most influential Western power centers, that is, from some prominent politicians of the international community, reading: Radovan Karadzic must immediately leave the political scene, because as long as he and General Mladic hold their current positions or have any influence on the policy of the Bosnian Serbs it is impossible to expect the successful implementation of the Dayton peace agreement.

Listening to this message, a logical question arises: Do these presumably competent leaders of major (in terms of their strength and influence on international relations) states really believe that the fate of any agreement, and, in this concrete case, that of the Dayton agreement, can depend solely on the influence of one or two people, regardless of their abilities? That is, are those gentlemen really convinced that, after Karadzic's disappearance, the people (citizens) of the Serb Republic would suddenly alter its—for the time being—extremely negative attitude toward the unitarization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and thus make possible the implementation of crucial—although not yet officially stated—objectives of the Dayton peace accord?

Even if we assume that the "big architects" privately do not have any illusions regarding these questions, that does not mean that they are ready to publicly acknowledge the truth. Simply, in a situation where it is becoming increasingly apparent that one of the mainstays of the Dayton framework—namely, the Muslim-Croatian federation—is bursting at all of its seams (take, for example, the disagreements over the Mostar elections) and when not only some more objective Western media, but also the U.S. intelligence service itself are openly questioning the possibility of the renewal of a unified Bosnia, for the Western, and particularly the Washington-based, architects the problem of Karadzic seems to be, if not the best one, then definitely the least harmful excuse.

Further motives for the current aggressive, nervous, and basically hysteric anti-Karadzic campaign are to be sought in the dissatisfaction of those who expected that, through the now already former prime minister of the Serb Republic [Rajko Kasagic], the whole issue would be settled in an elegant way and without any excessive risk, as well as in their need to promptly find alibis in the new circumstances, the goal of which is to represent them as efficient (and indispensable) implementors of the international community's principled policy. It is no wonder, therefore, that the current coordinated action to apply pressure—the bearers of which are Clinton's special envoy John Kornblum and the inevitable Carl Bildt—is directed toward Belgrade as much as toward Pale and is founded on the well-known trump card—the threat of the reimposition of sanctions.

Technically, for Washington, it would do to have such an idea simply passed in the Security Council, but a totally different question is whether the Clinton administration, for the reason of political opportunism, will really go for that option. Although such a step cannot be completely discounted, it is almost certain that Washington will endeavor to enforce its desired solutions by applying pressure, because reaching out for the ultimate means in the current circumstances would not only cause disagreement on the part of its partners in London and Paris, but—what is more significant—would also cause a considerable political headache for Boris Yeltsin in the closing stages of the election campaign. Regardless of certain disagreements, the United States still wants to see Yeltsin in the Kremlin after 16 June.

The pressure will not only continue in the coming days, but will probably intensify. What is of particular concern to officials of the international community, however, is the possibility of the announcement of a referendum in the Serb Republic at which the people would express their confidence in the current leadership (and its policy). How terrified the verbal supporters of fair and democratic elections are at the prospect of the citizens of the Serb Republic democratically expressing their will (and support for Radovan Karadzic) is most clearly shown by Kornblum and Bildt's threatening messages—that the organization of a referendum will be prevented by all (I guess forceful) means available, that is, that sanctions will be reimposed if a referendum is held. Let us wait and see!

B-H: ONASA: Only by Force Can IFOR Remove Karadzic

AU2805153696 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 25 May 96 p 2

[Commentary by ONASA news agency: "Criminals Can Be Removed Only by Force"]

[FBIS Translated Text] No real reconciliation in Bosnia is possible without clearly establishing the culpability of criminals and giving satisfaction to the victims. Furthermore, without the elimination of the persons who are most responsible for war crimes, there cannot

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

be stability, reconciliation, or peace. The leader of the Bosnian Serb rebels, Radovan Karadzic, is playing a cat-and-mouse game with the international community again. Under pressure from all sides, he is trying to deceive the world by delegating some of his functions to Biljana Plavsic. In this way, he is just trying to fool the world public. That this is so, and that the criminal is continuing his insane policy is shown by his recent interview to a Greek news agency, in which he calls for the establishment of a Balkan alliance of Christian Orthodox states. Although this was political nonsense, Karadzic is still behaving like a man who pulls all the strings. The most powerful Western states do not know how to remove Karadzic from the scene, while the Serbian President Milosevic appears to be unwilling to do so, for once he is in The Hague, Karadzic could turn out to be a very unpleasant witness. Thus, the strings of crimes pulled by the great leader himself [Milosevic] would be clearly brought to light. Even the seemingly wise formula incorporated in the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement, which bars indicted war criminals from participation in the forthcoming elections, does not guarantee the removal of Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb army. Recent history is full of examples of strongmen who held power while actually never formally performing any prominent political function. The only way to remove the criminals is by force, which the Implementation Force [IFOR] must apply if it wants to end its role in Bosnia-Herzegovina successfully and prevent this suffering state from receding into a war inferno again.

B-H: Serb Official: Karadzic Agreement Relatively Satisfying

AU2405155096 Paris AFP in English 1554 GMT 24 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 24 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serb official for foreign affairs Aleksa Buha said Friday an "agreement" reached with international peacekeepers on the future of Radovan Karadzic was "relatively satisfying" for both sides.

Buha told Bosnian Serb radio that on a visit to the Serb stronghold of Pale this week by Carl Bildt, the top international civilian official enforcing the Bosnian peace: "We reached, I hope, an agreement, a solution, which is relatively satisfying for both sides."

Under the terms of the verbal agreement, reached earlier this week and already made public, Karadzic, an indicted war criminal and Bosnian Serb president, has to step out of public life or Serbia will face the return of crippling economic sanctions.

Bildt has threatened to "discuss" the re-imposition of sanctions on former republic of Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia and Montenegro, if Karadzic appears again in public life in the Serb entity in Bosnia.

Buha told Bosnian Serb radio it was still possible the Serbs would organise a referendum to confirm support for Karadzic.

He said this would not happen if the international community accepted the agreement made between Bildt and Serb leader Momcilo Krajisnik "as a long-term solution," Serb radio said.

Western leaders still say Karadzic and other war crimes suspects should be made to appear in The Hague to answer charges at the UN war crimes tribunal.

B-H: NATO's Solana Denies Agreement on Karadzic's Future

AU2405161996 Paris AFP in English 1612 GMT 24 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Madrid, May 24 (AFP)—NATO chief Javier Solana denied Friday that any deal had been reached on Bosnia that would let Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who has been indicted for war crimes, cling to power.

"There is no accord. War criminals should be in prison," Solana said on the sidelines of a seminar here.

Sources in Sarajevo said earlier that the United States and its allies had agreed to let Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb military commander, General Ratko Mladic, remain in power so long as they stay out of public view.

The deal was made at talks between U.S. and western diplomats in Belgrade and in the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale in the past few days, added the sources who asked not to be named.

The NATO secretary-general also said that peacekeepers in Bosnia would now be able to "immobilize" suspected war criminals by spreading out throughout the republic as it prepares for elections in September, rather than just monitoring separation lines as has been the case until now.

But a NATO official in Brussels said the alliance's policy of not hunting down war crimes suspects had not changed. Under this policy, NATO says its troops will arrest suspects only if its comes across them in the course of normal duties.

"War criminals run a greater risk of being arrested with this increased deployment," the official said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Solana said that troops from the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) would thus be able to "proceed with the immobilization of (war) criminals."

Since being deployed in December, IFOR's 60,000 troops have not arrested any of the 52 war crimes suspects on a list issued by the UN war crimes court in the Hauge.

In Sarajevo, a spokesman for IFOR confirmed there was no change in NATO's policy on hunting down war crimes suspects, saying Solana's remarks amounted to a change of tactics for the peacekeeping force.

B-H: Sources Say Karadzic Possibly Facing 'Physical Liquidation'

AU2905123296 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 27 May 96 p 1

[Report by Zdravko Latal: "Karadzic's End Inevitable"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 26 May—The elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina announced for September could only be postponed if the U.S. elections are postponed. As this will not happen, the international community will do everything it can to see that the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are carried out within the envisaged deadlines, even if not all liberties are achieved. However, one condition that they cannot avoid is the removal of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic from their present positions. It could be heard from several Sarajevo sources today that the notorious Bosnian Serb leaders will be removed in two months' time at the latest.

The Sarajevo sources that expect Radovan Karadzic to be arrested doubt that the psychiatrist will actually be handed over to the Hague tribunal together with General Mladic, because, in that event, President Milosevic would be implicated. For that reason, they raise the possibility of Karadzic's physical liquidation. In a statement for DELO, Dr. Miodrag Zivanovic, president of the Social Liberal Party of the Serb Republic, said that Karadzic has not been the first and the most powerful politician in the Serb entity for quite some time. This place is now occupied by Momcilo Krajisnik and Dr. Biljana Plavsic, who in the Serb Democratic Party espouse views even more extreme than Karadzic's.

The Implementation Force [IFOR] soldiers were issued with official instructions on how to act in the event of encountering people suspected of war crimes and those for whom the Hague international tribunal has issued a warrant. IFOR today denied press reports that Gen. Mladic flew from Banja Luka to Belgrade with a Bosnian Serb military helicopter (to attend the funereal of Gen. Djukic) with the approval of the international forces. The flight was approved for Gen. Mirkovic and IFOR soldiers did not check the passengers in the helicopter. The denial is rather lame, especially, because the flight supervisors have now been ordered to compile passenger lists and check them. It is also not clear how Mladic could have flown aboard a Gazelle, which is an attack helicopter, when the Serb Republic Army officially does not have such helicopters. [passage omitted]

B-H: Daily Urges Arrest of Karadzic, Mladic

AU2405210596 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 96 p 2

[ONASA commentary: "The Hash Has Been Settled in the Belgrade Kitchen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] International authorities had extended full support to the recently replaced "prime minister" of the so-called Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rajko Kasagic, but what was the use of that? The officials are now forced to hold talks with Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the "assembly" of the so-called Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who is obviously pulling all the strings. It transpires that the gestures of support to Kasagic had been without any contingency plans. Political naivety, lack of seriousness, or something else? The chase after Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who has so far been emerging from such situations as a winner, has again started. Everything is aimed at the leader of the rebel Bosnian Serbs "not to be heard and seen" in the future, but to remain there. The announced referendum on his fate is in fact a wish for a mass plebiscite for the benefit of the ultimate greater Serbian aspirations.

The statement by the new "prime minister" of the so-celled Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gojko Klickovic, that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serb cannot live together with other people under any circumstances, and that the so-called Serb Republic is an "independent state and that it will secede," is being aimed in that direction. Therefore, this is a racist, separatist, and warmongering rhetoric. This is the result of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement.

The change in the situation requires an agreement on a combination of military, political, and economic measures. Karadzic might even be sacrificed by his own people if this benefits the "movement," that is, the rest of the junta, and if it suits the interests of a "greater Serbia." Nevertheless, there is only one possibility that could undermine the nazi-fascist regime in the so-called Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if he and the commander

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of the army of the rebel Bosnian Serbs, General Ratko Mladic, are arrested.

B-H: Bildt on Karadzic's 'Provocative' Attempts To Retain Power

AU2805203096 Paris AFP in English 2002 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome, May 28 (AFP)—The top civilian official overseeing the Bosnian peace process Tuesday described as provocative the attempts Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic is making to hang on to power while facing charges of crimes against humanity.

Carl Bildt, in Rome for talks on Bosnia with the Italian and Russian foreign ministers, said he had asked the Bosnian Serb leadership to relieve Karadzic of his functions before Monday, but the deadline had not been respected.

"Now they have announced certain steps of getting him away to some extent," he said. "Let's see what happens."

The former Swedish premier said many people in the Republika Srpska, the Moslem-Croat Federation, rump Yugoslavia and Croatia were to blame for not handing over indicted war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague.

But what Bildt termed "particularly provocative" were Karadzic's attempts to hold on to power.

"You have to press on. You press as much as you can, and you see the results," he added.

Bildt was speaking while Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was reported to be meeting senior Bosnian Serb officials in Belgrade.

Karadzic, who was reported to be attending the meeting by the Serbian news agency BETA, was not seen.

Last week, the top U.S. official dealing with Bosnia, John Kornblum, said that he had raised the possibility of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro if Milosevic did not help remove Karadzic from power.

Karadzic has been indicted by the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague for genocide and crimes against humanity for his role in the war in Bosnia.

Bildt was in Rome to meet Yevgeniy Primakov and Lamberto Dini as part of preparations for an international conference on Bosnia in Florence on June 13 and 14.

B-H: Serbs in Australia Support Karadzic, Mladic

LD2805140796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1308 GMT 28 May 96

[By SRNA Sydney correspondent Ljubo Grkovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sydney, 28 May (SRNA)—The Serbs in Australia trust and support Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and General Ratko Mladic, commander of the General Staff of the Bosnian Serb army, in their intention not to give in to the pressure and blackmail of the international community.

The Serb community in Australia is very interested in what is happening in the Serb Republic and the sequence of events which have preceded or are leading to further changes within the political leadership.

"Relaxation in one field leads to further traps and the general decline of the defense mechanisms of the Serb nation, the best example of which is Yugoslavia. Because of its conciliatory policy Yugoslavia, has become the scapegoat of the western soothsayers," Serbs from Australia warn.

Their very clear message is that "President Karadzic, Gen. Mladic and the present leadership of the Serb Republic leadership should lead the Serb people until the people themselves take a different decision."

B-H: Plavsic Comments on 21 May Meeting With Milosevic

AU2405170296 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 96 p 1

[Interview with 'Serb Republic Vice President' Biljana Plavsic by N. Puvacic; place and date not given: "We Proved That We Lead a Consistent Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Puvacic] Ms. Plavsic, tell us who called this meeting [with Serbian President Milosevic in Belgrade on 21 May], that is, at whose request was it held?

[Plavsic] It was called at the suggestion of President Milosevic. The invitation to this meeting came after the events in the Serb Republic that were chiefly linked to the change of the prime minister and the vote in the Assembly. Such meetings had been held before. True enough, I did not attend them. The sequence of events was that after President Dr. Radovan Karadzic had entrusted me with a task, which he had the right to do according to the Constitution, I went to the meeting in Belgrade that was also attended by Vice President Nikola Koljevic. With his signature, President Milosevic confirmed that Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia, was the guarantor of the Dayton accord, and his interest in the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

process of the implementation of the Dayton accord over here was therefore logical. He simply wanted to learn more about it because some Dayton accord deadlines that are binding for us are pressing, and he was also interested in the progress of the preparations for the elections.

We told him that we accepted the Dayton accord as a sort of optimal and not a minimal solution for us, for that is exactly what it represents to us: A solution that can be realized at the moment and that also has some advantages for our side.

Above all, it brought us peace, and, at present, we are taking great care of this peace because the other entity is pursuing a policy that does not exactly lead toward peace. We wanted to tell him that, even if some agreements were to be made that would threaten a continuation of the war, we were sincerely resolved not to meddle in this. Peace is very precious to us because it primarily facilitates certain activities that will lead to the economic prosperity of the state.

The preamble to the Dayton accord states that Bosnia-Herzegovina, which in reality does not exist yet, will exist only after the completion of the elections, when the joint institutions will be formed. Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of two entities and, naturally, we are taking care of peace in our entity, because this is the only precondition for normal life, and we are determined to go this way as soon as possible.

Therefore, the Dayton accord and its implementation formed the framework for our talks with President Milosevic.

[Puvacic] Did Mr. Milosevic show special interest in some issues? Did he had any suggestions or objections?

[Plavsic] Well, naturally, there is the issue of elections. As the elections are drawing closer and require a special procedure, he was interested in the preparations and their progress. With the appointment of Mr. Slobodan Kovac as the Serb Republic representative in the Interim Commission for the Monitoring of Elections, I personally believe, and that is what I told Mr. Milosevic, too, that we have secured a true guarantor and that everything will develop as it should. I must emphasize that not for a moment did Mr. Milosevic take his interest or some suggestions beyond the atmosphere of a meeting of completely equal partners.

[Puvacic] Was there any mention of the dismissal of Rajko Kasagic and his government?

[Plavsic] We touched upon the new government in the light of past events. Due to some statements by Mr. Kasagic, the international community gained an impression that "the isolationist Pale leadership," as they emphasized, did not wish the implementation of the Dayton accord and concluded that Mr. Kasagic was the sole person to turn to. We stated the fact: That our Assembly adopted the Dayton accord and that our politics is moving within the boundaries of this agreement. Some upheavals, if I can say so, occurred in the Serb Republic in the past week, however, this can also be beneficial. After each earthquake the ground stabilizes and the situation crystallizes. I believe that everything that happened in connection with our government was also good for the international community, especially for Mr. Bildt, who is in charge of the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton accord, and he personally has a perfectly clear picture of the situation. Namely, to proceed with the task on the basis of some incorrect assumptions would be a waste of time, to put it mildly. All this was harming our peoples, too, because it gave rise to the questions of what sort of a policy this was, which was leading toward the reintegration of the Serb Republic into Bosnia-Herzegovina. The term "reintegration" refers to the other territory where the problem is fundamentally different, as is the case in eastern Slavonia. I believe that we proved to the international community that we are pursuing a consistent policy and that we can go further. I believe that Mr. Bildt and the international community have learned a lot from everything that happened, because as partners in the talks they have the people who are consistent and unswayable in their stance, which definitely inspires respect.

[Puvacic] This was said by Serb Republic Vice President Dr. Biljana Plavsic in a statement for GLAS SRPSKI.

B-H: Serb Commentary Criticizes Milosevic's 'Fickleness'

AU2805192196 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 25-26 May 96 p 2

[Commentary by Radomir Sekulovic: "Pride and Shame"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By his confusing attitude toward the Serb issue, Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, has brought himself and the Serbians into a position of complete dependence on U.S. envoys. This is the unanimous opinion of the Serbs in London.

The Americans are teaching him lessons every day about whom he is supposed to arrest if he wants to avoid the reimposition of UN sanctions on FRY.

The Serb Diaspora asserts that the sanctions against the FRY have never actually been lifted and that the United

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

States openly refuses any restoration of Belgrade's relations with world financial institutions until the issue seen by the United States as the Kosovo problem is resolved.

The United States threatens to reimpose the sanctions on Serbia because it refuses to arrest persons charged with war crimes and extradite them to The Hague.

Milosevic has put himself in such an unenviable position by "having suddenly begun to feel ashamed of what he is supposed to be proud of," sources close to London-based Chetnik warlord Momcilo Djujic assess.

The moment Belgrade accepted Western allegations that "it is a crime to help the Serbs outside Serbia" it actually became a voluntary, unpaid client of the United States."

Instead of sticking to the attitude that the disintegration of Yugoslavia made possible the constitution of nation states, including the Serbian one, Milosevic is still behaving as though the constitution of such a Serb state were "a crime" and as though the world has a right to summon participants in that project in The Hague for criminal responsibility.

The only reason why Milosevic did not arrest General Ratko Mladic and Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin, who attended the funeral of Gen. Djordje Djukic in Belgrade, is his fear that the two might state before the Hague court that they participated proudly in the realization of the project of the Serb nation state, to which Milosevic himself had extended full material support at the beginning.

This fickleness regarding crucial ideas has brought his regime to a position where it has to apologize to the West for its relations with the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina and simply disregard the fact that Germany, Hungary, Argentina, Iran, Turkey, the United States, the Czech Republic, Pakistan, and Malaysia were arming the Bosnian Muslims without ever being punished for that.

It appears that these countries should be proud of their violation of the UN arms embargo against former Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas Serbia and the FRY should be ashamed and punished for even thinking that they should aid the Serb Republic militarily.

For that reason, today, U.S. envoys are able to openly dictate to Milosevic that he should extradite to The Hague even potential witnesses against himself, because otherwise the sanctions will be reimposed on him.

"He is not only asked to sniff the foul-smelling stuff, but also to roll in it," the sources close to warlord Djujic say.

B-H: Commentary Protests Accusations of Serb 'Isolationism'

LD2705214396 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 May 96

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] The news coming from abroad lately confirms more and more clearly that world diplomacy is carrying out media preparations for the new political moves by which the world powers wish to justify a strategy that would make the violation of the Dayton agreement inevitable.

This will be done in style: The Dayton decisions are valid for you who were at war, but not for us who prepared them. It seems that the decisions will be made in line with current world interests and with well-timed political qualifications mostly aimed at the Serb Republic.

The news commentary deals with similar dilemmas:

If anyone cared to note all the labels attached to the Serbs from the very beginning of the war up to now in order to disqualify them, it would not be a simple task at all. It is even more difficult, almost impossible, to find any common sense in them or any arguments supporting them.

Every now and then various falsities, insinuations, and lies are cooked up in the world and Muslim-Croat propaganda kitchens, depending on what and when is convenient for justifying unequal standards of the so-called international community in assessing the state of affairs, but always to the detriment of the Serb people.

At the very beginning and throughout the war, the Serbs were horrible aggressors. Now, in some mysterious way, they have turned overnight into something entirely different: They have become isolationists.

The isolationism of the Serb Republic, a falsity similar to the one about the Serb aggression, was invented recently, after the donors' conference in Brussels. It was introduced into this region by Carl Bildt, the high representative of the international community.

Let us recall, the Serb representatives did not want to attend the donors' conference because they were invited, not as the Serb Republic delegation, but as part of and under the name of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation.

According to such an idea and such an invitation, the Serbs were supposed to make the first step in dissolving the Serb Republic into the unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina and annul everything achieved so far with regard to its independence. Mr. Bildt himself confirms that this was the intention, or at least one of the intentions of the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

organizers of the donors' conference, by repeating over and over again: If you had come to Brussels, you would have been given the money.

Then Mr. Bildt invented the term isolationism, but also went a step further. He did not accuse the whole of the Serb Republic of this imaginary isolationism, but only the Pale leadership. To be truthful, he had reasons for doing this: The accusation of isolationism was well received by some individuals and groups here who, it seems, found everything else more important than the struggle for the essential national interest—the preservation of the Serb Republic.

It is obvious that in this respect one cannot speak about self-isolation, but this is not the first time that wrong conclusions are drawn by which attempts are being made to impose foreign interests on the Serb nation. What sort of isolationism can we talk about if the Serb people do not wish to live in a unitary and multiethnic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Or maybe it could, if that imaginary state were considered a totality, a universality. If it is so, then the Serbs are isolationists.

But then what can be said about the rest of the world and the remaining part of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, to which the Serb Republic is offering a hand of cooperation on the principle of complete mutual respect. Or what about the Serb Republic's aspiration to join its mother country; why is that being prevented? Is such an aspiration also isolationism?

And to conclude, it would suffice if someone said that the Serbs imposed sanctions on themselves to make us believe that the reluctance to cooperate and isolationism is indeed the exclusive Serb speciality.

B-H: Pale TV Criticizes Hague Tribunal, Cites Late Serb General

LD2605222396 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 May 96

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] Will the last words of the late Djordje Djukic, general of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic army, reach the ears of those who love justice above everything else? Drawing on his own misfortune to be a prisoner at the Hague Tribunal, the late general warned on his deathbed that Serb President Radovan Karadzic and [Serb military commander] Ratko Mladic must not at any cost get into the hands of anyone connected with the Hague Tribunal, because that would amount to their physical demise.

Why did Gen. Djukic say this? Because, according to his own words, despite his grave illness, at The Hague prison he was physically abused, tortured by denial of food and given food which he could not eat because of his illness.

Gen. Djukic made a brief comment about the Hague Tribunal prosecutor Richard Goldstone: He is a hater of Serbs and a murderer with a child's face.

The facts, which the late Gen. Djukic revealed about the Hague Tribunal on his deathbed discredit and level serious accusations at the Tribunal and at the international community, which is its patron. In the last minutes of his life, Gen. Djukic warned his people about the Tribunal's bias and tried to alert the democratic and justice-loving part of the world about all the dangers and traps they could fall into unless they halt this moral and political shame of the world.

There are attempts to dismiss as the culprit and bring into the dock a whole nation which wanted to live in one state, its own state, and because it defended itself—successfully—from the knife, dagger, and certain death in the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When it became obvious that these statements and false, coached witnesses will be used to extend the list of allegedly guilty Serbs, and that this could cause suspicion in the world, there was a rush to add to the list [of indicted war criminals] a few Croats and Muslims who—if they ever make it to The Hague—will have special treatment and live under house arrest in a villa with a swimming pool and limited freedom of movement. They will be followed by TV cameras for the first few days, and then they will live undisturbed. But TV cameras are constantly on in the courtroom where the trial of Dusko Tadic is taking place, and where witnesses on whose accounts the prosecution is building its case are following one another day in day out. The prosecutor has invited foreigners, allegedly experts on the former Yugoslavia, as witnesses. Their witness accounts are most often treatises and their own theories on the disintegration of Yugoslavia, on the basis of which conclusions are then made about the Serbs' responsibility.

Why is the Hague Tribunal not trying or at least not mentioning crime against peace, for which an international court of justice can be founded? Is it not because the first to stand in the dock would be [Bosnian President] Alija Izetbegovic?

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] One thing is in connection with the beginning of the war and another in connection with peace. We were not able to avoid involvement into the 1992 crisis. We were not able to avoid holding a referendum which in the final analysis was conducive to war. Otherwise, we would have remained

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

in the rump Yugoslavia. We were only faced with that option—to stay under Serbia and Montenegro. In order to prevent that, we had to hold the referendum. Holding the referendum inevitably meant we were going to war. That was one of the must-do things [end recording]

This statement and his famous sentence that he would sacrifice peace for sovereignty do not call for any additional explanations. Croatia had the intention to ethnically cleanse the Serbs and did unfortunately succeed in achieving it with the support of the international community.

[Begin recording] [Croatian Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak] We were given the task to carry Operation Storm out in the period of three days, we did it a bit too quickly, we were compelled to do so by bad weather—as we were entering Okucani it was beginning to rain. We had to do it before the rain.

[Ivo Sanader, head of the Croatian president's office] Our foreign minister, in agreement with the president, invited the diplomatic corps to a meeting. On the very first day of the action we explained to everyone what was going on, and why the decision was made to launch the action.

In this context, I can remember, Mate Granic and I were at that meeting with the diplomatic corps, some ambassadors—of course, I cannot mention their names, but ambassadors of Western countries—approached me and Granic saying—of course, we cannot say this officially, but if you finish the operation within the deadline just mentioned, well done, you will have our support. [end recording]

As it is increasingly obvious that this court is the expression of complete unbalance of power in the world, expression of dominance of one power and its unscrupulous use of international institutions to achieve certain political ends, the court has no future—history will make its final judgment.

B-H: Muratovic: War Criminals' Removal Electoral Precondition

LD2805200696 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 28 May (BH PRESS)—Dr. Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received Iqbal Riza, special envoy of the UN secretary general and head of the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During their talks, particular attention was devoted to the preparations for and the organization of the elections. The prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina confirmed once again that the elections represent a major aim of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, but he believes that the conditions for holding elections in the Serb entity will not, and cannot, be fulfilled unless war criminals are removed from power.

Dr. Muratovic and Iqbal Riza agreed on the need for close and intensive cooperation between the Mines' Action Center and the government mine-clearance agency, and that the greatest possible part of these activities should be entrusted to domestic organizations.

The question of speeding up the procedure for resolving damages claims submitted by citizens and other subjects of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the United Nations was also raised.

B-H: SDA Endorses Muslim Participation in Mostar Elections

LD2605183996 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1706 GMT 26 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 26 May (BH PRESS)—The Executive Committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] held its seventh regular session in Sarajevo today. The session was also attended by party Chairman Alija Izetbegovic.

While considering the current political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the committee discussed elections in Mostar, the upcoming session of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and party preparations for the upcoming elections, a press statement says.

The SDA Executive Committee supports the agreement on local elections in Mostar, in line with which elections in Mostar should be held by 30 June. According to the agreement, the right to vote is granted to all who were registered as citizens of Mostar in the 1991 census and did not leave their place of abode in this city of their own free will.

This agreement has partially eliminated unacceptable provisions contained in the voting regulations; together with other patriotic parties the SDA has thus succeeded in securing some measure of democratic elections in Mostar.

The SDA will make the greatest possible efforts to ensure that the right to vote is granted to Mostar refugees and displaced persons who are currently abroad.

With regard to the upcoming session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Executive Committee calls on deputies at the assembly to harmonize amendments to the Constitution of the Federation with the Dayton agreement as soon as possible.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

With regard to electoral activities, the SDA has been meeting all its obligations according to the timescale envisaged by the interim electoral commission; the SDA at the same time, strongly insists on unacceptable provisions of the electoral regulations being altered.

As is the case with Mostar, the SDA will ask the interim electoral commission to eliminate the lack of freedom and limitations by which the right to vote of non-Serb citizens living in the Serb entity is threatened. This particularly refers to the freedom of movement, political pluralism, freedom of media, and Bosniak participation in electoral commissions in that area.

B-H: Kljuc Commission Objects to OSCE Election Rules

AU2805151696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 28 May 96

[Report by Edina Dusanovic from Kljuc]

[FBIS Translated Text] The municipal elections commission in Kljuc has set in motion the technical preparations for the elections in accordance with the Bosnia-Herzegovina election rules adopted by the provisional election commission at the end of April. During the second visit by the temporary election commission, forms for the application and registration of voters were handed over. Upon receipt of these forms, which will be handed to them on (?3 June), the citizens will have six weeks to fill them in.

Asked who will have the right to vote, Dzemal (?Dodic), chairman of the Kljuc municipal election commission, said that the provisional election commission was explicit, and that the right of vote was given to those citizens who left their place of residence between the 1991 census and (?6) April 1992. These citizens will be allowed to vote indirectly [u odsustvu] and in person, while the citizens who changed their place of residency since (?6) April and during th war, either voluntarily or under duress as a result of the aggression—according to the OSCE rules—can vote only in person. Of course, the Kljuc municipal election commission has lodged a complaint about this stipulation by the provisional election commission, since this is to the detriment of the citizens who were forced to leave their place of residence.

The provisional election commission with its seat in Bihac found this complaint unfounded [words indistinct] freedom of movement, and—according to them—the very fact that they have to vote in person will enable the citizens in this category to return to their place of residence unimpeded. [passage indistinct]

B-H: Poll Shows Majority Believe IFOR Can Arrest Karadzic

AU2905121396

[FBIS Report] Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian on 24 May on page 3 carries an approximately 400-word unattributed report on the results of an opinion poll on whether IFOR (Implementation Force) should arrest suspected war criminals in Bosnia-Herzegovina, entitled "IFOR Can, But Does Not Want To."

The poll was carried out by Avaz Agency, which interviewed a total of 300 respondents in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla over the telephone, using the random sampling method.

The results of the poll are expressed below.

Do you think IFOR is capable of arresting war criminals Karadzic and Mladic?

	Percent
Yes, and will do so soon	14
Yes, but does not want to do it	66
No, because this is not its job	11
Do not know	9

B-H: Stolac Bosniaks Say IFOR, UNHCR 'Too Incompetent'

AU2805182796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 May 96

[Report by Velid Sefko from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sefko] Some 100 Bosniaks from Stolac who set off this morning in four buses to visit their town—from which they had been expelled some three years ago—were stopped in Kovacina by the police from the western part of Mostar and prevented from visiting their homes.

Revolted by this act, which is surprising to say the least—since this visit was arranged at the highest level—the Stolac people then blocked the M-17 road. Hedzad Fezo, leader of the trip, tells us about this:

[Fezo] We set off in an organized way, in a disciplined way [words indistinct] waited two hours to get through at Kovacine, with the explanation that a telex had arrived saying that the visits were not to happen any more. I said that this was not true, that this was a lie [words indistinct] about 200 people to go every day to Stolac with security provided by the Implementation Force [IFOR] and with the cooperation of the UNHCR

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Un High Commissioner for Refugees]. This agreement was not observed. I warned the representatives of IFOR and UNHCR that I was afraid that problems would arise, and, as we can see, the road is blocked here [words indistinct]. IFOR and the UNHCR are too incompetent to do their job.

[Sefko] The citizens of Stolac were particularly irritated by the fact that, soon after the M-17 road was blocked, IFOR soldiers appeared on the scene and demanded that the traffic be let through, while just half an hour earlier they had watched coolly while the Croat police violated the freedom of movement agreement on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. An identical [words indistinct] with the representative of the United Nations, who told us that he did not know why [words indistinct].

B-H: IFOR Tactical Command Moves to Prijedor

LD2805220296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1938 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prijedor, 28 May (TANJUG)—Since today, British General Michael Walker, commander of the Implementation Force [IFOR] ground forces, has his tactical command in Prijedor.

Today, Gen. Walker had talks with the mayor of Prijedor, Milomir Stakic. After the talks, Gen. Walker said that during the next few days the command will be in Prijedor, so as not to spend all the time in the central part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Thanking the mayor for the reception, he said that today they had an extensive and "even philosophical" discussion on a whole range of issues that both sides will have to tackle because of the approaching elections and the realization of the "vision signed by many people in Dayton."

Walker said that many issues require further talks and new meetings.

The mayor of Prijedor thanked Gen. Walker both in his name and in the name of the Prijedor citizens for the talks and his visit.

Stakic said that the war is almost over and that efforts are needed to keep the peace and to hold elections.

B-H: Muratovic Addresses Bosnian Assembly on Dayton Agreement

LD2705223796 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1910 GMT 27 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 27 May (BH PRESS)—The session of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is still under way. [passage omitted]

After adopting the program of work of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a discussion on the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton Agreement was opened by Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic. The discussion is still under way.

Prime Minister Muratovic stressed that it would be difficult to give a general assessment of the implementation of the agreement so far, among other things also because the responsibility for it is shared by both the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and the international community.

"We are responsible for not harmonizing the constitution, laws and [state] set-up with the obligations contained in the [Dayton] agreement and for not having carried out those activities for which we had resources," Muratovic said.

He went on to say that the international community bore responsibility for obligations not been met by its institutions, for twisting the facts through the use of legal jargon and for the slow provision of resources.

"Our responsibility, given that this is our top priority interest, is greater. The international community has both power and resources, and it is also aware that its success here is a condition for our success," Muratovic said in his address.

Enumerating successes achieved in this sphere so far, Muratovic laid an emphasis on results achieved in the military field. In this connection, he said that the cease-fire was holding, that the international process of control, particularly in the Serb entity, had been opened, which had not been the case so far, that road checkpoints had been removed, and that territorial settlement had been achieved without incidents, apart from Dobrinja.

In his address, Prime Minister Muratovic did not shrink from dwelling on the problems burdening the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina's integrity has to some extent been threatened, given that foreign forces are present on its territory. Muratovic said that freedom of movement had not yet been achieved, that legitimate authorities did not control Bosnia-Herzegovina borders, and that the process of the return of refugees had not yet begun.

"In Dobrinja a territorial delineation line has to be drawn in accordance with the peace agreement and the local population must be helped to move into their apartments. This is the clear obligation of IFOR [Implementation Force]. There has to be freedom of movement, first on the roads between Sarajevo and Gorazde; Bihac

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

and Donji Vakuf; Travnik, Tuzla, Orasje and Brcko; and then on all the other roads. People have to be able to move freely before the elections, because without this freedom there can be no elections," Muratovic said.

Without the resolution of these issues, the process of the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be seriously difficult. The problem of the extradition of war criminals to the Hague tribunal has to be added to these crucial issues. Prime Minister Muratovic pointed out that Carl Bildt's office took stronger measures to this effect.

In the course of further discussion, Prime Minister Muratovic talked about the work of the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, pointing out good cooperation between the government and the ministries, with certain problems of political nature particularly within the federation.

Elections were described as a top priority goal and a precondition for the organization of the state structure.

Certain efforts have been made in the economic reconstruction. The World Bank played an especially important role.

A lot has been done with regards to the implementation of the Dayton agreement, but a lot is still ahead. That is why the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina need maximum support of the people, Hasan Muratovic ended his address.

B-H: Herzeg-Bosnia Government Reorganized Into 6 Ministries

LD2505170496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 25 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A meeting of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, chaired by the acting president, ended late last night in Mostar. Antun Mrkonjic reports:

[Mrkonjic] The report by Bosnian Federation President Kresimir Zubak on the implementation of the Dayton and other agreements was endorsed. On the basis of this, the Clubs of Croatian Deputies in the Republic and Federal Assemblies were made responsible for the consistent application of the agreements reached.

The Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia also adopted several conclusions to do with the functioning of the government bodies of Herzeg-Bosnia in the transitional period up until the full operation of the Federation.

A public statement says that the government of Herzeg-Bosnia will be reorganized into six ministries—the Ministry of Defense, of which Vladimir Soljic remains at the head, the Ministry of Internal Affairs with Ivan Vrankic remaining as minister, the Ministry of Justice and Administration headed by Mate Tadic, the Ministry of Finance led by Neven Tomic, and the Ministry of Economy and Social Affairs headed by Nikola Antunovic and Ile Kreso respectively. These decisions are to be confirmed in the Chamber of Deputies of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. [passage omitted]

Under personnel issues, the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia also promoted Valentin Coric and Zlatan Mijujelic to the rank of major general. [passage omitted]

B-H: Government To Resettle Bosniaks in Serb Houses

AU2905104296 Paris AFP in English 1027 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 29 (AFP)—The Bosnian Government has decided to resettle about 8,000 Moslem refugees in abandoned Serb apartments and houses in Sarajevo, the daily newspaper OSLOBODJENJE reported on Wednesday.

Quoting the town's former municipal authorities, it said the decision was taken at a secret meeting at the Ministry for Refugees in the first half of May and had been widely criticised.

The refugees are from the Serb-held town of Doboj in northern Bosnia.

According to the paper, they are being rehoused in apartments in the former Serb-held areas of Ilidza and Grbavica which were abandoned when these areas were restored to government control in March.

Ekrem Ajanovic, a Moslem MP from the town of Tesanj, south of Doboj, said the decision ran counter to the government's official position and the right of refugees to return to their homes.

He said that refugees from Doboj living abroad had been contacted and invited to come and live in Sarajevo.

But a local Tesanj official, Himzo Becic, said the former inhabitants of Doboj had not left the region to go to live in Sarajevo. He said that the refugees could just as easily go to villages near Doboj.

Doboj was captured at the beginning of the war in Bosnia, which broke out in 1992. Before the war, it was 40 percent Moslem and 29 percent Serb, according to figures from the 1991 census.

On Tuesday, the Bosnian authorities annuonced that more than 40,000 refugees had returned to Bosnia in the last six months, out of a total of 2.4 million.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The Minister for Refugee Issues, Nudzeim Recica, said that this number represented those who had registered themselves and that the real figure was probably much higher.

B-H: Muslim Refugees Prevented From Visiting Homes in Stolac

AU2805203896 Paris AFP in English 2023 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 28 (AFP)—Bosnian Croat police prevented some 200 Moslem refugees from visiting their homes in Stolac in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina on Tuesday, a UN official said here.

The official, who works for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), said this was in contravention of last year's Dayton peace accords, which allowed for freedom of movement throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The refugees' buses were stopped on the outskirts of Mostar on Tuesday morning. The refugees had come from the eastern part of the town, which is divided between Croats and Moslems who fought 11 months of bitter clashes ending in 1994.

Bosnian Croat official Radoslav Lavric said that the buses had been stopped because 600 refugees had already been allowed to visit the town. He said this was "one hundred more than envisaged in the initial agreement."

Since Wednesday, Moslem refugees have been allowed to visit their homes in Stolac, some of which have been destroyed or are occupied by refugees from elsewhere.

Meanwhile, a pro-Bosnian government source said Tuesday that Bosnian Serbs on Monday handed over the bodies of 51 Bosnian government soldiers killed in fighting in 1994 near Mostar.

He said that no international organisation had been involved, and nothing had been given to the Serbs in return.

The source said that officials would meet in a cemetery in Moslem-controlled east Mostar on Wednesday to identify the remains and conduct funerals.

The Moslem authorities in Mostar have declared three days of mourning for the dead soldiers, he added.

B-H: Soljic Writes Army HVO Generals on Fojnica Arrests

LD2805222696 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1850 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prompted by the arrest of six guards of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and two civilian police officers of the Interior Ministry of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia in Fojnica municipality, Federation Defense Minister Vladimir Soljic has written to General Rasim Delic and Colonel Gen. Zivko Budimir, HVO General Staff commander. The letter reads as follows:

On 25 May of this year, in the village of Alaupovka in the Fojnica municipality, the Bosnia-Herzegovina military police arrested six members of the 3d HVO Guard Brigade and two civilian policemen. The reason given for the arrests was that on 24 May, a vehicle and two Bosnia-Herzegovina Army members disappeared in Kiseljak.

This action by the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army military police is in contradiction with the law and constitutes violence. If the story about the two Army members who went missing in Kiseljak is true, then this constitutes an illegal act which calls for condemnation and appropriate disciplinary measures. General, in accordance with the aforementioned facts, I demand that you, as commanders, see that officers and soldiers under your command fully observe regulations.

I call on the international players, primarily the Implementation Force and the international police, to join in shedding light on this incident within the limits of their mandates, and to prevent possible incidents, reads the open letter that Defense Minister Vladimir Soljic sent to Gens. Delic and Budimir.

B-H: Air Force Commander Describes Peacetime Objectives

LD2405181196 Tuzla Radio Tuzla in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 May 96

["Excerpt" of remarks by Brigadier Salko Begic, commander of the Air Force and Antiaircraft Defenses of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on 24 May; place not given; from the "Otvoreni program"—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Just like the entire army, our air force, as one of its services, is also going through the process of transformation from wartime conditions to peacetime ones. In line with our doctrinal commitments and in light of our knowledge of our theatre of war, its geography and climate, we are carrying out an organization, or rather, we are working on developing an air force to suit our geography and climate.

This transformation is primarily designed to create an air force that in peacetime will guarantee safe and sovereign skies above Bosnia-Herzegovina, since there is no sovereign country without sovereign skies; to ensure that in safeguarding our sovereignty and executing this task we are a vital segment of our army in deterring

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

aggression. By this transformation and our training, we want, in peacetime, to create certain...[pauses] well, our views of the war are already formed, to have an efficient air force capable of and prepared for combat operations under all combat and weather conditions, by day and night.

We emerged from the war equipped with valuable experience of how to perform only some of the air force tasks made possible by the equipment and skills we had. To us this transformation means expansion. We want to be responsible for the sovereignty of our skies. In addition to aviation [as heard] and helicopters, we want to develop a multipurpose aircraft to suit our doctrinal commitments, to be capable of fighter-plane tasks, air raids, and reconnaissance tasks. We want to develop assault helicopters to suit the geography of the Bosnia-Herzegovina theater of war. We want to develop pilotless aircraft, missile systems, and units to protect certain zones and regions such as Tuzla, Zenica, and Sarajevo. We want to develop our radar units or VOJN [Vazduhoplovno Osmatranje, Javljanje I Navodjenje: Air Reconnaissance, Warning and Guidance], as we airmen call it, to cover all of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to provide information about and control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina skies. We have enough people for this. We shall have to train some of our people alone or with the help of our friends. We believe that very soon we will have the technical capacity to fully meet these tasks.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Croatia: Tudjman Delivers Speech at Presidential Council

LD2505100896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English/Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 25 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia has emerged from being an object of international politics to a subject—and this does not fit in with some plans of European circles—that goes back to the time of Versailles [1919], President Franjo Tudjman said in his speech at the second session of the Presidential Council which has begun in Zagreb. He was speaking about Croatia's international position.

In his introductory address he recalled the circumstances in which an independent Croatian state, which international factors were not enthusiastic to see, was established. The world quietly approved the policies of Belgrade and the Yugo-army, and did not expect Croatia to defend itself—but we succeeded in doing this, President Tudjman said. He recalled that this had been a difficult road and that the world, today too, wants to determine Croatia's future.

Croatia has become a regional power. It has achieved a partnership with the United States and has facilitated the Dayton agreement, President Tudjman said.

Speaking about policy regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, he recalled that the purpose of this policy was to ensure the survival of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the strategic interests of the Croatian state, and to prevent greater Serbian imperialism.

President Tudjman also spoke about Croatia's relations with Serbia and the FRY, stressing that Croatia does, indeed, favor the normalization of relations. Under no circumstances will it accede to any form of Balkan integration.

Apart from the permanent members of the Presidential Council and members of the international relations council, other senior officials, well known people in public life, and the leaders of opposition parties are also attending the session of the Presidential Council, which will be debating Croatia's international position over two days.

Croatia: Tudjman Says Armed Forces Need To Resist Pressures

LD2805170996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the occasion of Armed Forces' Day, Supreme Leader [vrhovnik] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia and supreme commander [vrhovni zapovjednik] of the armed forces, received senior officers and representatives of the Republic of Croatia Defense Ministry, of the Croatian Army General Staff, and of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Zoltan Kabok reports from the presidential palace.

[Kabok] Supreme Leader Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the republic, received greetings on the occasion of Armed Forces' Day of the Republic of Croatia, first from Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak. [passage omitted]

After Minister Jarnjak, Defense Minister Gojko Susak delivered his sincere greetings and said:

[Begin Susak recording] President, Supreme Commander, allow me, on behalf of the senior officers in the Defense Ministry and of the Croatian Army General Staff, to convey sincere greetings on the occasion of Armed Forces' Day and to express gratitude for everything you, as our leader, have made possible over the last five years, enabling us to witness the creation of a free, sovereign, and independent Croatian state. Since you were the one who set the guidelines for the entire Croatian people at home and abroad, I will take this opportunity, Sir, to wish you a happy Armed Forces' Day on behalf of the Croat Defense Council [HVO]. [end recording]

[Kabok] Greeting all those present and responding to the greetings and congratulations, Supreme Leader Dr. Franjo Tudjman spoke about several junctures in the creation of the armed forces.

[Begin Tudjman recording] This is the first year that we are marking Armed Forces' Day. There are additional reasons for this. It is only five years since we embarked on a covert effort to set up our armed forces as part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was the time when some officials, not just in Belgrade and the world but here in Croatia as well, accused us of creating paramilitary formations. That was a brief spell, only a trend in the history of a people, but, look what we have created and what we have achieved. We have achieved it with the help of our armed force that emerged from the consciousness, from the fold of the Croatian people; we achieved independence for Croatia, secured the future for the Croatian people and Croatian state. As I was watching earlier today the units of the 1st Croatian Guards' Corps that fought on all Croatian battlefields—Vukovar, Pakrac, Gospic—that took part in Flash and Storm, in Bosnia, I was more than pleased and proud of these people.

The fact that with these people and initially without any arms—but later we managed to find enough strength and know-how to arm them—this fact had to be noticed and recognized by the entire world. Even during the review last year and later, after all our victories, people were

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

amazed and they asked me: Where did you find such people? Well, I found them in our homeland and in the Croatian diaspora. We have created an armed force capable of guaranteeing a secure future for the Croatian people and the Croatian state.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have entered a peaceful period in which we can continue to reduce our armed forces, but at the same time must secure their combat readiness since we are living in uncertain times.

Ladies and gentleman, last week on Saturday and Sunday we met here, in this hall, to discuss Croatia's international position. We wanted to tell our people that despite all our victories, Croatia was coming under pressure which sought to influence not just its policies but its position as well. As evidence that we are not on the margins of what is happening but rather in the midst of it, I will mention two things.

After we passed the Law on Amnesty for the eastern Slavonia, Baranja, western Srijem, for the Croatian Danube basin, I received initial written demands to pass a new law, something I rejected, not accepting any diktats. Still, last night, I received the ambassadors of the Contact Group and the European Union, in other words the most important European and world players, and they repeated the same thing. Thus they still want to impose conditions on Croatia, to submit Croatia—in spite of disagreements among themselves—they still want to submit Croatia to some specific interests of their own.

I wish to mention this because we are going to be confronted with circumstances in which there will be attempts to impose conditions on Croatia. In order for Croatia to continue along its way, for the Croatian state to be secure, in order for us to be able to build our freedom and democracy in peace, we must continue to have combat-ready armed forces, with the most sophisticated battle equipment possible but which is first and foremost imbued, as it has been until now, with high national consciousness.

In order to realize these tasks also in conditions of peace, I entrust you, the representatives of the legislative and executive authority, and you, the employees of the Defense and Internal Affairs Ministries, with the following: on the one hand, to secure the funds necessary to maintain our armed forces, and on the other hand, in doing this, to economize as much as possible to keep the burden on the state budget, in other words our people, all citizens of Croatia, to a minimum.

But from this discrepancy—the need to have the armed forces, to ensure their normal life and development, and frugality, the need to be reasonable—we must demonstrate to all citizens of Croatia, to the Croatian people, the necessity of such a development, of the continuation of the policy and behavior of every single Croat, of the majority of the Croat people who will be the continuation of these successes and achievements. They will make sure that in the years to come we will continue to celebrate in peace and that at the same time we have armed forces, a guarantor of the peaceful future of the Croatian people and sovereign, democratic Croatia.

Thank you for your good wishes. Once again, I extend best wishes in these endeavors to the Armed Forces, to all our officials, and to the whole nation. [end recording]

Croatia: Tudjman Addresses Troops on Armed Forces Day

LD2805125396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A ceremony marking Croatian Armed Forces Day was held in the Damir Martic military base in Rakitje [near Zagreb] in the presence of President Franjo Tudjman, the supreme commander. In addition to Defense Minister Gojko Susak, other military and political officials attended the ceremony. [passage omitted]

President Tudjman addressed the soldiers and stressed the following:

[Begin Tudjman recording] I would like to extend my best wishes on the occasion of Armed Forces Day to all of you heroes, members of the Croatian Army's elite unit—the 1st Croatian Guards Unit [zdrug]—and all members of the 1st Croatian Guards Corps, to all members of the Croatian Army, the Croatian Navy, and the Croatian Air Force.

Our Armed Forces astounded the world with their courage and bravery, with everything we have achieved in the interest of the Croatian people and the future of the Croatian state, which no one will ever again threaten because we will treasure our Army—which we have created with you, our Army garlanded in glory—for the benefit of the Croatian people and the Croatian state. May our only and eternal homeland Croatia live and prosper forever. [end recording]

Croatia: Human Rights Group Calls Serbs' Situation 'Alarming'

AU2805163796 Paris AFP in English 1625 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, May 28 (AFP)—An international human rights group in Zagreb said Tuesday that Serbs living in former Serb-held areas of Croatia

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

were facing continued harassment and described the situation as "alarming."

The announcement comes days before a working group of the Council of Europe meets to measure the progress made by Croatia in improving democracy and human rights.

The Strasbourg-based council voted earlier this month to reject Croatia's application for membership on the grounds that it needed to make progress in areas such as improving the conditions for the return of Serb refugees.

Officials of the Zagreb branch of the Helsinki Committee for human rights, which has consultative status with the Council of Europe, told a press conference here that the situation was "alarming."

"Hundreds of Serbs are facing increasingly hard treatment and horrible things are happening to elderly Serbs in Croatia," Dragutin Hlad said.

"In some villages in the Knin region, groups of men come in the night to beat them up, attack them and rob them of their food. Some die from this treatment," he said.

He said that a Serb woman in her eighties was recently found dead near Knin after having been robbed.

Knin, in southern Croatia, was the "capital" of the separatist Serb region of Krajina, set up in 1991. It was recaptured in two offensives by the Croatian army last year.

According to figures from the International Committee of the Red Cross, about 180,000 Serbs fled to Bosnia during the offensives fearing Croat reprisals, while about 9,000 stayed.

The UN Security Council has criticised Croatia on several occasions for harassment of its Serb minority.

The head of the Zagreb branch of the Helsinki committee, Zvonimir Cicak—who is currently suing a pregovernment newspaper for describing him as an agent of the Belgrade authorities—said that a report of over 200 pages would be published soon about the harassment.

Cicak said, without giving any details, that new mass graves had been discovered in Croatia.

"We will publish a report on this subject... This report will be a terrible thing because the number of people killed since the end of the military operations in August 1995 has risen considerably," he said.

Citing government figures, the committee said that between 5,000 and 8,000 Serbs had returned to Croatia in the last few months. It then criticised what it said were "the multitude of administrative obstacles imposed by the Croat authorities to dissuade the Serbs from returning."

The committee said that there had been conflicts between returning Serb refugees and Croat refugees expelled from the Serb-held town of Banja Luka in northern Bosnia.

"Certain Bosnian Croat refugees are chasing Serbs from their houses and making them live in stables," Hlad said.

He said that the committee would hold a round table meeting in Zagreb on June 20 and 21 on the situation of the Serbs in Croatia.

Croatia: Beli Manastir Assembly Rejects Chairman's Resignation

AU2805101896 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 27 May 96

[Report by Jovan Vlajkovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 18th session of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly was held today. The resignation submitted by Assembly Chairman Slobodan Milovac was the first item on the agenda. We have a report by Jovan Vlajkovic.

[Begin recording] Deputies of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly did not accept Assembly Chairman Slobodan Milovac's resignation, which was submitted for personal reasons. The discussion about the reasons that lead to the assembly chairman's resignation in this critical period when crucial decisions of vital interest to all people living and working in Beli Manastir municipality are to be made and implemented, will be continued at the next session, which is scheduled to take place on Friday, 27 June.

The second part of the session focused on the political and military situation in Baranja. Deputies concluded that it is imperative that all institutions, bodies, and organizations of the system be organized so as to stabilize the political and security situation, especially with regard to the Beli Manastir police department, which is expected to submit, already at the next session, a detailed report on who is destabilizingthe political scene in Baranja and how much.

At today's session, deputies of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly welcomed the initiative of their Vukovar counterparts, who sent the text of the proposal on the special status of the Serb district of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem to all five municipalities of the district calling for the district to have an autonomous and demilitarized status. Welcoming the initiative, Baranja deputies formed a commission that would—together with foreign experts in international

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

law as well as local experts—view the viability of the proposal, but also make suggestions for the drafting of a platform that would reflect the basic interests and goals of the people in the district. Deputy chairman Svetislav Stankovic scheduled the next session for Friday, 7 June. [end recording]

Croatia: HDZ To Sue Weekly for Libel

LD2805211296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In reaction to an article in the weekly GLOBUS, the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] main secretariat has issued a statement which says, among other things:

The latest issue of GLOBUS contains an article headlined: The HDZ leadership's list of state enemies includes Budisa [Croatian Social-Liberal Party], Cacic [Croatian People's Party], Mesic [Croatian Independent Democrats], Racan [Social Democratic Party], Tomac [Social Democratic Party], Tomcic [Croatian Peasant Party], and Gotovac [Croatian Social-Liberal Party].

By using such phrases as our collocutor, but failing to disclose the person's identity, the author is insinuating that the HDZ has drawn up a list of state enemies. It is no coincidence that the article appeared immediately after the second expanded session of the Presidential Council last weekend at which all the participants agreed about Croatia's strategic interests.

Obviously, the author finds it difficult to accept that the session is seen as a strong contribution to the efforts to stabilize and heighten the maturity of the political scene in Croatia. Therefore, we see the article as being against not just the HDZ but against more stable and more constructive political relations in Croatia.

The allegation about the blacklists of state enemies is a blatant lie which is nothing more than a form of psychological warfare against Croatia and an attempt to weaken it. We expect opposition leaders and especially those who, as the author claims, are on the blacklists, will react and reject these ill-intentioned and shameless lies for the benefit of more stable and more constructive political relations in Croatia.

As a political party and a legal person, the HDZ will instigate libel proceedings against GLOBUS with the relevant court, the HDZ main secretariat said in its statement.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FYROM: Butrus-Ghali Views Petition for Early Elections

AU2805200096 Skopje MIC in English 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] After the formation of the new government, in accordance with the constitutional decrees, the two biggest out-of-parliament opposition parties launched a general campaign of collecting signatures which were to support the Referendum for the holding of early elections. While the parliamentary majority was not ready to recognize the constitutional basis for the holding of such an initiative, the peaceful and organized fashion in which the campaign was organized represents one more encouraging example of the progress made in the consolidation of pluralist democracy.

This is a part of the report of the UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali in which he suggests that the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment] mandate in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] be extended the next six months, up to November 30 this year.

Regarding the February changes in the Macedonian government, Ghali's report says: "It is worth mentioning that the emergence of parliamentary opposition represents an important step in the internal development of the state. As a result of the changes that occurred in February, 1996, the Liberal party, which was an important part of the ruling coalition, withdrew from the government becoming a main opposition party. The misunderstandings between the ruling and the oppositional parties in relation to the constitutional grounds upon the reconstruction of the government, have not degenerated into a larger political crisis, which in itself, speaks of an improvement in the political stability."

FYROM: Rehn Advises Albanians To Study in Tirana

AU2805195496 Skopje MIC in English 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The human rights situation in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is much different than in the other states which have stemmed from the former Yugoslavia—the UN special envoy for human rights Elisabeth Rehn told Radio Skopje.

"In Macedonia," Rehn emphasized, "human rights are respected to a much greater extent and the situation in the other fields is also better."

Elisabeth Rehn stated that she had accepted the proposal of President Gligorov to draw up a comparative analysis of the rights of the minorities in the Balkans in general. She assessed that the "effects of such a study are always positive, in view of the greater volume of information."

Authorities in Macedonia are trying to find a solution and to meet the demands of the Albanian minority for tertiary education in their native language, Rehn said.

She stressed that this problem can be solved if the Albanian minority goes to university in Tirana or Pristina.

FYROM: Skopje Refuses To Join Meeting in Sofia

AU2805200596 Skopje MIC in English 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] finds it unacceptable to take part in the Sofia meeting of foreign ministers from the Eastern European countries, announced for June 8 and 9 by the initiator, that is by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, the Macedonian Foreign Ministry says.

The reason for such a stance is that Macedonia would accept to take part in this meeting only under its constitutional name—Republic of Macedonia, and not as the organizer suggests—FYROM. The second reason for this decision is the suggested term for the holding of the Sofia meeting of foreign ministers, which coincides with the long announced international summit of cities in Istanbul, to which Macedonia plans to send a delegation.

Agency news says that Slovenia and Croatia have also declined this invitation, under the explanation that they are distancing themselves from Balkan regional association and Turkey, due to the holding of the abovementioned summit.

FYROM: Gligorov May Meet Greek President in Jun

AU2405144996 Skopje MIC in English 24 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] There is a chance that the presidents of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Greece Kiro Gligorov and Kostas Stephanopoulos might meet in Strasburg at the session of the Council of Europe, scheduled for the end of June.

The Greek newspaper ELEFTEROTIPIA published this news yesterday, MAKFAKS reports, stating that the two presidents are expected to hold speeches at the session of the Council of Europe, which could well mean they might meet during the meeting.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FYROM: Trends Toward Radicalization Among Albanians

AU2905103396 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 25-26 May 96 pp 4-5

[Article by Predrag Dimitrovski: "Radical Song Echoes Over Border"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Interethnic relations have again excited the domestic political scene. A number of events have taken place recently, two of which reaffirmed the fragility and sensitivity of political subjects.

First, there were some casual statements by parties about an alternative proposal in the newly drafted statute of Tetovo Communal Assembly to change the patronage of the town. Then there was Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] President Gligorov's interview for the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, which generated a stormy reaction from the Albanian political parties and a few communal assemblies. Finally, there was another interview, this time by PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] leader Arber Xhafferi for NOVA MAKEDONIJA. All this was accompanied by regular information about the events and situation in Kosovo, and the election campaign in Albania. The Albanians and their political representatives have again found themselves in the center of public attention, which gives rise to the question about the possible objective this time.

Many Attacks

The stir that was created in the Tetovo Assembly when it was suggested that the Tetovo Holiday be changed from 19 November, Liberation Day, to 3 March, the day when the first multiparty assembly was constituted, was settled in the easiest manner. Not because it is insignificant or because reshaping history was not a goal any more, but because it is a nonsense to adopt something that will become useless after the new territorial division and make the other side angry, conditionally speaking.

President Gligorov's interview for FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG caused a revolt among the ethnic Albanian parties in Macedonia. His assessment that "the majority of ethnic Albanians regard Macedonia as their fatherland and that there are only a few extremists among them" and that Tetovo phantom university is an "institution that was founded and planned by separatists," as well as his view that direct rather than mediated talks between Belgrade and Pristina are necessary, was the reason for a whole lot of unscrupulous attacks.

On the other hand, President Gligorov's next interview for EL PAIS a few days later met with no reaction. The Albanians in Macedonia, he said on that occasion, "have a guaranteed right to elementary and secondary education, and we are trying to find a solution for their higher education. The main problem is the low level of their elementary and secondary education. Because of this they feel they have unequal opportunities of access." The essence of the problem was hit again, but this time the ethnic Albanian parties in Macedonia remained silent.

If, in the first case, there was real disagreement with the president's conclusions, at least one counterargument or fact should have been presented. Unfortunately, there was no such a thing. The reason was simply that there is not another truth or argument for what President Gligorov stated. Simply, the goal was to strike a blow at currently the most stable political personality and function in the country and thus denigrate and humiliate the state of the Republic of Macedonia.

Finally, there is the PDPA leader's interview for NOVA MAKEDONIJA. In it, he spoke about unfulfilled human civil and rights of Albanians in Macedonia ("a population that has been pushed to the margins, in ghettos" and "it is necessary to make investments in education and sports, and in institutions that produce social values, in order to remove the Albanians from their ghettos"), Arber Xhafferi presented his own recipe for an overall solution to the Albanian question ("Kosovo is requesting and it is entitled to the right to external self-determination because it used to be a constituent element in the former federation, while the Albanians in Macedonia are asking for the right to internal self-determination. So, without changing the border, they will have the right to decide themselves on the way in which they want to develop"). Then he warned about the day-by-day increasingly militant spirit among the Albanians, and he ultimately threatened that he might reactivate "Ilirida" [Albanian name for western part of Macedonia, which some would like to see annexed to Albania].

Two Questions

The latest developments raise at least two questions—has anything changed in the tactics of the Albanian parties, and what is the objective of this strong course also in the interethnic relations, at least as far as our region is concerned? The answers are confined to Tirana-Pristina-Skopje relations.

It is evident that Dayton was a big disappointment for all the Albanians, without exception, in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania. Their expectations were not

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

fulfilled. Although it is one of the most pressing problems in the Balkans, Kosovo remained in the shadow of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has basically boosted the adrenalin of the Albanians. An additional reason for this was also because the Dayton agreement is slowly coming to life and thus prolonging the waiting list. The message [from Dayton] was clear—there will not be an integral solution to the Albanian question.

This (un)expected interim solution before the final resolution of Kosovo restraint was understood in some Albanian circles as a debacle for the moderate policy of the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, who had to swallow another bitter pill. He left empty handed after his visits to European capitals and the United States, without any support for an independent state of Kosovo, which was the final signal for Kosovo and for all-Albanian radical circles to launch an offensive.

When the situation in Kosovo returned to normal after the latest serious events, the tension surrounding the Albanian question had to change location. Of course, it had to be Macedonia. Once again, for the hundredth time, just to preserve continuity. It was necessary to express and demonstrate dissatisfaction with the situation of the Albanians here and to identify it with the situation in Kosovo in order to place Macedonia in the same basket with Kosovo, or to serve its goals. While waiting for the international community to express its opinion about the overall Albanian or individual Kosovo problem, they are waiting for a new Dayton.

In the well-known Kosovo trend, as every good salesman would have done, at least as far as the radicals are concerned, the maximum requests were on the top of the list. The highest price is determined and the bargaining begins.... What else can there be? There will be talks about the increasingly militant spirit among the Albanians in Macedonia and the impossibility of keeping it under control, and there will be visions of "Ilirida" as a twisted picture of the clear vision of federalization and Great Albania. In facing reality and the facts, the radicals and the government will have to answer to who is going to set conditions and make the rules in the game that has been opened.

Linked Radicals

The other side of the coin is Albania. By the way, Tirana has adopted the habit of acting as supervisor when legal acts are adopted in the Macedonian Assembly, which goes beyond all limits of good manners and tolerance. The latest case was the draft law on territorial division. The remarks were that the Albanians in Macedonia will lose the towns and remain in the country. Tirana forgot to mention, however, that the Albanians were the ones who had asked for more communes. It was probably not in good taste to indicate that the expectations were—more communes and the authorities of a state. Usually, every sizable event in Albania is reflected here, on our side of the border. The same is true of the lengthy campaign for tomorrow's parliamentary elections [in Albania]. It is a fact that representatives of Albanian parties in Macedonia, the PDPA and NDP [People's Democratic Party], participated in the election meetings of the Democrats, which shows clearly that there is a link between Berisha and our Albanian radicals and distance between them and the moderate PDP. Obviously, the support is mutual and the radical song of the Albanians in Macedonia was not accidentally sung at this moment. It echoes beyond the border, at least for now. However, it will be heard here for a long time, at least until our local elections take place in the autumn. Why not until the possible early elections as well? The views of the PDPA and the NDP in this area are clear. The only thing that is not is why, on the one side, they criticize the government together with the Macedonian opposition, while on the other side their manners contribute to the government's favor! Every disruption of interethnic relations in the country can only score a negative point for the early elections.

The hardliners' offensive is evidently producing results. On the other hand, it places the PDP in an unfavorable position, particularly because the PDP's moderate policy is producing concrete results in interethnic relations. The latest statistics show that 6.7 percent of university students are Albanians, 4.6 percent of Interior Ministry employees are of Albanian nationality, they hold three ambassadorial positions, and the number of the Albanian workers in the state administration is also increasing... This is a small step forward, but an important one.

Nevertheless, in the struggle for the voter, the PDP is and will be forced to change its style, and its course. The announcement about leaving the government coalition may, but need not, be the first signal. Let us just hope that the results of the concrete activities and the previous policy will be a more accurate visiting card than the naked federal and Great Albanian promises that nobody reasonable wishes. We have seen that sooner or later such promises drift away like bubbles.

FYROM: Party Identities, Orientations Analyzed

AU2905091196 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 28 May 96 p 4

[Article by Z. Darkovska: "Parties Strive for Center"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Five years after the introduction of a multiparty system, a number of changes have

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

taken place on the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] political scene and more changes are could take place in the light of the announced local elections. The basic determiners by which a party is "left," "right," or "center," have already been changed in some parties. The SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] has recently come out with an analysis on its party's positions, in which it indicates the SP [Socialist Party] and some other minor parties with communist orientations as "left." SDSM sees itself as a party left of the center, with an emphasis that the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] might join it the moment the civil spirit prevails over the national. According to the SDSM's newspaper DEMOKRATIJA, the pure center is vacant at the moment, although the LP [Liberal Party] aspires to it, but also the DP [Democratic Party], although the latter is still to the right of the center. By this listing, the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] are "right" parties, with the difference that the former is positively assessed as a party well on the way to becoming a classic parliamentary "right" from a radical "right" party.

According to their ideology, they [SDSM] say that the "right" has been a synonym for a conservative and reactionary party throughout history. More precisely, it is characteristic for the "right" to preserve the old or the existent classes, they are inclined to hierarchy, they are reluctant to make social and political changes. The "left" are defined as liberal, progressive, and more daring compared to the "right," while the "center" parties are characterized by moderate solutions and postponed solutions if these may cause conflicts, that is to say they tend to the "golden center."

How far are these definitions acceptable today, that is, how do the parties whose place has been defined by the SDSM react? Finally, where do the parties see and declare themselves to be?

Program and Practice

In unofficial discussions, some members of the Liberal Party claim to belong to the center. Zoran Krstevski, member of the Executive Board of the LP and member of parliament, says that the civil parties that are consistently oriented to democracy accept that they are publicly assessed in relation to their program and activities. According to him, a party can only speak of itself, and if it speaks of others in general, it is like labeling and trying to impose itself. The LP, Krstevski says, is prepared to give its view on every concrete question, but it is not prepared to give general assessments and list any party as "left" or "right."

The listing of the parties in poles, according to Krstevski, is today of a limited and dubious value. The same is related to Marx's later political thought in which this division is developed, but also simplified, so that the fans of the revolutionary methods in the political struggle are "left," the opponents to these methods are "right," and the "hesitant" ones, who come in as a "flood," as a "fluctuating, disoriented mass" are the "center." The LP considers this view to be incorrect and it considers that to divide the parties according to their views on revolutionary methods is of minor significance, because this question has been resolved. Civil thought, says Krstevski, today has other criteria in assessing the positions of the political parties. The first one is the relationship toward the structure of modern society—the civil and political sphere and the sphere that composes the state body. So, those parties that respect the relative independence of these spheres with their programs and practical activities belong to the civil parties. Those that aspire to negation of this independence with the aim of accomplishing full control over them with their programs or practical activities are considered to be totalitarian. Those who abuse and manipulate the social affiliation of the individual for the realization of their own goals claim to be "left" parties, while those who abuse the national feelings and national affiliation of the individual, as Krstevski says, were mainly called fascist parties.

As for the second criterion, whose essence is the system in which the laws rule, Krstevski says that it implies legal security in three fields: mass media, finances, and administration. Really democratic are those parties that defend legal security, while those that wish to introduce party influence or rule are said to be inclined to left radicalism or extreme nationalism, that is totalitarianism. Finally, Krstevski says that if these party efforts are expressed in a soft and hidden form, they are more inclined toward creating or supporting the Mafia.

Classic Right

The assessment on the position of the VMRO-DPMNE is given by this party's leader Ljupco Georgievski. He recalls that in 1990 this party could be defined as a radical right party, if we consider the two basic characteristics that define the parties—ideological and economic and social program. Meanwhile, the independent Republic of Macedonia was created, and the need for such a right radicalism was lost. So, we are now finding our place in what is called the normal right in parliamentary democracy, which is in power in a number of European

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

countries, Georgievski says. This is exactly the position of VMRO-DPMNE that we declare ourselves and try to develop with our program and activities. This is our definition after the 1994 elections although we see some illogical matters here as well. For instance, according to its ideology, VMRO-DPMNE can be placed fully on the right of the center, while as regards the economic and social program we are heading more toward the center. A political party that declares rightist policy cannot neglect the social moment and that is why I say that in this sphere we are heading toward the center.

The paradox with our greatest opponents, the party that declares itself as SDSM, is also one of proportion, VMRO-DPMNE's leader says. In the political sphere, they remain on the left, and in the economic sphere they are transformed into a classic, extreme right, because we see that this party is advocating a capitalism that in our terminology is often referred to as a giant who only cares about profit, while the social component is completely erased. Nevertheless, Georgievski says that the view that the parties have on their position has to be respected, although it is a completely different matter whether they meet the norms for such a position with their attitudes, and this is something for sociologists and professors in policy to assess.

As far as the DP is concerned, its leader Petar Gosev says that it tries to profile itself as a party of the center, primarily protecting the rights of the middle class, which is developing. I believe, Gosev says, that in this phase we have succeeded in imposing such an identity, because our party membership is mainly composed of this class. Some people have clear motives in trying to present us as a party that is half way from the civil option. We do not mind this. They used to create confusion even before by identifying the party with a class affiliation, the party with the state, the party with the national and chauvinist tendency, or national with the private interest, and so on. Unfortunately, Gosev says, they are doing the same today, now from the position of afternoon independent intellectuals, because in the morning they are members of the leaderships of the ruling parties.

Incomplete Social Base

According to Petar Gosev, Macedonian society lags behind in the completion of the social structure for familiar reasons, and as we know also in the actual constitution of its own state. It normally marks the basic political and platform determinations of the parties. Namely, they still do not have a strong social base. This is literally related to the old and the new SDSM. So, if we analyze the views of all relevant political parties, we will see that there are some (with certain differences) that are counting on all the social classes, trying to present themselves as national parties. Others are concentrating their platforms on the status of their ethnic or religious communities, groupings, or nationalities.

While the latter are well articulated, the parties of the former group stand before a period of more precise program profiles and of presenting facts that will prove that their program and practical activities coincide during their rule. To say that you are a civil party with a left, semi-left, central, or right origin is one thing, and it is another thing to have a clearly profiled platform, while it is a completely different matter to prove all this, says Gosev. That is why I think that we are closer to the truth if we say that this is a period in which the parties "are playing" on too broad a social base, that the daily policy affects their political views and that we can rather speak of general tendencies than of strong ideological positions.

FYROM: Socialist Party Elects Ljubisav Ivanov as Head

AU2705161996 Skopje MIC in English 27 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At its congress yesterday, the Socialist Party of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] elected a new president—Ljubisav Ivanov. 89 delegates voted in favor of Ivanov, and his opposing candidate Ilija Filipovski received 25 votes less.

The new president is a member of the Macedonian Assembly, a well-known businessman from Kratovo and general director of the combine SILEKS and president of the Soccer Federation of Macedonia. After proclaiming victory, Ivanov stated that "the Socialist Party is one of the most progressive political forces in Macedonia, which will hold its next congress as a party in power."

Saturday's edition of DNEVNIK commented the election of Ljubisav Ivanov in the following way: "This new change at the top of the Socialist party will definitely contribute to the party's profile. Its left-wing orientation can be expected to be radicalized, and its ties with the Liberals may well be strengthened, which will be ideologically comical, but also the only hope for the two small political groups to survive in the court registries at the next elections. The only thing uncertain is how Mr. Andov will take the support the Socialists are giving to Vasil Tupurkovski.

"Nevertheless, people of Ivanov's profile have never measured their survival in power with the quality of their ideas and moves. That's like leaving a soccer championship to the indefinite battle of the quality of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the teams and sports luck in the field. Therefore, it won't come as a surprise when Ivanov, very soon after becoming president, will introduce a doze of absolute loyalty toward himself by all the members of the Republican and Municipal leaderships. Some of those disloyal ones will be thrown out, others will be 'bought,' and the fine society will leave at its own initiative.

"Then, the systematic, personnel campaign will be launched, by appointing as many as possible of his own people in the right positions. The model already exists in a small form and its called Kratovo. Macedonia, according to its dimensions, perfectly suits such an ambitious socialist experiment, as a 'world process.'"

FYROM: Socialist Party Chairman Criticizes Government

LD2705153496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1234 GMT 27 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 27 May (TANJUG)—The Socialist Party of Macedonia [SPM], a coalition partner in the government, elected Ljubisav Ivanov as new party chairman at its second special convention last night.

Of the 156 delegates attending the convention, 88 voted for Ivanov in a secret ballot, while 65 representatives of the party's municipal branches voted for the other candidate, Blagoje Filipovski. [passage omitted]

During the debate, Ivanov sharply criticized the government of Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski and the parliament for having failed to focus sufficiently on the economic problems in the country.

He noted many mistakes committed in the recent past, especially in the field of privatization and economic reforms.

After his election as chairman, Ivanov said that the SPM will remain open to broad cooperation, because it operates in a democratic atmosphere and with a modern orientation.

The Socialists and the Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity are the coalition partners in Prime Minister Crvenkovski's government.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: Paper Reveals Vatican Confidential Letters

WS2805115696 Warsaw NIE in Polish 23 May 96 pp 1, 7

[Report by "Editorial Team": "Rosati-Concordati"]

[FBIS Translated Text] About two weeks ago, the press ran reports on the exchange of confidential letters between the Vatican and the Polish Foreign Ministry. Judging by those press reports, these letters create hopes for a more flexible stance by the Vatican on reservations about the version of the Concordat that was signed by the Suchocka government, which resigned while signing this version. The public, however, never learned about its details. The president confirmed the very fact of the letter exchange and talked about the need to be patient while conducting this dialogue. For his part, Rosati called on the press to stop talking about those letters altogether because this harms the correspondence between the Vatican and the government.

We believe that nothing should be secret on the Concordat issue. [Former Prime Minister] Suchocka and [former Foreign Minister] Skubiszewski negotiated and signed it in great secrecy, concealing it from society. So, we are making those letters public. Everyone can now read in our NIE what Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, the Vatican's secretary for relations with states, wrote to Rosati (see copy No. 1)

We would like to bring to your attention the fact that Archbishop Tauran suggests that, in matters that cause anxiety among Polish society, the Polish Government or Foreign Ministry should make its own relevant declaration and that it should be a unilateral declaration because the Vatican does not want even the slightest appearance suggesting that the Concordat is being renegotiated. If, citing the archbishop's letter to Minister Rosati, the Polish side insists on pointing out that the Vatican does not oppose such a declaration, the Vatican hierarch mercifully allows adding the phrase: "The Government (or Foreign Ministry), in agreement with the Holy See, declares the following..."

However, the formula "The Government or Foreign Ministry, in agreement with the Holy See" is not legally binding for the Vatican, especially without the official approval of Rome.

To piss off [as published] the fans of Polish sovereignty even further, we are also publishing the second letter that, along with the first, was received by Minister Rosati, the chief architect of a plan to impose the agreement with the Vatican, who has already been nicknamed "Minister Konkordati" (see copy 2). This is a draft declaration by the Polish Government written...in the Vatican!

They are so good to us that they even draft declarations for our government.

The acceptance of the Vatican's interpretation is a condition that the Vatican will not oppose the declaration of the Polish Government.

Let us take Clause 4, for instance. It follows from it that the Holy See treats school on a par with kindergarten, although the teaching of religion in kindergartens is not regulated in Polish legislation. It is based only on a directive from [former] Education Minister Samsonowicz, which is not supported by any law. Using the word "voluntariness" with regard to the teaching of religion in kindergartens is evidently making a fool out of everybody because, for example, a four-year-old kid who does not participate in a religious lesson cannot be left without care. So, who will hasten to ensure this care for the kid? This will be like teaching ethics in school: religion and nothing more.

Let us go on to Clause 5 of the Vatican draft of the Polish declaration, which pertains to the voluntariness of using priests' services in hospitals and slammers. The "voluntariness" included in the Vatican draft of the Polish declaration is severely mocked by that article of the Concordat that stipulates that a diocesan bishop may, without asking the owner's permission, send his black-clad Holy Joe to every health-care center, including private ones, even if it is run by Orthodoxes, Evangelicals, Jews, or unbelievers. The owner of the center is under legal obligation to conclude an "agreement" with such a Holy Joe regarding the latter's services, and any voluntariness is out of question here. The Holy Joes argue that nothing of this kind would ever enter a bishop's head. However, taking away buildings belonging to schools and hospitals enters their minds pretty regularly.

The Most Reverend Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran's biggest cracks are to be found in Clause 6 of the declaration that is being imposed upon us: "The Concordat acknowledges the power of state bodies to justly regulate, in agreement with a relevant Commission (...), financial and tax matters lying within the competence of Polish law." Let us turn our attention to the expression "in agreement with a relevant commission." This means that, if there is no agreement within and with this joint commission (for instance, regarding taxes to be paid by the Catholic Church), the Polish State may wipe its shoes with its legislation. The church is to be a single taxpayer negotiating how much it has to pay, at the same time keeping its revenues secret from the Revenue Office.

The Catholic Church has grabbed as much land as it could and has become a landed estate magnate once

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

again, but, if the Polish State wanted to change the tax regulations to make the Holy Joes pay what they are due for those tens of thousands of hectares of land, the commission would surely object, and the Polish State might kiss the commission's cassock opposite the commission's hinder parts.

It is said that, in any location with a Catholic cemetery, the church (which takes the Catholic cemeteries in its sole possession) may bury a non-Catholic. The church may offer—it is obvious—the Warsaw cathedral as a meeting hall to the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. The Vatican, however, will not concede to the word "must"—that is, to the obligation to bury every dead body, and so on, and so forth.

This is how this looks at short range.

Minister Rosati asked journalists not to be inquisitive about what the correspondence between the Holy See and Warsaw pertained to. Now we have seen this correspondence and know that the Catholic Church in no way intends to back off in anything signed by Suchocka and Skubiszewski. The church does not give the least hope that it is possible to bargain with it to obtain something, even if you are patient. It refuses renegotiation as if the Concordat were one of its dogmas. The dictated conditions—an inconceivable circumstance alone—are supported by [Spokesman of the Polish Episcopate] Pieronek's thinly disguised blackmail that, if the Concordat is not ratified, the pope may not come to Poland. Well, he may not, Mr. Pieronek. Kwasniewski will not be seen in the pope's company. Kwasniewski would like to parade in the shade of the white cassock, but his voters would easily get over the fact that he was denied this prestigious pleasure.

However, we have reason to believe that the top leadership of the left wing has been very much frightened by these threats. We have heard from our squirrels that, in the Presidential Palace, Kwasniewski is now calculating aloud: Let us ratify the Concordat and lose a part of the electorate. Let us say, one-third. But gains among the believers will make up for this loss. Maybe we will not lose anything. Our voters will vote for us anyway because they decidedly will not vote for the Movement of the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP].

These are suicidal calculations for the left wing. In elections, neither the church nor its clients will support the SLD, even if all of the leftists lie prostrate and sign anything the Vatican may produce. Kwasniewski is preparing an election failure for the alliance he formerly headed.

We have learned that there are plans under way on how to persuade deputies from the SLD club to vote for the Concordat. Those opposing the idea will be told the following: If you do not support [the Concordat], you will not be included on the list of candidates for next year's elections. At any rate, you will not be put in the place that is high enough to guarantee your election success. The opposite outcome is also possible: The leftist electorate will reject anybody who votes according to Rosati's and Kwasniewski's will.

We are giving a warning: This game is fraught with a split within the left wing. Consequently, it may result in a failure like that suffered by the split right wing. Such operations conducted a year before the elections mean a shot in one's head at a short distance. We may be called hysterical men with concrete heads, but we are reminding eminent leaders of the leftists that the Catholic Church has never adhered to any agreement with the left wing. The church will take the Concordat and support the right wing all the same; it will advise voting for the Christian National Union, Solidarity, Walesa, Maniek [Solidarity leader Marian Krzaklewski], [ROP leader] Olszewski, and Hienna [National Bank chairwoman Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz]—for anybody except the commies. We also think there are things more important than the presidential conception of personal career.

Now we can already taste what is in store for us: one cannot watch on television what one likes because the Christian values [must be observed]; the Constitution will be bad unless it includes an appeal to God; to have an abortion, one will have to go abroad and arrange for appointments with the help of carrier pigeons, because the police tap telephone calls searching for those arranging abortions. It is impossible to teach young people how to avoid pregnancy because any drawing of a pussy or a cock is treated by Pieronek as an offense to God. It is possible, however, to buy a car from a priest at a lower price because the priests can export cars without customs duties. If this is too little to allow Kwasniewski to go to the Vatican or the pope to visit Poland once again, then let them rather sit on their asses, everyone at his own place.

The case of the Concordat is a realm of hypocrisy. Leftist politicians in the president's retinue pretend that, through an exchange of letters with the Vatican, they will be able to mend and elucidate something in this murky and mendacious Concordat. A majority of SLD politicians in the government and the Sejm oppose the Concordat and know that the voters do not want it. They lie, however, [when they say] they want a concordat, only a better one.

Actually, this is what is taking place: The church wants the obligation to adopt concordats to be included in the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

constitution. The compulsion to sign them means that Polish governments and parliaments will always have to sign everything the Vatican wants, otherwise they will break the constitution. The church says that the Polish side may elucidate obscure matters by adopting laws connected with the Concordat. These laws, however, like the provisions of a future constitution, must already be compatible with the Concordat, which is pushed by Rosati and the president for approval in parliament. This is an international agreement, and domestic laws should be conformed with it.

Thus, the Concordat does not only mean financial benefits for the church, its status as a state within a state, the issues of cemeteries, weddings, religion in kindergartens, etc., etc. This is the problem of who governs Poland: how much authority is for the Vatican and its local subordinates and how much for people elected by the Polish society.

Thus, the Concordat is unnecessary and harmful in its entirety. It is time for the left wing to say this explicitly.

• • •

[Seal of Vatican's State Secretary]

Vatican, 3 April 1996

[reference number] N.265/96/RS

Dear Mr. Minister:

In your letter of 2 March 1996, you presented to Cardinal Secretary of State, also on behalf of the Polish president and Government, several observations connected with ratification of the Concordat between the Holy See and the Polish Republic signed on 28 July 1993.

I would like to thank you very much for your kind proposal, which became a subject of thorough analysis by the secretary of state.

Therefore, authorized by the Cardinal Secretary of State, I would like to communicate the following:

1. Signature of the Concordat by the Holy See means that it considers its contents precise and clear. Articles 27 and 28 of the Concordat offer a method of resolving possible interpretation problems. As a matter of fact, it is usually used in international treaties.

2. However, I will not consider it a problem if the government or Foreign Ministry drafts a relevant declaration. This declaration could refer to clauses that you identified; however, it should be complemented with amendments introduced in the attached Polish- and Italian-language versions.

3. Thus, this shoul[illegible] be a unilateral declaration rather than an additional protocol, which would prevent any appearance of the Concordat's renegotiation.

4. Finally, if the government or Foreign Ministry insists on pointing out that the Holy See does not oppose the contents of this declaration, it will be necessary to take into consideration all of the introduced amendments. In fact, this has been said in the draft's preamble, which reads: "The Polish Government or Foreign Ministry, in agreement with the Holy See, declares the following."

I would like to express my hope that the initiative you have undertaken will facilitate ratification of the Concordat, elevating at the same time the international prestige of Poland, whose authorities are aware of the enduring importance of the principle *Pacta sunt servanda*.

Seizing the opportunity, I am sending you my expression of respect.

[Signed] Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, Secretary for Relations with States

• • •

Mr. Darius Rosati, Minister of Foreign Affairs Warsaw

Draft Declaration by the Polish Government or Ministry of Foreign Affairs

To provide a clear explanation of clauses of the Concordat concluded by the Holy See and the Polish Republic on 28 July 1993, hereinafter referred to as the Concordat, the Polish Government or Foreign Ministry, in agreement with the Holy See, declares the following:

1. The principle stipulated in Article 1 of the Concordat whereby the state and the church are independent and autonomous is, in fact, a legal expression of practices that have evolved in Poland in recent years. They reject antagonistic attitudes in the perception of constitutional norms, favoring instead the principle of the development of man and public good.

2. The notion of inviolability of cemeteries, used in Article 8, Section 3 of the Concordat, cannot be perceived as the right to deny a non-Catholic or an atheist burial in a Catholic cemetery.

3. The Concordat respects total freedom of the nuptial couple as to what marriage it will contract and on what forum this will produce consequences. [as published]

The Concordat leaves the issue of implementing principles stipulated in Article 10 to Polish law.

4. In Article 12, the Concordat determines that:

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

—Catholic religious instruction will be provided with due respect for the freedom of parents and major students and according to current Polish law;

—individuals will be encouraged to voluntarily receive catechism in schools and public day-care centers.

5. In Article 17, the Concordat sanctions the state-guaranteed right to:

—voluntarily receive religious service in penitentiaries;

—voluntarily receive the service of chaplains in medical care and social facilities.

6. The Concordat acknowledges the power of state bodies to justly regulate, in agreement with a relevant commission described in Article 22, Sections 2 and 3, financial and tax matters that rest within the competence of Polish law.

7. Principles laid down in Articles 27 and 28 of the Concordat will be applied with due respect to the constitutionally approved powers of the Polish Government and respect to the powers of the Holy See and the Polish Episcopate Conference.

Poland: Reaction to NIE Publication of Vatican Letters

WS2805132196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 23 May 96 p 2

[Report by PAP and "ML": "NIE on the Concordat; Letter From the Vatican"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Yesterday [22 May] at the Sejm, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz expressed his regret over the publication of confidential correspondence between the Vatican and Poland on the Concordat.*

"I would not like to see negotiations broken off because of the publication," said the prime minister.

The NIE and PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY weeklies recently published a letter the Polish foreign minister received from the Vatican's secretary for contacts with other states, in which the Holy See says it does not see why the Polish Government or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] could not text a unilateral declaration on the Concordat. The weeklies also published the text of the draft declaration. NIE claims that the Vatican wrote it. Government Spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska denied the information and officially stated on Tuesday [21 May] that the draft had been elaborated in Poland.

PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY argued that a "sense of responsibility" was the reason for publishing the confidential correspondence. A loquacious commentary stated that the church is not willing to make any concessions and does not agree to renegotiate. PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY wrote in addition that "it will soon become clear to what extent [Foreign] Minister Rosati is going over to the Vatican's arguments."

"In my view, the ministry is not the source of the leak," MSZ Spokesman Pawel Dobrowolski told GAZETA WYBORCZA. He refused to say how many people within the MSZ and beyond it received copies of the Vatican letter. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary general of the Polish Episcopate, told GAZETA WYBORCZA that the prime minister's reaction is an indication of his good manners.

Poland: Church Official on Concordat, Constitution

WS2705100396 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary general of the Polish Episcopate, by Ewa K. Czaczkowska; place and date not given: "It Is Time To Stop Concealing Our Finances"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Czaczkowska] Judging by the political calendar, it does not seem likely that [church-state] relations will return to normal in the near future.

[Pieronek] If one follows party reasoning, I will agree that there is no such possibility; however, if one follows a different line of reasoning, if one takes into account the common good, the good of society, then this will be possible.

[Czaczkowska] Do you think the Sejm will ratify the Concordat, as is so optimistically predicted by Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych?

[Pieronek] For some time now, I have not wanted to discuss the Concordat because its ratification has ceased to be a problem for me. Everything that could be explained has actually been explained. The Polish Episcopate showed a great deal of goodwill to help some people understand the Concordat. This offer was turned down; thus, let the government and the parliament assume responsibility for it.

[Czaczkowska] It should also be the Holy See.

[Pieronek] I do not think the Holy See is trying to make anything happen; it is counting on the honesty of a government that is familiar with the following principle of international law: *Pacta sunt servanda*, which requires that concluded agreements be kept.

[Czaczkowska] Can one infer from this that the Concordat will not include a unilateral or bilateral interpretation note?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Pieronek] I do not rule out this possibility, but this is up to the parliament and the government.

[Czaczkowska] However, there must be consent of the Holy See.

[Pieronek] I do not want to discuss this issue. The parliament knows perfectly well what it can do; namely, it can pass executive laws and include in them an interpretation that would be more favorable to it. However, the parliament must want to do that.

[Czaczkowska] If the Concordat is not ratified, will John Paul II visit Poland next year?

[Pieronek] I suggest that you direct this question to the press spokesman of the Holy See.

[Czaczkowska] For a long time, there has been speculation that, in return for ratification of the Concordat, the church will not object to adoption of the new constitution in a referendum. You have recently declared that the church is not looking at the Concordat and the constitution as things that can be swapped for other things; however, you have also admitted that discussions on this subject are under way.

[Pieronek] Swapping does not make any sense because the church would contradict itself by exchanging one truth for another. In this issue, I cannot see any possibility of bargaining; however, there exists a possibility of holding serious talks that would finally show what the church really cares about in the constitution.

[Czaczkowska] What is it?

[Pieronek] This may sound like a slogan, but I will say that what the church wants is our Polish constitution; it wants the basic law to refer to the Polish constitutional traditions, it wants the document to respect national traditions and Christian societies. It wants the constitution to respect the right to life, to protect families as the natural and fundamental social structures. The constitution should not juxtapose families to relationships that do not have anything to do with families; the church wants parental rights to be preserved. Now, as far as church-state relations are concerned, I believe that in this draft they are defined very well, perhaps with the exception of the not really fortunate formulation regarding the impartiality of the state. However, I will not make an issue of this. The most important thing for the church is the axiology and the system of values; the atmosphere that is created by all of the provisions is also important. I do not think the Polish constitution might include some references or provisions that might be interpreted to the detriment of the church, not only the Catholic Church. There is also the problem of the preamble, or *invocatio Dei*; however, as far as these issues are concerned, I am convinced that it is possible to find some reasonable solution, if allowances are made for the fact that the Polish society is pluralistic.

[Czaczkowska] Aside from a reference to God, the preamble may also include a reference to values that are important to nonbelievers.

[Pieronek] Is anyone raising any objections to that?

[Czaczkowska] The church is not?

[Pieronek] No, it is not. Democracy entails pluralism, and the church wants to live in a democratic society.

[Czaczkowska] You must admit, then, that it is unfair to call the draft constitution nihilistic and totalitarian, as some church officials have called it.

[Pieronek] Extreme opinions might be found on the other side as well. Let us not quote them. I believe that it is possible for us to hold talks that would be more moderate, less heated, and based on sound arguments.

[Czaczkowska] Since March now, we have heard announcements of talks between representatives of the Episcopate with representatives of the Constitutional Commission. Will they actually take place? Do they make sense at a time when work on the draft constitution is almost completed in the commission?

[Pieronek] This is a good example of stagnation in church-state relations. Of course, talks are possible. Right now the church should say clearly what it wants. It should explain what it believes is the most important thing in the constitution and what it sees as a threat. I believe that this is where the role of the church ends. It is a prophetic task for the church—to specify what is good and what is bad. What the parliament will do with this is its responsibility.

[Czaczkowska] If the parliament adopts the constitution and decides to ignore these evaluations, how will the church react? Will it call upon people to vote against it in the referendum?

[Pieronek] It is too early to talk about this. I believe that the church might only continue to play the role it has played; this means that it would offer its own assessment. Let me quote another Latin adage: *Sapienti sat*, which means "This is enough for a wise person." The role of the church involves preparing people for a mature, Christian decision. The church cannot impose anything. Anything that is imposed by the church does not have any internal value.

[Czaczkowska] The personnel changes that have recently been made at the Conference of the Polish Episcopate, linked to the reorganization of its structure, have

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

led some journalists to believe that now the strongest group in the Episcopate will be a group of bishops of the so-called center, identified with the integral Catholicism [katolicyzm integralny].

[Pieronek] I think I can agree that changes are taking place, and they are taking place on several platforms. We are witnessing a change of generations; some of the people that are leaving us are very valuable. [passage omitted]

[Czaczkowska] Can we infer from these changes that now there will be fewer unnecessary conflicts in church-state relations, and that in the election campaign next year the stance of the church will not be as obtrusive as it was in the previous campaign?

[Pieronek] I hope there will be fewer conflicts, not only between the state and the church but also between the church and the people because the elections revealed many radical attitudes. Radicalism is a good thing if it is in line with certain principles, but *est modus in rebus*. One can be overly radical and do things that are disapproved by Christianity: be aggressive and condemn people for their mistakes.

The people or, in other words, the church, because there is not much of a difference here, must become mature enough to be able to support what is lasting and what will yield results in the long run; they should not keep fighting for bridgeheads and treat them as fundamental issues. Even though this may outrage some people, we must get used to the following: If a change of government takes place in Poland in line with democratic principles, it cannot be interpreted as the end of Poland. This is a normal thing in democracy, and we, as a church, must be prepared to live and to develop in any system that is not inhumane or totalitarian. There will never be a situation—it does not exist anywhere in the world—where the church commands total obedience or has some special privileges. We are not trying to obtain any privileges. The cross is part of every person's history. It is also part of the church's history.

Poland: Weekly Views Polish Church Moves To Reform

WS2405150596 Poznan WPROST in Polish 19 May 96 pp 20-21

[Article by Stanislaw Janecki: "The Hierarchy of Change; Who Will Reform the Polish Church?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP] and the church are battling over the Concordat or, more precisely, over [President] Aleksander Kwasniewski. Unlike his former party colleagues, the president cannot wait with its ratification until the constitution has been passed. On the other hand, the SdRP cannot fail its anticlerically bent electorate. Top Polish Peasant Party [PSL] politicians such as [Chairman] Waldemar Pawlak, a pronounced advocate of the Concordat as of late, have moved fast to turn the situation to their advantage. The church wants to prove it is being discriminated against once again so as to justify its political involvement. This camouflage is necessary because three out every four Poles disapprove of the church's meddling in politics, and 56 percent of Poles deny it the right to voice its opinion on acts voted by parliament.*

Some bishops are wondering whether the postponement of the ratification of the Concordat is helping the governing coalition or helping the church, a close associate of Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek [secretary of the Polish Espiscopate] told us. Signs of irritation from President Kwasniewski roused the interest of officials at the Episcopate headquarters when in March of this year Kwasniewski asked [Foreign] Minister Rosati to find a solution to the deadlock. Neither the PSL, the coalition partner, nor the SdRP leadership knew anything about the move.

In keeping to the president's request, Dariusz Rosati forwarded a diplomatic note to the Vatican proposing that the Vatican issue a declaration stating that adoption of the Concordat is not tantamount to the abolition of guarantees of liberties for nonbelievers. The Holy See was to also make a pronouncement on disputed sections of the agreement. The Polish Episcopate was informed of the note by the Vatican, and, on 27 March, Archbishop Jerzy Stroba, then cochairman of the Joint Episcopate-Government Commission, shared the information with the public.

It was at that time that Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek described Kwasniewski's enunciations as "empty-worded" and claimed that [the prospects for] "ratification of the Concordat were worse than ever" and that the impasse in church-state relations was "the most serious in years." The church took advantage of the fact that, in his expose, [Prime Minister] Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz had not said a word on the Concordat and that the SLD-dominated Parliamentary Group for Freedom of Religious Orientation had presented far-reaching proposals interfering with the agreement with the Vatican.

Piotr Jarecki, bishop of Warsaw, said that "the failure to ratify the Concordat is indicative of the crisis of government, of the malaise of the state." The primate of Poland, Jozef Glemp, made a similar statement on 12 May. Although the correspondence between the Foreign Ministry and the Vatican had started behind the back of the Polish church hierarchy, the Episcopate recognized

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

that it fuels the conflict of interest within the SLD and thus, as a result, serves to perpetuate the image of the church as the wronged party in the dispute over the Concordat.

In the meantime, the effects of a creeping revolution in the church could already be observed. The most important decisions were made during the 280th Plenary Conference of the Episcopate, held in Czestochowa at the turn of November and December. Precise guidelines were approved during the deliberations of the Episcopate's Main Council in Zakopane on 17-18 January of this year.

First of all, the obligation was made of Primate Jozef Glemp to limit the number of political pronouncements to a minimum. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek secured for himself almost exclusive rights to make statements on behalf of the Episcopate. It was he who admitted early in January of this year that: "We began too late to reflect on a number of things in the church. We could not continue this way of thinking—that only we are right and that opinions of others can be disregarded." This remark was echoed by the Elblag ordinary Andrzej Sliwinski: "The church in Poland has become too clerical, priests took on too many tasks."

Changes in the rules of the Conference of the Episcopate served as a pretext for deep reform.

The Main Council (constituted only by heads of archdioceses serving ex officio and two bishops elected by their peers from dioceses) was replaced by the Standing Council, whose members include eight representatives of dioceses. Seated in what (between plenary sessions) is the most important collective body of the church are such adherents of change as: Archbishop Henryk Muszynski, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, Archbishop Tadeusz Goclowski, Cardinal Franciszek Macharski, Archbishop Damian Zimon, Bishop Alfons Nossol, and Bishop Jozef Zycinski. Apart from Primate Glemp, the Standing Council has two other proponents of the vision of a "world ruled by freemasons and forces of evil": the metropolitan of Przemyslaw, Archbishop Jozef Michalik, and the Bishop of Kielce Kazimierz Ryczan.

It seemed that Juliusz Paetz, the new archbishop of Poznan, would speak out in favor of reform, yet there are few indication at present to confirm this. Archbishop Paetz, formerly bishop of Lomza, gained considerable support in the Episcopate largely due to his good ratings in the Vatican, where he spent 16 years. The retirement of Jerzy Stroba, the previous metropolitan of Poznan, helped strengthen the representation of the church in the Joint Commission. This was due to Archbishop Tadeusz Goclowski's assumption of the cochairmanship of the commission and Bishop Jozef Zycinski's appointment as new member.

The prominence of many influential conservatives in the Episcopate was, at the same time, reduced after the number of commissions was radically cut from 30 to eight. Several of these commissions are now chaired by reform-orientated officials: Waclaw Swierzawski, bishop of Sandomierz; Andrzej Suski, bishop of Torun; Jacek Jezierski, auxilliary bishop of the Warmia Voivodship; Edward Samsel, auxiliary bishop of Elk; and Stanislaw Gadecki, auxiliary bishop of the Gniezno Archdiocese.

Worthy of notice is the conspicuous absence in these bodies of Bishop of Lowicz Alojzy Orszulik, replaced in the Public Media Commission by Archbishop Juliusz Paetz. This would mean that the church is preparing for confrontation with the media, which has increasingly been dominated by the ruling coalition. This change, as well as the strengthening of the Joint Commission, prove that the church is more comfortable in its role of victim of an ideologically foreign state than in supporting a government that claims it has spiritual kinship with the church.

During Tadeusz Mazowiecki's premiership, this support manifested itself in the relentless imposition of its viewpoint on the national legislature.

These methods are no longer workable. In spite of the changes on the Polish political scene, the disapproval rate for church policies has dropped very slowly—by 2 percent since last March. The approval rate in the same period has dropped by barely 1 percent (from 57 to 56 percent). This means that, without inner transformation, radical improvement of the image of the church is not possible. [Lech Walesa's] defeat in the (1995) presidential elections was also a serious blow to the church. Bishop of Sandomierz Adam Smigielski said openly: "The last events in Poland (the presidential elections and referendum on mass privitization) have shown the weakness of the priesthood. We have to make a reckoning of our conscience to see if we have carried out the functions of our offices well."

According to information received by WPROST from the office of the primate of Poland, Metropolitan of Lublin Boleslaw Pylak, Pelplin Bishop Stanislaw Nowak, Jerzy Stroba, the just-retired Poznan archbishop, and Bishop Leszek Slawoj Glodz, head chaplain of the Army, have been retired from their direct influence in shaping current policies of the Episcopate. At least four [number as published] other changes in positions of diocese ordinaries are expected in the coming months. Alfons Dlugosz, auxiliary bishop of the Czestochowa Archdiocese, Stanislaw

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Gadecki, auxiliary bishop of Gniezno, and Warsaw Auxiliary Bishop Piotr Jarecki all stand a chance of being promoted.

Influential members of the Episcopate have, in recent months, unequivocally voiced their support for freedom and democracy.

Last February, Bishop Jozef Zycinski conceded: "In their current experience of disturbing change, many people attempt to lay blame on freedom and democracy for new manifestations of evil visible in our society. This sort of approach cannot be reconciled with the Gospel." He obtained further support from Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek: "The church in Poland wants to understand democracy; it wants a state that is democratic and cannot be an exception on the world map in this regard."

In the existing situation, the Presidential Chancellery does not want to repeat the mistakes made by Izabella Sierakowska, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, and Jerzy Wiatr, whose intransigence toward the church has been equally disapproved of as church fundamentalism. That is why Marek Siwiec asked Barbara Labuda and Danuta Waniek on behalf of the president to refrain from making statements against the church.

A peculiar race for the Concordat is now going on within the ruling coalition—the president, the speaker of the Sejm [Zych], Waldemar Pawlak, and lately Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz as well. The only problem is to convince SdRP leaders that they ought to oppose their own electorate and calm down the mood in the Labor Union against the Concordat. The fever has already run so high that almost every few days one of the four politicians mentioned above makes a statement on the final date by which the issue will be settled. A few days ago, the speaker of the Sejm said it would be this June. In the present heated atmosphere, hardly anyone remembers what the Concordat is about and why its ratification is so important.

Poland: Coalition Leaders Deny Split

LD2805214596 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 28 May 96

[Relayed via Warsaw TV Polonia Network; passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz has declared that nothing threatens the stability of the government or the Polish Peasant Party-Democratic Left Alliance [PSL-SLD] coalition. After a meeting last night, the leaders of the coalition agreed that the exchange of critical observations between the partners was merely an exchange of views about program areas.

[Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska] Today the leaders of the coalition played down any arguments between the partners.

[Cimoszewicz] "[?During the coalition meeting] we talked, among other things, about various statements by politicians from both coalition groups who, over the past few days, have not spared each other critical remarks, and we concluded that it was nothing, which as far as the essence of the functioning of the coalition could mean any serious threats."

[Franciszek Stefaniuk, PSL—identified by caption] "The coalition continues to function. It is made up of two subjects, but various opinions and views do clash."

[Marek Borowski, SLD—identified by caption] "We have explained to each other from where the speculations could have come from, such as, for instance, that the SLD would like to carry out local government reform, bypassing the PSL."

[Kolenda-Zaleska] Today SLD leaders distanced themselves from yesterday's statement by their colleague Krzysztof Janik, who said that the Sejm could pass the act introducing administrative districts in the fall with support of the alliance and the Freedom Union. Adam Struzik from the PSL threatened that in such a situation the Peasants would leave the coalition.

[Borowski] "We expect the government in the near future to present proposals containing various options for public discussion, and we hope that then, in that public discussion, we will win them over to our position."

[Kolenda-Zaleska] "But, in the immediate future, there could be another dispute inside the coalition, about the date of the elections. According to the SLD, the elections should be held in May."

[Jerzy Szmajdzinski, SLD—identified by caption] "Because then it is possible for the political alliance that wins the elections to form the government and bear the responsibility for the most important document, which is the state budget, and for the budget-associated legislation."

[Kolenda-Zaleska] The PSL is in favor of the constitutional deadline, which comes in the fall.

[Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, PSL—identified by caption] "I cannot quite see how the election campaign could be combined with the pope's visit. There are also other considerations."

[Kolenda-Zaleska] A coalition meeting about this is probably going to be held next week.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: Politicians View Early Parliamentary Elections

WS2805140896 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 28 May 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "ER": "Representatives of Parliamentary Clubs Answer TRYBUNA's Question; When Will the Parliamentary Elections Be?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"May is a good time to hold parliamentary elections," said President Aleksander Kwasniewski. Thus, he recalled the proposal submitted by the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. Will the election calendar be changed to speed things up? Will the SLD manage to persuade two-thirds of the Sejm deputies to back its proposal? For the time being, its greatest ally on this issue is the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, an extraparliamentary group...*

Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of the SLD Parliamentary Club: In the SLD club's speech on Wldodzimierz Cimoszewicz's policy statement presented in the Sejm, we proposed that the idea of calling the parliamentary elections in May be seriously discussed. Such a date would give the political parties elected in the elections a chance to assume full responsibility for the preparation of the state budget, the most important document used by the state. This is the fundamental reason for submitting this proposal, directed to all of the parliamentary forces. Acceptance of this proposal requires making a change, which, in turn, requires the support of two-thirds of the votes. Thus, a lot depends on how the parliamentary parties evaluate this proposal; they will decide whether such an initiative will be formally carried through.

There are no other reasons. However, if we assume that the constitution points to September as the election month, it will mean that Poland is the only democratic country in which the election campaign is waged during the summer vacations as well as during the time when intensive work is done in the fields. Of course, such a situation is possible, but the question arises whether this is right and appropriate.

Janusz Piechocinski, Parliamentary Club of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]: For a few months now, an increasingly heated discussion on the date of the parliamentary elections has been under way among high-ranking Polish politicians. Those who are in favor of shortening the parliament's term argue that the political calendar should be adjusted to the calendar of work on the state budget. As a member of the Commission of the Economic Policy, Budget, and Finance, I believe that this argument is well founded. Quite often after the main principles of the budget were adopted by the government and passed by the Sejm, thorough amendments were made by a new government and a new Sejm.

On the other hand, there are also arguments against. First, the legislative work on many draft laws is at a very advanced stage. This Sejm has demonstrated immense legislative capabilities. In line with the Sejm's internal regulations, if the term of the Sejm is shortened, its entire work will go down the drain, and the new Sejm will have to start the long and difficult work from scratch. Second, shortening of the parliament's term of office must be backed by general agreement of the political parties. At the moment, some of the extraparliamentary opposition parties are already exerting pressure to have early elections, whereas other groups would like the elections to be held according to the schedule. The situation in parliament looks pretty much the same. The coalition does not have the support of a two-thirds majority. In addition, as far as issues like this one are concerned, the political will of party leaders often differs from what the parliamentary clubs propose.

There is also no reason for the president to dissolve the parliament, unless it turns out to be difficult to form a government after the reform of the central administrative bodies. However, this discussion has only just begun. The PSL realizes the gravity of the argument regarding the budget; however, it also bears in mind the stand taken by Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, who pointed out that the highest priority before the elections is the completion of work on the constitution.

Grzegorz Cygonik, Parliamentary Club of the Confederation for an Independent Poland: The president tends to agree with his party colleagues, who are apparently afraid of the pope's visit to Poland. The real purpose of this proposal is not to ensure that the new parliament has the time to prepare the state budget because we are in a position to go on working as we have so far. This is only to keep up appearances. The real purpose is to see to it that the elections are held before the pope's visit to Poland, when the SLD's preelection rating is sufficiently high to guarantee the party a considerable number of seats in the Sejm.

In my opinion, the elections should be held according to schedule. We have had enough of shortening terms of parliaments. Let us have one full term. Let us build the parliamentary system and the Polish political scene, but let us not do it badly and hastily; otherwise, we will see that the reforms, such as the social security system reform, were not carried out only because the parliament was dissolved and everything had to be started all over again.

Andrzej Gasiennica-Makowski, chairman of the Parliamentary Club of the Non-Party Bloc in Support of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Reforms: I am taken aback by the president's stance. It was always said that elections are best held according to schedule. This looks like another game; it is related either to the visit by the pope or to fears concerning the market situation.

Any reason can be given for changing the election date. I believe that, if the right wing is prepared, the date will not be so important to us. However, if one says that something should take place in line with a schedule, one should stick to this.

Andrzej Potocki, press spokesman of the Parliamentary Club of the Freedom Union: It seems that the idea of holding the elections in May is to ensure, among other things, that issues concerning the budget are not discussed in the election campaign; in other words, the coalition would not have to reveal its financial plans before the elections. From the point of view of the voters, this idea is neither good nor honest.

Wieslawa Ziolkowska, first chairwoman of the Parliamentary Club of the Union of Labor: The date of the parliamentary elections was not discussed by either my club or my party. I personally think that the elections should be held according to schedule. I see no special reasons to hold them earlier, unless the coalition partners have exhausted the possibilities of cooperating with each other. If so, they should be held earlier—for the good of Poland. It is also possible that the coalition partners fear the opinion, which is voiced more and more frequently, that the four years have not been properly used to carry out several reforms—health care, medical care, education, another level of local self-government. Although this coalition has had more time than the previous ones, it has not carried through any systemic reforms.

The argument concerning the budget is only a veneer to cover political arguments. I have been working on state budgets for so many years that I know that the effective work on the budget does not exceed one month.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Romania: PRM's Tudor Launches 'Most Venomous' Attack on Iliescu

AU2805113996 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 22 May 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Once More Corneliu Vadim Tudor Violently Attacks Ion Iliescu"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The most recent issue of the weekly ROMANIA MARE carries the most aggressive attack ever launched against President Ion Iliescu by his former ally, Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Is it paranoia or the desperate gesture of a man with nothing to lose? Readers might wonder about this, after reading the terms ascribed by Vadim to the head of our state, such as "Russified Gypsy," "sclerotic monkey," "Stalinist," "the biggest shame of the human species," "criminal," and so on. As a matter of fact, the weekly begins its attack on its front page with a parody of a text written by poet Marin Sorescu ("Eminescu did not exist...") in which Iliescu is accused of having abandoned his mother, having staged a bloody military coup, supporting a predatory mafia, etc.

Below are some excerpts from the most venomous text ever published against the head of the Romanian state. The subheads are ours.

The weekly does not ignore other "clients" of Vadim either, such as Ion Cristoiu [EVENIMENTUL ZILEI director], Vasile Vacaru [senator of the ruling party, chairman of the parliament panel exerting control over the Romanian Intelligence Service], and others. However, comparing the seriousness of the accusations directed against President Ion Iliescu with the ones addressed to Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, for instance, the latter seem to be mere friendly jokes.

"The KGB did not exist! What did exist was just a Russified Gypsy, having the profession of a politruk, who first roamed about going to kolkhozes, his coat hanging from his shoulders. Afterwards he abandoned his mother and stayed on the watch for 25 years until he could stage a bloody coup, spoiling the holy day of Christmas by an odious murder, as he is a declared atheist. What did exist was an ethnic Hungarian drayman [reference to Romanian Intelligence Service Director Virgil Magureanu, born Asztalos], and a Gypsy rascal of Strehaia [reference to General Dumitru Iliescu], both proven and shameless gangsters, whom he swore to protect, without any respect for laws, common sense, or God. What did exist was a predatory mafia, which starved the Romanian nation, robbed it, disdained it, and turned it into the servant of foreigners, bringing it to the brink of despair, in a nightmare and genocide that seemed to have no end, while all the crimes and illegal doings of the Octopus were hushed up at the highest level. And because all this evidence of callousness and high treason against the homeland had to bear a name—they called it Iliescu!"

"Individuals Who Abandon Their Own Mothers Will Do Any Evil Thing"

"(...) The irresponsible stance of citizen Ion Iliescu did not surprise us at all. Individuals who abandon their own mothers, who trigger bloodbaths and subsequently destroy the entire country, will do any evil thing. Some of our readers asked us to respect him, if not as a man, at least in his capacity as head of the state. But we reply: Is Iliescu still the head of our state? Which state? Has he ever been one? When all the roads and interests of the mafia lead to him, when rats such as Sever Muresan, Marcel Ivan [businessmen], Dumitru Iliescu [commander of the Guard and Protection Service], Zaher Iskandarani [Syrian-born businessman currently under arrest for corruption], as well as other criminals are nesting under his armchair, when he does not want to comprehend anything about the torments of the population, and instead of going to the spot during the 1995 and 1996 floods, he shows up, like an old witch, at all kinds of parties, letting himself be photographed with starlets, and—finally—when disaster and squalor have overcome the economy, public health, agriculture, tourism, armament industry, investments, and the standard of living, he keeps grinning like a sclerotic monkey, shrugs, and pulls his wooden tongue out of Moscow's butt to say that 'the situation is complex'—what kind of a state president can such an irresponsible person be? (...)" [passage omitted]

"Beria-Type Habits"

"The Beria-type habits displayed by Iliescu prove how deep the Stalinist indoctrination was, which he underwent in the fifties in the USSR (...)"

"The Biggest Shame of the Human Species"

"Listen to us, you Iliescu, when we say: You are the biggest shame of the human species; scoundrels and criminals such as you are only born once in a hundred years, and even those are kept in formaldehyde at legal-medical institutions, but you managed to flee between the legs of the people and now you are turning their lives into a Calvary that does not seem to end! Do you really mean to say that an entire nation of 22 million people is involved in diversion, and it is only you and the Hooded Snake [Sarpele cu Ochelari—reference to Magureanu] who are walking about among the people with your backs straight, just like God and St. Peter, but much rather like Satan and Mephisto, taking everyone's will to

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

go on living. There are countries where people commit suicide for infinitely lesser sins (former French Prime Minister Beregovoy, former U.S. Admiral Boorda, and others) or they step down—but not you; you keep walking about proudly, your tails up, always together like the stitch that goes with the cough, a Gypsy and a Hungarian, spoiling everything you touch. We hope you had your helicopter made ready for takeoff, because the people's rebellion is close! (...)" [passage omitted]

Romania: Iliescu Declares PRM's Tudor 'Nonexistent'

AU2805163396 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 24 May 96 p 7

[Report by Vera Iliescu on statement by President Ion Iliescu: "For Me C.V. Tudor Is Nonexistent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Ion Iliescu stated yesterday, 23 May, that he does not intend to file suit against C.V. Tudor [president of Greater Romania Party—PRM] for the qualifiers he used against him, although the PRM senator's parliamentary immunity has been lifted. "I do not want to comment on Mr. Vadim's words or behavior. I have not filed suit against him and I do not intend to have anything to do with him. For me he is nonexistent. I completely ignore him."

Romania: PD's Roman Stresses Need To Join NATO

AU2805100896 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 16 May 96 p 7

[Report by Liana Sega on news conference by Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party, with unidentified reporters in Bucharest on 14 May: "In the Effort To Join NATO, the Czech Republic and Romania Are Shoulder to Shoulder"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sega] Upon his return to Romania after the two-day visit to Prague at the invitation of the Czech parliament, Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party [PD], held a brief meeting with the press. On this occasion he said:

[Roman] During this brief visit I held meetings with the chancellor of the Presidency of the Czech Republic, with the president of the Defense and Security Committee in the Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Vladimir Suman, and with Defense Minister Vilem Holan. As was natural, during our talks we approached the issue of NATO association. And here was the first pleasant conclusion for me: All these people with high responsibility claim that Romania belongs to the first line of countries that rightfully aspire to joining NATO. They wish Romania to assert this point most emphatically, believing that its action should be made concomitantly with the actions of the Czech Republic. They assured me that this viewpoint is also expressed in Poland and Hungary. Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski even gave us some proof in this respect during his recent visit to Romania.

Thus I believe that with regard to the platform we are coming up with for the discussions regarding NATO enlargement, things look better due to the great support I believe we enjoy from the partner countries. We are not talking about competition, but rather about the understanding of a need and joint necessity.

We have also approached army issues, reform in the army, issues regarding the national defense industry—as was normal—and about parliamentary control over the military institutions and over the institutions of public order.

Mr. Suman, the president of the Defense and Security Committee in the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Rebublic suggested to me an interesting initiative; namely, to try the action of notifying the parliaments of the 16 NATO countries about NATO enlargement. It is a correct idea because, as is known, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, the access of a country to NATO, even if it is approved by the NATO Council, must be ratified by the parliaments of the 16 member countries. Therefore, it is very important to start such actions right now.

The talks have been fruitful because we could talk broadly about what our join interest means, and we noticed that Romania is regarded as a country that, in light of the stabilization of democracy, is a trustworthy partner, a first-class partner.

I also held meetings with members of the Czech Social Democratic Party, and I noticed that, in the full swing of the electoral campaign—the elections will take place on 31 May and 1 June—the atmosphere is not heated at all, as it is in our country. There is no invective, and the campaign is unfolding in responsible fashion. I followed by chance a confrontation between current Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and his major opponent, the president of the Czech Social Democratic Party, which was held under elegant conditions of healthy policy discussion. I was somehow envious because there an electoral campaign can be based on arguments, on an assumption of responsibility, and on the attempt to convince the electorate. Our social democratic colleagues assured us that they would grant us complete support in the electoral campaign of the Social Democratic Union [USD] and the Democratic Party.

I held an interesting meeting at Radio Free Europe with the head of this station, Mr. Gillette from the United

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

States; the head of the Romanian Section, Nestor Rates; and many journalists in the Romanian Section and other sections, such as the Russian and Bulgarian sections. The discussions certainly focused on the political situation in Romania in view of the elections. For example, the journalists there were unpleasantly surprised at the statements made by Mr. Adrian Nastase [Party of Social Democracy of Romania executive president] against BBC Radio, as well as by the way in which the National Audiovisual Commission is granting broadcast licenses. They follow with great interest what is happening in Romania—this is their job—and I believe that Radio Free Europe will continue to remain a radio station that is a source of reference for the opinion of the public in Romania.

[Sega] The journalists present at the briefing also asked Petre Roman several questions.

[Reporter] Did you hold discussions referring to your proposal made in Rome regarding the institutionalization of NATO?

[Roman] No, I did not. The discussion that I held was connected with the report that I am going to present in Athens on 18 May. We swapped opinions, each bringing forward additional arguments in favor of NATO enlargement and for the support of what I believe is the essence of my report, that is, including Romania in the first group. Our arguments are converging, and in most cases they are even identical. I could say that the remark that I made some time ago, namely that Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia present a unified message with regard to NATO enlargement, has been confirmed.

[Reporter] Do you have any elements of comparison in connection with the stage of reform in the Czech Republic and Romania?

[Roman] Certainly we discussed this issue, because I am interested in learning elements of reference regarding reform in the Czech Republic. No doubt it is more advanced than in our country. First of all because there, privatization went very fast and decisively. Privatization made it possible for the profitable economic activities in the Czech Republic to prevail today, even if there continue to be problems with the restructuring of industry. It is a very significant fact that in 1995 Prague had an income of about $2 billion from tourism, something that is most remarkable. However, one cannot say that the population has a high standard of living compared to the prices. Nevertheless, one can see that the population trusts Czech Republic's positive evolution and the fact that the reform process is already a success. Although—I have to repeat it—the standard of living cannot be compared with Western standards.

[Reporter] Corneliu Vadim Tudor [president of the Greater Romania Party] presented to the press cassettes that prove that the Romanian secret services have tapped certain telephone conversations of politicians and some journalists. What can you say about this?

[Roman] I am waiting for the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies' Defense Commission in order to discover what might be the institutional formula for us to interfere in this. Until then, I could say that it has been confirmed once again that the intelligence and counterintelligence services fulfill their mission only when they are not involved politically, when they are not asked to carry out political activity, get involved in political affairs, or do political favors. This is the fundamental issue. If those wiretappings took place indeed, then we should find out on the basis of what accord, what approval, it was possible to carry out such a tapping, being aware of the fact that, from this viewpoint, the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] has very precise rules, established through the law on national security, even if their action is aimed at revealing some violations, some facts of an undemocratic nature, or, let us say, some antidemocratic facts. In this case, the means that can be used in order to restrain the effects of an illegal action are regulated by the law and the parliament, and the parliamentary commissions have the possibility of intervening. I still believe that these actions—together with political signals coming from some people, who have no moral credit or moral profile whatsoever, to shout "Catch the thief!"—prejudice even the idea of improving the climate in Romania with regard to the actions of the intelligence and counterintelligence services.

[Reporter] Do you believe that a dangerous precedent has been set—if it is proven that those recordings are real—for the intelligence services in Romania, meaning that now anybody can come up with a cassette illegally recorded in order to sell it "at auction"?

[Roman] Any illegal act, particulary if it has a political nuance, is very serious. Any violation of the national security law and the law on the organization and functioning of these services is unacceptable. I would say that we should not do anything hasty before we find out the details that, I believe, must emerge any moment now. I think this is the right thing to do.

[Reporter] Nevertheless, will Romania ascend to NATO in the first wave, given John Major's statement in Prague?

[Roman] There are several statements that can lead to such a discriminatory image. There is no point in making speculations now about these statements. Before the elections in Russia and in the United States are over, and before a decision of the NATO Ministerial

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Council emerges, these speculations needlessly incite the debate. I keep my opinion—even my promise—that until the very last moment Romania must tirelessly use arguments and bring into discussion its aspiration to become a NATO member, and this should be done—I repeat—up to the very last moment before the decision is made by the official NATO representatives.

[Reporter] How do you think you will be able to notify the parliaments of the 16 NATO countries about the expansion of the alliance?

[Roman] The suggestion of the Czech parliamentarians is very useful; that is, it seems to us, being in the full swing of debates, that our arguments are known to everybody. Unfortunately, this is completely false. The parliamentarians of the 16 NATO countries have no means of being so well informed, and direct information, through various channels, can indeed be useful. I have noticed that every discussion of this kind can clarify things in the direction we desire.

Romania: Roman Urges Mures Inhabitants To Vote Wisely

AU2905124196 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 27 May 96 p 7

[Article by Liana Sega: "Petre Roman: Put at the Head of the Community People Who Can Make Order Because Order Can Be Made"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The visit to Transylvania by Mr. Petre Roman, presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Union [USD], continued last Friday at the SC Electromures company of Targu Mures, where Mr. Petre Roman met with the enterprise's employees and management. [passage omitted] When the manager of the SC Electromures company asked him for support in establishing trade links with Yugoslavia, Mr. Petre Roman's answer was clear: "Hurry up and enter that market." [passage omitted]

The problems of the people in the communes visited by the USD presidential candidate are no different from those of the peasants throughout Romania, and are caused by the government's disinterest or inability to properly administer the agricultural sector, Mr. Roman said. These problems are: high prices; lack of agricultural equipment and machines and the impossibility of acquiring them; lack of a proper purchase system; and very low pensions. All these shortcomings make the people's lives impossible. And so they are all waiting for a change.

"Be careful about who you are going to vote for this year! If you want a change for the better in your lives, you should put at the head of the community people who can make order, because order can be made," Mr. Roman told the people in all the visited localities. [passage omitted]

"I feel very well here in Mures County, where I arrived yesterday," Mr. Roman said in his speech to the Targu Mures inhabitants. [passage omitted] He praised the USD lists of candidates for the local elections in the county, which include outstanding personalities, beginning with Dr. Sant Bert Hasgean, candidate for the Targu Mures City Hall, and continuing with the best known and most respected names in the municipality. "It is an honor to be introduced this evening by Mr. Petre Roman himself," Mr. Hasgean said. [passage omitted]

Romania: PDSR President Favors Ties to PUNR After Split

AU2805174196 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 25 May 96 pp 8-9

[Interview with Oliviu Gherman, president of the Social Democracy Party of Romania-PDSR, by Anne Juganaru in Bucharest on 22 May: "The Breakup of the Protocol Between the PDSR and the Romanian National Unity Party Does Not Automatically Create an Antagonistic Attitude"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Juganaru] Mr. President Oliviu Gherman, is the alleged harassment of the candidate of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] for the Cluj-Napoca City Hall the "straw that broke the camel's back" in the relations between your party and the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], or has the moment come for your party to go alone in the "race," without partners?

[Gherman] At the meeting of the PDSR Central Executive Bureau, we raised the issue of the repeated PUNR chicaneries aimed not only against our mayoral candidate Ioan Rus, but also against other PDSR people who are competing with PUNR candidates. [passage omitted]

[Juganaru] In view of the fact that these attacks have been going on for some time—something you also admit—part of the press believes that President Iliescu has only now given the "green light" for you to break up the protocol with the PUNR. Can you deny this?

[Gherman] I must confess that I do not know President Iliescu's stance on this, because, as I have often said in the past, in none of the meetings with him do we go beyond discussing various aspects of coordinating the activity of the two chambers and the government to improve the legislative process. I would like to point out that President Iliescu has never interfered in these political matters, and we did not solicit his opinion,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

partly to avoid exposing him to criticism for interference in politics. He may agree or disagree with this position, but the PDSR decision had nothing to do with President Iliescu's viewpoints on the matter.

[Juganaru] Is it true that a secret meeting took place at Cotroceni Palace between the PDSR and PUNR in the last 24 hours?

[Gherman] As far as I know, no meeting between the PDSR and PUNR took place, and I believe that, in my leading position with the PDSR, I would have known of any such meeting. Besides, we do not schedule our meetings at Cotroceni Palace. We would schedule such a meeting in a neutral place, neither at our headquarters, nor at theirs, but more likely in a protocol house of the government or parliament.

[Juganaru] Mr. President, although the two ruling parties were supposed to meet, the PUNR did not show up. We know that a new meeting is in the offing (the interview with Mr. Gherman took place on 22 May 1996—editorial note), but according to the latest statements of the PUNR leaders that meeting will not take place. What will your attitude to that be?

[Gherman] We expressed our viewpoint in the letter addressed to President Funar [Gheorghe Funar, PUNR president]. We believe protocol stipulates such procedures. [passage omitted] If the PUNR parity commission does not present itself to the meeting, we will consider ourselves absolved of any responsibility in connection with protocol.

[Juganaru] What might change if the meeting were to take place after all?

[Gherman] Well, we may draw up a complete file of PUNR actions, situated outside the protocol provisions. We will present this file to the leadership of the two parties to settle, once and for all, the issue of whether we are two groupings bound in a governmental coalition, or whether one of the parties simply wants to enjoy a double role: on the one hand, it wants to be partner in the government and benefits; and on the other hand, it wants to criticize the government.

[Juganaru] According to the latest statements of the PUNR staff, the PUNR does not want to break up the protocol. However, I must tell you that many observers of the Romanian political scene are rather baffled: They either hear belligerent statements and imminent intentions of "divorce," or they note appeasing nuances through various references being made to future talks within a parity commission. Therefore, are you going to continue the cooperation with the PUNR or not?

[Gherman] I would like to say that our move aims at breaking the protocol, but we do not want to anticipate the results of the talks in the parity commission, nor of the talks between the two party leaderships. That would mean that we are setting out with ill intentions in both meetings. Consequently, we are not striving to break up the relations, but rather the protocol. After all, the two parties can maintain contacts without their being stipulated and included in a proper document. [passage omitted] If convergent positions emerge, along with full assurances that no such mishaps will repeat themselves, we do not rule out the possibility of preserving the protocol, either. [passage omitted]

[Juganaru] Why did you not behave with similar patience, tact, and "diplomacy" when you broke up the protocols with the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] and the Greater Romania Party [PRM]?

[Gherman] Things were quite different, there. In the case of the PRM, certain duties were brutally violated by that grouping, something which proves an elementary lack of civilized political behavior on their part. In those circumstances, we did not deem it necessary to go through additional stages, which would have also included talks at the level of all four parties joined through the protocol. Any dragging on would have only exacerbated that unacceptable situation on the Romanian political landscape and we considered the prolongation of the process—which would have involved the other signatories of the respective protocol—more harmful than useful. The break with the PRM was obligatory and unequivocal and it took place at Parliament level.

Regarding the PSM, we actually held a talk on the dissolution of the protocol. We only noted the fact that PSM President Ilie Verdet said on two occasions (and he must have known what he was doing) that, in the PSM's opinion, the protocol has never existed and has had no effects whatsoever. Consequently, there was no protocol to break up, but rather one had to ascertain that it has had no effects.

[Juganaru] Excuse me, but even you refuted his statement at that time!

[Gherman] It is true that I could not agree to President Verdet's statements, because, as far as we are concerned, one cannot dissociate the presence of the PSM representatives in local governmental authorities from the protocol as such. President Verdet claimed that this matter was linked to an annex of the protocol, not the protocol itself.

[Juganaru] What signals did you receive from the PUNR ministers if the protocol is canceled: Will some of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

them join the PDSR, or will they withdraw from the government?

[Gherman] We have received no such signals from them. I am morally obliged to grant all due respect to the four current ministers who belong to the PUNR. [passage omitted]

[Juganaru] According to some political analysts, there are three parties that count in Transylvania, and the struggle for the electorate will be waged among them: the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], the PUNR, and the PDSR. Since one can assume that the UDMR's votes cannot be lured away from it, it means that the "battle" will be waged between the party you are leading and the PUNR. Who do you think the Transylvanian population will turn to if the protocol no longer functions?

[Gherman] I would like to state here that there is no reason for our relations with the PUNR to become antagonistic. For the time being, we have a cooperation protocol with the PUNR, but the relations between the two parties can continue in a spirit of mutual respect, without such a compulsory document. Therefore, the cancellation of the parliamentary and governmental cooperation protocol does not necessarily presuppose the emergence of a state of hostility.

[Juganaru] I thought that accusations usually lead to animosity, particularly at the time of elections, when competition reigns supreme and the boundary to hostility is pretty thin!

[Gherman] All parties are competitors in the elections. There is no doubt that no one will give up the initiative, because we are all engaged in a political battle. Although I do not like to make hypotheses about the future, we do not rule out the possibility that—in case the cooperation protocol is canceled—we could still support worthy PUNR candidates at the second ballot in certain localities, if none of our members are facing them. The breakup of the protocol between the PDSR and PUNR does not automatically create an antagonistic attitude. To answer your question more exactly, we did not embark upon this course to change the electorate's options. We are trying, and generally succeed in sticking to our principles. The reason for which we initiated this action has nothing to do with any frivolous approach, such as attracting 2 or 3 percent of the votes from the other side. We believe that the interests of the voters should be observed and, if by breaking the protocol, we will also induce a change in their electoral choice, that is the electorate's problem. Anyhow, we did not start this action out of a sense of mercantilism at the expense of the electorate's interests.

[Juganaru] I do not think that drawing the electorate to your side is equivalent to frivolity or mercantilism, but rather it is the way to get to the stakes of the "game."

[Gherman] Of course, we are not talking about frivolity here. This is not the motive or the driving force behind our action. If we manage to attract part of the electorate through this action, then it is all for the better. However, this was not the reason behind our action.

[Juganaru] Weren't you thinking of the possibility of attracting part of the electorate from Transylvania when you canceled the protocols with the two leftist parties?

[Gherman] No, we believe that the main thing for our party is to center its activity around the party program, not around some small maneuvers behind the scenes.

Romania: Daily Warns of Moldovan Secret Service Disinformation

AU2805192296 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 23 May 96 p 3

[Article by Mihai Vicol: "Secret Agents From Chisinau Are Intoxicating the Romanian Press"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a telephone conversation on 28 May 1996 with a former officer of the Intelligence Service from Chisinau, we learn that the institution has a special section dealing with the Romanian press and supplying it with false information. It was members of that special section who in 1994 entered the dwelling of Victor Bucataru, the man who was poised to open an independent television station (in the Republic of Moldova). Three days before the official opening of the station, the members of that ministry entered Victor Bucataru's dwelling and stole all the equipment. To this day, the perpetrators have not been found, despite the fact that an official inquiry has been opened. The same fate should have been shared by the BASA-press independent agency, but on the respective night the "burglars" were surprised to find two journalists in the target room. Therefore, they had to abort their mission. We were also told that the cessation of the activity of the CATALAN independent television station was also contrived by Minister Vasile Calmoi [minister of national security of the Republic of Moldova], at the request of Prime Minister [of the Republic of Moldova] Andrei Sangheli, who does not tolerate any kind of competition. There is an informative note of the government which demands that pressure be applied on that station to remove any competition for the Chisinau national television station.

We were warned by our source that "many false rumors by the Russians have penetrated Romania. It is a pity that two big Bucharest newspapers fell into the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

trap set by the KGB agents. The respective newspapers published several items that do great disservice to the Romanian nation and to the independent Moldovan state. For instance, one of the newspapers even published the news that Ilie Ilascu is a KGB agent, something which stirred things up among the pro-Russians in Chisinau, who actually brought the paper with the respective material into the Moldovan parliament and made a big hullabaloo about it all. We hope that the respective newspaper will retract that big lie about a great Romanian patriot."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovenia: Watts 'Concurs With' Slovene Stance on SFRY Division

AU2905091696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0500 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The most important thing at the moment is to embark on the division of assets of the former Yugoslavia and the resolution of those issues on which all sides can reach a consensus, Miran Mejak, chief of the Slovene negotiating team, stated after yesterday's talks with Arthur Watts, international envoy for the legal division of the former SFRY.

According to Mejak, the question on which the successors could reach an agreement was the division of the foreign currency reserves of the former National Bank of Yugoslavia frozen abroad, the diplomatic missions, and the clearing accounts' state of accounts.

Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ignac Golob assessed after the talks with Watts that a successful solution of the succession issue would also help the stabilization of the territory of the former Yugoslavia. He repeated that FRY could not make its participation in the negotiations conditional on the recognition of its continuity.

Watts concurs with Slovenia's views. He left Ljubljana for the talks in Skopje, Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Belgrade.

Slovenia: EU Associate Membership Feared To Become Casualty

AU2905083296 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0500 GMT 29 May 96

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Luxembourg—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even if one could now—with a healthy dose of skepticism—perhaps buy the theory that Rome is really willing to lift the veto on our EU associate membership in Luxembourg, it would nevertheless pay to remain cautious. Namely, it cannot be ruled out that London will undermine Ljubljana's optimistic scenario on 10 June, when the Union's foreign ministers are expected to finally signal the green light for Slovenia.

The British representatives in Brussels today remained diplomatically vague regarding questions as to whether Slovenia could become the mad cow casualty in Luxembourg. They repeated a principled stance that until the lifting of the partial ban on the British beef London will consistently block all EU political decisions that require a consensus.

According to the reports here, the permanent representatives of the Fifteen who are preparing the agenda for the foreign ministers' meeting will not discuss Slovenia this week. A pessimistic interpretation of this could mean that the case of Slovenia has started to slide dangerously to the side, making way for more important topics to be discussed by the foreign ministers. The optimistic interpretation has it that nothing has been missed yet as the permanent representatives will meet again next week, after the meeting of the EU ministers on the lifting of the British beef ban.

The answer as to whether Slovenia will secure the signing of the agreement on 10 June—on the assumption that Rome will not again require additional explanations by Ljubljana—will, therefore, be given by the EU agricultural ministers in Luxembourg on Monday. If the EU embargo on British beef is partially lifted we can also hope for the support of the British foreign secretary a week later. The estimates here believe that the chances for the lifting of the ban are realistic; however, nobody wishes to venture into any definitive assessments.

Slovenia: Privatization To Be Finished by End of Year

AU2805123796 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 15 May 96 p 9

[Article by Igor Brstovsek: "Privatization will be Accelerated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 15 May—Even those in the Agency for Restructuring and Privatization believe that privatization is finally coming to an end. Despite this there still are a few problems which have prompted the Agency to resolve to take decisive steps. This is due to the fact that the time limit for redeeming the certificates will irrevocably run out on 30 September.

As Agency director Mira Puc has said, the Agency has examined all those companies that have not yet received the secondary consent on the realization of ownership reorganization and divided them into three groups. The most problematic is the first group of companies, which do not even have primary consent. This group consists of 318 companies, the programs for which have not received approval from the Agency, and 13 companies, which will be shifted to the Development Fund of the Republic of Slovenia. The reasons for the delays are various. After examining these companies, the Agency found that some of them will not be privatized through certificates, some will file for bankruptcy or be liquidated, some are not at all in a hurry and are not cooperating, and some would like to carry out the privatization, but cannot for various reasons.

At the Agency we were also told that the time limit for these companies to receive primary consent is 15 July if there is to be an advertisement for the certificates and

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

their use. The companies that do not wish to participate in the privatization will be reformed by the Agency itself. The Agency will do this by transferring 60 percent of the company's shares to the Development Fund and the remaining 40 percent to other funds. In exceptional cases, and if the employees of the companies will agree, the Agency will carry out an internal distribution and an internal purchase [odkup].

Those companies that would like to carry out the privatization but cannot get the primary consent represent an even greater problem. The first reason for this is the unsettled situation of the land and forests, which have not been transferred to a corresponding fund. Because of this the Agency does not know the extent of social capital in these companies. The second reason is unsettled relations with denationalized entitled persons [upravicenec].

In the first instance the Agency will find the corresponding state bodies, and in the second instance it will begin negotiating with the entitled persons.

The second group of companies need the secondary consent, and these companies are, according to the Agency, not as problematic (except those cases where similar problems to the aforementioned ones exist), since they too would like to accelerate the privatization. The third group is also problematic. These are the companies that have already received the primary consent, but have not yet begun carrying out the program, or where the program has come to a standstill.

The Agency representatives also said that the privatization was slow for numerous reasons, but that they had decided to accelerate it. For this reason, they will carry out the approved programs themselves. They will sell those companies that do not have approved programs to PIDs [authorized investment funds], and disobedient companies will be liquidated. The Agency has decided to carry out the entire privatization plan by the end of this year, and they will need extra funding to do so. Nevertheless, 1,135 ownership reorganization programs have been approved until now, 318 are being worked on, and 31 have been shifted to the Development Fund. There have been 588 secondary consents, and 110 are being worked on.

The Agency for Restructuring and Privatization yesterday also announced its calculation for the privatization gap. According to its calculations, the gap is SIT [Slovene Tolar] 136 billion "wide," which is close to the amount that the administering societies had been mentioning in their calculations. The reasons for the decrease in the value of the social capital are: the exclusion of the farming areas and forests, the denationalization of real estate in the Triglav national park area, the denationalization of buildings and equipment according to the law on economic public services, losses, free-of-charge transfer of funds to municipalities, and the forming of long-term reserves. They have also found reasons that the privatization gap has decreased, and these include the revaluation of opening balances, the change in methodology, and the halting of the depletion of social assets.

Slovenia: Law on Audit Agency Declared Constitutional

AU2805122296 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 18 May 96 p 4

[Article by Katarina Fidermuc: "End of Uncertainty Regarding APPNI"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 16 May—The constitutional court has, on the initiative of the Agency for Audit and Payment Operations, and Information [APPNI] and those employed by it, issued a judgment on whether changing of the law on APPNI is constitutional or not. The law was passed by parliament in October last year, and with it parliament announced the separation of the currently united agency into an audit agency and an agency for payment operations. At the beginning of December, the constitutional court decided that most of the law could not be implemented until it was declared constitutional. In the middle of February the court held a public discussion, and it has now decided that the law is not in opposition to the constitution.

The constitutional court first had to find out whether the establishment of the audit agency was in conflict with the constitution. Moreover, it was evaluating whether the agency's authority for auditing, which is set by law, is such that it is possible for it to continue and complete the audits without trouble. On the initiative of those employed by APPNI, the constitutional court had to evaluate whether the right to work and employment were guaranteed to them at the time of the reorganization or not, that is, rights resulting from a work association. The law on the separation of the agency in fact says that those employed in the area of the auditing the ownership of companies, would, with the establishment of the audit agency, become the employees of that institution. Moreover, the law guarantees them employment in the tax department after completion of the audits. The constitutional court found no inconsistencies with the constitution in any of the mentioned cases. It judged that the reorganization of the agency will not disable the audits. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

An Audit Agency in August

There are thus now no obstacles to separating the institution into an audit agency and an agency for payment operations. However, the law that was passed last fall has set time limits that have become absurd since the proceedings regarding whether the law is constitutional or not. The establishment of the audit agency had been foreseen for 1 January this year. The constitutional court examined these inconsistencies and decided that its decision would be valid as of the 75th day after it is published in the official gazette. That is the approximate time that would pass between the time of the validation of the law and the beginning of the audit agency's operations, even if there were no proceedings at the constitutional court. The agency will take over the audits as well as those employees of the current agency, who will at that time be working on audits. The agency will report on the completed audits to the state council every three months, and once a year it will report on its own work. The funds for the operations of the agency will be set by the state council upon the suggestion of the agency, and these funds will be a part of the state budget. After the 75-day time limit, the agency for payment operations will become a public institution which will be responsible to the government for its operations. This means that the government will name the director general and his deputy, and it will also give its approval to the agency's tariffs and its financial plan.

[Box, p 4]

The Bank of Slovenia had been waiting for the constitutional court's decision because of the reform of the payment system. This is because it will now also be possible for banks to perform payment operations. The conditions that the banks will have to fulfill in order to perform these operations will be set by the Bank of Slovenia and the minister of finance. According to the law, this should have been done by 1 January of this year, and the constitutional court has in this case also set a 75-day time limit.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Federal

FRY: Belgrade Does Not Want IMF Membership Interrupted

LD2905095596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0907 GMT 29 May 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 29 (TANJUG)—The head of the Yugoslav government team for negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Oskar Kovac said Tuesday Yugoslavia would find a way to restore its membership in the IMF.

'Yugoslavia is one of the founders of the IMF and we do not want its membership to be interrupted for a single day,' Kovac told REUTERS.

The government invited IMF experts to visit Belgrade at the end of May or early June but has not received an answer yet.

Kovac said the future talks with the IMF should be conducted only on economic aspects of Yugoslavia's membership because the issue of who should inherit the former Yugoslavia was in the competence of the United Nations not of the Fund.

'There is no need to discuss with the IMF whether Yugoslavia is recognised or not, whether it is a U.N. member or not. Switzerland is not a U.N. member but is a member of the IMF,' Kovac said.

Belgrade will try to convince the IMF to accept that Yugoslavia has assumed all economic obligations for regulating its membership in the fund, Kovac said.

FRY: FRY, Russian Deputies Urge Aid for Bosnia

LD2805181096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1430 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 28 (TANJUG)—The chairmen of the defense and security boards of the Yugoslav and Russian Parliaments, Radmilo Bogdanovic and Aleksandr Ivanovich Ryabov said here Tuesday that Bosnia needs more material aid to remove the effects of the war and secure the return of the refugees.

Ryabov, who headed a delegation of Russian parliamentarians touring the Russian troops within the international peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and the Srem-Baranja region, said they are carrying out all tasks successfully.

Bogdanovic and Ryabov also discussed the activities of their parliament's defense and security boards primarily in the legal sphere, the Yugoslav parliament's press service said.

FRY: 'Anonymous' Terrorism in Kosovo Reported

96BA0279A Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian 6 May 96 pp 12-13

[Article by Milos Djordjevic: "The Beginning of Anonymous Terrorism?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Never before now, not even at the height of the fiercest and largest demonstrations of Albanians, has there been such a danger of a conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija as last week. The murder of a university student, the Albanian Armend Daci (the murderer was a Serb), and then a series of four attacks on Serbs and law enforcement agencies (five Serbs were killed and four wounded)—have resulted in such tension as to demonstrate once again how little it takes to ignite the powder keg here.

What actually did happen? Here is a chronology of the events.

On the night between Monday and Tuesday five Serbs were killed and four seriously wounded in terrorist attacks on a restaurant and police during an interval of 45 minutes in Decani, Stimlje, Pec, and Kosovska Mitrovica.

Stana Radusinovic, a refugee from Albania, Blagoje Okulic, a refugee from Knin Krajina, and Djordje Dragic of Bolec near Belgrade, were killed in Decani.

The policeman Milenko Bucic was killed in Stimlje, and Dragana Nesic of Pristina in Kosovska Mitrovica. A police patrol was taking the latter to serve a prison sentence. In the terrorist attacks on the Serbs in those four towns, Safet Kocan, a policeman from Vitomirica near Pec, and Zoran Dasic of Gordevac near Pec were wounded. Ranko Bibic, a refugee from Krajina, and another policeman were seriously wounded in Decani.

The Murder of the University Student Daci: The Serbian Version and the Albanian Version

Some of the witnesses to the events described to us what happened and how. In Decani, an automatic weapon was fired from the entrance into a restaurant full of patrons, and an antipersonnel bomb was thrown in through a window. The attack on the police patrol in Pec occurred in front of the railroad station, and the patrol was fired on by people on the run. In Stimlje, a policeman was attacked in front of the police station. In Sipolje, which is near Kosovska Mitrovica, a "Stojadin," property of the police, was fired on; inside were two policemen and

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

two women (one was killed) whom they were taking to serve a prison sentence.

And that is all the testimony from witnesses and the facts which to that point are not in dispute. The killings and woundings of the Serbs followed an event which the authorities were quiet about and played down. This was the murder of Armend Daci, a university student. The killer, a Serb who recently killed an Albanian with a vehicle and whose child two years ago killed the son of Zoran Pavlovic, his neighbor, by accident, fired on Daci from a range of 10 meters and killed him.

The Serbs have accepted a version of this event that the automobile of Jovanovic, the murderer, had been broken into several times, that he had informed the police of this, and that he had threatened to kill anyone he caught red-handed. That is, in fact, what happened. When the burglars were around the car, he pulled out his pistol and killed one of them.

But the Albanians have accepted this version: With a sniper rifle at a range of 65 meters, the Serb, an "emigre from Croatia," killed the young Albanian who was walking home some friends from a birthday party!

Without getting into a judgment as to where the truth lies (the police should have something to say about this, because an event of this nature could have serious consequences), it is obvious that the stories are colored either to minimize the event (the Serbian version) or to heat it up and give it a political coloring all the way to explosion (the Albanian version).

And this gives rise to the reason why many analysts associate the killing of the Serbs and the wounding of the Serbs with the murder of the student Daci in Decani.

Minimizing Conflicts, but There Is Fear Everywhere

"A masked terrorist burst into the 'Cakor,' a Serbian restaurant, and fired. It is a wonder he did not kill us all. There were about a dozen customers in the restaurant. The attack was carried out like lightning. There were several attackers. I am convinced that this was a terrorist attack by Albanian separatists. They are bothered by us few Serbs and these hundred or so refugees," said Danilo Stesevic, the restaurant-owner, and he added: "Their aim is to frighten us and get us to move away. Neither I nor any of my people were on bad terms with the Albanians."

And then come two versions interpreting the causes and consequences of the bloody night in Kosovo and Metohija. The stories are circulating while the police maintain silence.

"Blood vengeance has been transformed into terrorism. These events are an example of how a random incident (a Serb killed an Albanian, although he did not know who it was) can turn into a conflict with broad dimensions. The connection is obvious between the killing of the university student and the series of terrorist events. The killings of Serbs in Decani, which is where the murdered student was from, are directly connected. Those murders and woundings are evidence that blood vengeance (customary law among Albanians) has turned into terrorism.

"At the same time, the series of terrorist acts indicates that the terrorists are looking for even the slightest pretext to ignite conflicts in Kosovo and Metohija. But this does not suit a majority of Albanians, and I personally have become convinced of their fear. Nor is it any better with the Serbs," says Dr. Milorad Jevric, people's deputy from Kosovo and Metohija. He also observed that once again the authorities have attributed minimum significance and response to terrorist acts in which five people were killed. On the other hand, the throwing of the explosive device on the mosque in Belgrade had all the presses humming, Dr. Jevric said.

The events in which five Serbs were killed, more than ever before in the rebellions of separatists in Kosovo and Metohija, are assessed among the Serbs in the context of the census being taken of refugees. Zika Patric, a former policeman who at one time was on the commission for preventing Serbs from moving out, said tersely: "The attacks have only one objective—to intimidate the Serbs and refugees in Kosovo and Metohija, to send the message that they dare not circle the answer which indicates that they would like to stay here."

Although the first reactions among the Albanians and their political leaders and parties preclude any connection between the murder of the student and the series of attacks on the Serbs, they respond, however, unanimously to the Serbian argument that this is revenge: "The murder in Decani (which is most iniquitous), is not revenge for the killing of the student Daci. If anything, it is perhaps related to the murder of two Albanians three months ago (in January) committed by refugees from Albania. They attacked an Albanian family at that time."

These two versions of causes and consequences or of conditions and pretexts for terrorist attacks on Serbs also clearly indicate how complicated the political-security situation is, to use the old vocabulary. But the Serbs view terrorism in Kosovo also through the prism of absolutely erroneous assessments and estimates of the authorities. Just a week before that, the authorities were boasting that the police had removed their bulletproof

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

vests! A still more serious fact is that the government, in spite of the large police forces, obviously has no proof of the existence of terrorist groups. If it knew something about all this, it would not be refusing to make statements to the public, and everything would not be reduced to detaining Albanians. So far, about 80 Albanians (according to Albanian sources) have been detained.

Although for two days we were seeking a statement from Zivorad Igic, people's deputy and member of the Defense and Security Committee of the Assembly of the FRY, all he was able to say aside from referring to the statement made to TANJUG, which even on his admission is unsatisfactory, comes down to the people in positions of responsibility telling him that "they have no information" and "we do not know anything." He also made the statement that terrorism is linked to the "Zurich connection." We were unable to learn what that was.

Whose Terrorism Is It?

And while among the Serbs confusion prevails amid suppositions that it is a case of vengeance, of actions organized from one center, of terrorism directed by the "Front for National Liberation of Kosovo," which has taken responsibility for the recent attacks on five refugee centers all over Kosovo, among the Albanians the murder of the student and the murder of the Serbs are being used as evidence that the international community should take the matter in its own hands. The first press release of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK] says that the peaceful policy is the greatest result of the national movement of Albanians and should be followed. Adhering to that, Fehmi Agani expressed assurance in a statement for SRPSKA REC that he personally believes that this time neither the government nor the DSK is behind the terrorism. But there are radical elements in both nationalities. In response to our query of whether he thinks that once again these were Serbs (as in the case of the attack on the refugee centers), Agani says that he cannot assert that, but it is obvious that the authorities have a tolerant attitude toward attacks on Albanians.

"This horrified the Albanians. They are speaking out of a gut feeling. It was all we could do to prevent them from demonstrating (after the student was killed)," Agani said, disclosing a significant fact which illustrates how inflammable relations are between the nationalities in Kosovo and Metohija.

Hidajet Hiseni, another vice president of the DSK, made a recent statement in a press conference (on Friday) in which he called upon Serbs and Albanians to be sensible and not allow themselves to be drawn into the dangerous trap of interethnic conflicts.

By contrast with the first reaction of Ibrahim Rugova [prime minister of Kosovo Albanian shadow government], who, while cautious, said that the killing of the Serbs was done by Serbs (!) and that the "patience of Albanians could not last indefinitely," and the international community should do something urgently "to resolve the Kosovo issue," there has been more political and pedagogical tact in the recent reaction of the DSK. Perhaps that tempers the harsh and exclusive position of Bujar Bukosi, "prime minister of Kosovo," who issued a statement in London: "Those are provocations, there is no terrorism in Kosovo. The assertions of the local MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] are nothing new to us. There is no terrorism on the part of the Albanians in Kosovo, there are no armed units, and there are no weapons (!?). What is happening in Kosovo is Serbian terrorism," Bukosi was explicit.

The only municipality (opstina) committee of the SPS which has so far spoken out is the one in Kosovo Polje, which said that this is "an impasse in which the Albanian separatist movement is trying to find a way out through conventional terrorism," opposing "inclusion of Albanians in the political life of Serbia."

The following statements also illustrate how the killing of the Albanian student has been politicized and how this is being associated with the killing of the five Serbs. Bosko Drobnjak, secretary for information and chief administrator of Kosovo Okrug, says that the series of attacks are conventional terrorism and that the killing of the student was an incident.

Sali Berisha, president of Albania, believes that the killings are "the work of Serbian ultranationalists" and he therefore calls upon Kosovo Albanians to be restrained, while Veton Suroi believes that there will be more violence this year both by the police and the Albanians, who will be "opposing the regime in Belgrade." By contrast with Agani and the Albanian-language press, which has politicized the killing of the student, Suroi sees something in the series of attacks which cannot "be isolated," and he says that there will be more such incidents. According to him, most Albanians do not support terrorism, but most of them think that the policy of nonviolence pursued by Ibrahim Rugova is not yielding results. Those who favor violence want to enter political life in that way, Suroi says.

The Post-Dayton Syndrome

In addition to the possibility of revenge and an outbreak of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, an analysis of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

recent events must also be mindful of the ongoing census being taken of refugees and the politicization of a killing (the Albanians say that the regime is setting the stage for repression) and the fact that the world and the European Community recognize the FRY. This is a fact which means to Albanians that their objective has not been achieved. It seems that Ibrahim Rugova is also well aware of this, when he says in an interview with the Belgian newspaper LE SOIR that recognition of Yugoslavia "is not constructive." After all, "if relations with Belgrade are normalized, this means that Serbia will become politically and economically stronger, and that could increase its aggressiveness in Kosovo. The process of normalization of relations," he concludes, "must unfailingly be linked to the promises of the Serbian authorities related to the Kosovo question."

Be that as it may, the past week in Kosovo and Metohija has been a "critical moment for peace." Everything that has happened indicates, as Adem Demaci says, "things are not clear, events have been politicized, and they are cloudy."

There are not enough data to draw a conclusion, because no one is taking responsibility. Does this mean that we must become accustomed to anonymous terrorism? That is the question put by Skeljzen Malici. After all, the police are unable to detect the perpetrators. But it is a fact that both the Serbian regime (JEDINSTVO, for example, the only Serbian-language newspaper in Pristina, has for now the third day said nothing about the killing of the five Serbs) and the DSK are keeping the matter in their own hands. Only if things of this nature continue could the situation become more tense. There have been similar actions in Skopje and Tirana, which suggests that the recent events are an expression of the "post-Dayton syndrome," suggesting that the direction of resolution of the "Kosovo question" is not to the liking of many people.

FRY: Serbian Extremists Implicated in Kosovo Events

96BA0279B Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian 6 May 96 p 14

[Interview with Azem Vlasi, lawyer and former politician, by Blagica M. Stojanovic; place and date not given: "It Could Be Anything"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stojanovic] There is much speculation built these days on the idea that the war in Bosnia is "moving" to Kosovo and that the most recent incidents are a confirmation of the argument because the war in Bosnia began with a single murder. What is your comment on that?

[Vlasi] There is nevertheless a difference between what has happened in Kosovo in recent days and what began in Bosnia. In Bosnia the beginning of the war was arranged by what was then the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], together with the official political structures of the Serbian side in Bosnia and with the support of the authorities in Belgrade. What has happened in Kosovo, unfortunately, still has not been altogether brought to light, but everything suggests that the official Serbian government was not behind this, nor was it an act by Albanians. It certainly would be best for the competent authorities, in the interest of peace in Kosovo and of our jointly sparing ourselves a great tragedy, to clarify what all this was. You recall that recently there were several synchronized explosions, without casualties to be sure, in several refugee centers, and that representatives of the official Serbian government said that this was not the work of Albanians. Now something similar is happening, and much of this suggests the involvement of those extremist Serbian forces which have been misusing the misfortune of the Serbian refugees who have come from the Serbian Krajina in Croatia and have settled here in Kosovo.

[Stojanovic] Which of those "extremist forces?" Who is behind them? Arkan, Seselj, who?

[Vlasi] I am referring to the radicals who, obviously taking advantage of what happened last year to the Serbs in Croatia, exploiting the Serbian refugees and their dissatisfaction, now want to work directly to destabilize the present regime, and they are saying: Here, after everything the policy of the present government has done, all the defeats it has experienced in Croatia and in Bosnia, and in Kosovo, this government and this regime are beginning to take hits.

[Stojanovic] There is a published report that so far 12 people suspected of these terrorist acts have been arrested. Do you know from your sources as a lawyer who those people are?

[Vlasi] I have no specific information, but I have learned that people have been arrested, but arrested at random, for preventive reasons, so that the investigation would be more effective, but all of it has been done without specific evidence. I have heard from other sources that in Decani and Pec this was done by certain Serbian refugees, but I still have not been able to verify reliably the first reports.

[Stojanovic] What interest would the Serbs have in starting a military conflict with the Albanians?

[Vlasi] There are very diverse opinions concerning Kosovo in the Serbian public and Serbian politics. The official government and regime believe that this

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

kind of situation is fine, that it should be kept under control this way and this apparent peace preserved, while you also have that radical, extremist faction which some time ago spoke out through the so-called Serbian Resistance Movement in Kosovo, who think that the situation instituted in Kosovo in 1989 when autonomy was revoked is a provisional situation, that the goal of a Serbian Kosovo and its Serbianization was not achieved, and they would like to push and compel this regime to take radical steps. They see war as their chance, and they think that in that way they will be able to settle accounts with the Albanians. This is an illusion and a very stupid idea, because those are the same aims held at one time in those parts of Croatia from which the Serbs came, there was also that kind of radicalism concerning Bosnia, and it has become evident that any radicalism which advocates total confrontation of the Serbian people with other peoples can generate consequences for both sides, which means for the Serbian side as well.

[Stojanovic] Is what has happened in recent days one of the preventive measures to prevent the return to Kosovo of Albanians who had asylum in Germany?

[Vlasi] That could be, it could be anything, it could be an attempt to prevent efforts of the international community to finally, after Bosnia, after Dayton and Paris, get some kind of reasonable political dialogue going in order to find a political solution to the Kosovo question.

[Stojanovic] It is believed here that this conflict better suits the Albanians than the Serbs because it is well known that we have lost all the wars we began and our reputation in the world is not worth much. This would be an opportunity for the Albanians in Kosovo to arrive more rapidly at the "Republic of Kosovo."

[Vlasi] That is not the official policy and orientation of those who are now speaking and acting as political officials on behalf of the Albanians, and that means Rugova. That is, the Albanians still believe that without great upheavals and without armed conflicts, by political means, they can arrive at a solution that would be fair, and that means a solution that suits Albanians. Accordingly, why arrange a conflict and cause unnecessary casualties in order to obtain something which can be obtained anywhere through a political process. After all, as you see, this present Serbian regime, which began all of this back somewhere around 89/90, has been unsuccessful in what it wanted to achieve by force. So, it has experienced a military defeat, and it cannot achieve success on the political plane either.

[Stojanovic] Are you involved in any political party? There is talk that you have received offers from JUL [Yugoslav United Left], is that true?

[Vlasi] I have not received any official offers from JUL, or from other political parties and structures. I am politically active to some extent, I have occasions to state my opinion and make suggestions of how to get out of the present crisis; so, I am not politically indifferent and uninvolved. Nevertheless, it is my choice to stay formally outside the existing political parties, because it seems to me that all of that is unproductive involvement. The problem we face in Kosovo, the problem of Albanian-Serbian relations and disputes, is a question which goes beyond the competence of existing political parties and indeed even regimes!

Serbia

Serbia: Karadzic 'Not Seen' at Meeting With Milosevic

AU2805180696 Paris AFP in English 1733 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, May 28 (AFP)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic met two senior Bosnian Serb officials in Belgrade on Tuesday, but the reported presence of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic was not confirmed.

Momcilo Krajisnik, the Bosnian Serb parliament speaker, and Biljana Plavsic, the vice president of the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic]—the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina—left the Serbian presidency building about 4:40 p.m. (1440 GMT), four hours after they arrived.

Journalists were prevented from approaching them by Serbian officials. Karadzic, who was reported to be attending the meeting by the Serbian news agency BETA, was not seen.

BETA had said that the three arrived in Belgrade on Monday, and that Milosevic was meeting them Tuesday in a bid to persuade Karadzic to relinquish power.

Karadzic has been indicted by the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague for genocide and crimes against humanity for his role in the war in Bosnia. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Serbia: Interest Asserted in All Forms of Economic Cooperation

LD2905115596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1046 GMT 29 May 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, May 29 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Republic of Serbia is interested in all forms of cooperation with foreign economic partners because that is the only way to secure investments of 1.5 billion dollars annually that are needed for its development.

President of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce Vlajko Stoiljkovic said to foreign reporters in Novi Sad on Tuesday that Yugoslavia recognized its foreign debt, which would be repaid in the coming period, but that economic recovery was the only way to ensure that it was done.

That is why we need debt re-scheduling and an inflow of foreign capital, Stoiljkovic said.

He said the disintegration of the former Yugoslav market and the economic blockade of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had impoverished the economy and reduced its gross domestic product to barely 1,400 dollars per capita.

In the period after the suspension of the embargo, one of the priorities is to normalize relations with the world trade organization and international financial institutions, the Chamber of Commerce president said.

Yugoslavia will therefore pursue a policy of economic stabilization aimed primarily to maintain stable prices and the national currency, he said.

The country's foreign trade is currently under review. Liberalization of exports is now 95 percent and of imports 88 percent, Stoiljkovic said.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Yugoslav Left Party Holds First News Conference

LD2805222796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1117 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 28 May (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Left (JUL) organizations have so far been set up in 17 out of 21 municipalities in Montenegro, it was announced at today's news conference—the first to be held by this political movement in the republic.

Svetozar Simovic, a member of the JUL main committee, told journalists that JUL in Montenegro, its official name in this republic, was registered two weeks ago.

JUL members include: the republic's branch of the League of Communists—movement for Yugoslavia [SKPJ], the Ecological Movement of Montenegro, and, Simovic stressed, a large part of the membership of Dr. Vidak Vujacic's Social Democratic Party (SDS).

According to figures produced at the news conference, JUL has about 8,000 members in Montenegro.

Asked about JUL's standpoint in connection with the recent departure of the SDS of Montenegro from JUL because of its treatment of Montenegro as a region, Simovic replied that this move had "no basis in fact."

The idea that Montenegro is a region is not the political standpoint of JUL, nor a basis on which JUL operates. JUL respects Montenegro as a state with all the rights of a state and its equal status in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Simovic said. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.